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NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL: COMPARISON,
ANALYSIS, AND BEST PRACTICE CLAUSES
MARTIN J. GREENBERG* & BRYAN M. WARD*
I. INTRODUCTION
Franchise relocation in Major League Baseball (MLB) has been, at times,
a common occurrence. In the twenty-year period between 1953 and 1972, ten
MLB teams changed their home cities.
* 1953 - the Boston Braves relocated to Milwaukee;
* 1954 - the St. Louis Browns relocated to Baltimore, becoming
the Baltimore Orioles; 2
* 1955 - the Philadelphia Athletics relocated to Kansas City;3
* 1958 - the Brooklyn Dodgers relocated to Los Angeles; 4
* 1958 - the New York Giants relocated to San Francisco;5
* Martin J. Greenberg is managing member of the Law Office of Martin J. Greenberg, member of
Southeast Wisconsin Professional Baseball Park District, member of National Sports Law Institute
Board of Advisors, adjunct professor of law at Marquette University Law School, and has written
The Stadium Game, Sports Law Practice, and $port$Biz.
** Bryan M. Ward is an associate at Bailes, Craig & Yon in Huntington, WV, and a 2010 cum
laude graduate of Marquette Law School.
1. Braves Timeline, http://atlanta.braves.mlb.com/atl/history/timeline2.jsp (last visited Nov. 4,
2010). The relocation year listed above is the year that the team played its first home game in the
new city. The Braves' move to Milwaukee in 1953 was the first MLB relocation in fifty years; in
1903 the Baltimore Orioles relocated to New York City, becoming first the New York Highlanders
and later the New York Yankees. Yankees Timeline, http://newyork.yankees.mlb.com/nyy/history/
timelinel.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
2. Orioles Timeline, http://baltimore.orioles.mlb.com/bal/history/timelineljsp (last visited Nov.
4, 2010).
3. Athletics Timeline, http://oakland.athletics.mlb.com/oak/history/timeline3jsp (last visited Nov.
4,2010).
4. Dodgers Timeline, http://losangeles.dodgers.mlb.com/la/history/timeline07.jsp (last visited
Nov. 4, 2010).
5. Giants Timeline, http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com/sf/history/timeline7.jsp (last visited Nov.
4, 2010). These were the first major league teams on the West Coast; the teams moved
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* 1961 - the Washington Senators relocated to Minneapolis-St.
Paul, becoming the Minnesota Twins; 6
* 1966 - the Milwaukee Braves relocated to Atlanta;7
* 1968 - the Kansas City Athletics relocated to Oakland;8
* 1970 - the Seattle Pilots relocated to Milwaukee, becoming the
Milwaukee Brewers;9
* 1972 - the Washington Senators relocated to Arlington, Texas,
becoming the Texas Rangers. 10
To contrast, in the thirty-eight years since 1972, only one MLB franchise
has relocated." A portion of the credit for this increased franchise stability
can be assigned to the emergence of "non-relocation agreements" between
MLB franchises and the cities they call home.12 This article will track the
evolution of these agreements, outline the typical covenants within, and
identify possible "best practice" clauses within current agreements that
provide the greatest protection for a city that wishes to keep its resident MLB
franchise from moving to another site.
II. THE APPEARANCE AND PROLIFERATION OF NON-RELOCATION COVENANTS
Non-relocation covenants first appeared in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In 1988, the Chicago White Sox (White Sox) entered into a lease agreement
with the Illinois Sports Facility Authority (Authority).' 3 In Article 26 of the
Lease Agreement, "Transfer of Franchise," the White Sox acknowledged that
simultaneously to facilitate travel for other NL teams.
6. Twins Timeline, http://minnesota.twins.mlb.com/min/history/timelineljsp (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
7. Braves Timeline, supra note 1.
8. Athletics Timeline, supra note 3.
9. Brewers Timeline, http://milwaukee.brewers.mlb.com/mil/history/timelinel.jsp (last visited
Nov. 4, 2010). The Pilots were a one-year-old expansion team at the time of their move, and this
made the move controversial. Most leagues since then have made a ruling that expansion teams
cannot move until they are at least five years old.
10. Rangers Timeline, http://texas.rangers.mlb.com/tex/history/timeline2.jsp (last visited Nov. 4,
2010).
i1. After playing home games in 2003 and 2004 in both Montreal and San Juan, Puerto Rico, the
Montreal Expos, in 2005, relocated to Washington, D.C., becoming the Washington Nationals.
Nationals Timeline, http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/was/history/timeline4.jsp (last visited Nov.
4,2010).
12. "Home city" is a term of convenience that includes county, state, or any other entity such as a
stadium authority that built, owns, or operates an MLB stadium.
13. Management Agreement between Illinois Sports Facilities Authority and Chicago White Sox
§ 26.01 (1988) [hereinafter White Sox's Agreement].
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the Authority would be "irreparably harmed by the transfer of the [White Sox]
American League franchise to a location other than the Stadium during the
Term of this Agreement .... "14 Accordingly, the lease prohibits relocation of
the White Sox as long as the Authority is not in default.15
Section 26.01. Agreement by Team.
Authority does not have an adequate remedy at law for breach
of this entire article XXVI.
(b) Team shall not enter into any contract or agreement of any
kind to transfer the Team's franchise to a location other than
the Stadium ....
.... Team shall play all of its home games, home League
Championship games and home World Series games at the
Stadium.16
In the event the White Sox would violate the covenant, the Authority would be
entitled to seek and obtain an injunction to prevent the team from relocating.' 7
In 1992, the Baltimore Orioles (Orioles) and the Maryland Stadium
Authority (MSA) entered into a lease agreement that contains a non-relocation
- no-move clause.18 Article 20 of this lease states that the Orioles will not
relocate during the term of the lease, as consideration for construction of the
ballpark.19 The Orioles are also forbidden from relocating the team or playing
post-season games in any other location.20 The sale, assignment, or transfer of
the team is not permitted unless all of the obligations of the lease are assumed,
including the relocation prohibition. 21 The MSA may use any remedy
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 72-73.
18. Agreement Regarding Oriole Park at Camden Yards between The Maryland Stadium
Authority and The Orioles, Inc., Sept. 22, 1992, art. 20 (1992) [hereinafter Orioles' Agreement].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
2010] 9
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available at law or in equity, including specific performance, to enforce this
agreement. 22 Article 20, "No Relocation," states as follows:
In consideration of MSA's construction of the Ballpark,
during the Term of this Agreement, the ORIOLES shall not
permit the relocation of the Baltimore Orioles Major League
Baseball team from Baltimore, Maryland, or permit any of the
Championship Season or Post-Season Games to be played at
any location other than the Ballpark, unless the ORIOLES are
expressly permitted to do so by Section 8.14 (fire or other
casualty) or Article XVIII (Eminent Domain) of this
Agreement. This obligation of the ORIOLES shall not be
deemed or construed to be a waiver by the ORIOLES of any
generally applicable equitable rights, remedies or defenses in
the event that MSA attempts to secure the ORIOLES' specific
performance of, or otherwise attempts to enforce, the
ORIOLES' obligations under this Agreement. The ORIOLES
shall not permit any sale, assignment or other transfer of the
Baltimore Orioles unless the assignee is required to assume all
of the obligations of the ORIOLES under the Agreement. 23
Both the Orioles and White Sox lease agreements are still in effect.
Since 1992, twenty additional MLB teams have entered into either (1) a
stadium lease agreement containing non-relocation covenants 24 or (2) a
separate non-relocation agreement with the "stadium leasing authority," 25 be it
a city, county, state, or separately created stadium district.26 Currently,
twenty-two MLB franchises are contractually bound by non-relocation
covenants.27
Not coincidentally, the proliferation of non-relocation agreements
corresponds to the boom of new stadium construction for MLB teams-
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See chart infra Section VIII for a list of all teams bound by non-relocation covenants, in
either a stadium lease or a freestanding non-relocation agreement. The MLB franchises with non-
relocation covenants in their stadium leases are the Braves, Giants, Padres, Phillies, Pirates, Reds,
Rockies, A's, Indians, Mariners, Orioles, Royals, Tigers, Twins, and White Sox.
25. The MLB franchises that are currently bound by freestanding non-relocation agreements are
the Astros, Brewers, Cardinals, Marlins, Mets, Nationals, and Yankees.
26. For convenience, a stadium leasing authority of any type will be referred to hereinafter as the
"home city."
27. See chart infra Section VIII for a list of all teams bound by non-relocation covenants.
[Vol. 2 1:110
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publicly financed stadium construction and renovation drives the non-
relocation agreement by creating the need and the leverage to require franchise
commitment to a city. From 1986 to 2003, 77% of MLB teams received new
or substantially renovated facilities. 28 Since 2003, the Philadelphia Phillies,
San Diego Padres, St. Louis Cardinals, New York Mets, and New York
Yankees have opened new stadiums; the Minnesota Twins opened a new
stadium in 2010, and ground was broken on a new stadium for the Florida
Marlins in July 2009.29 Brand new, mostly publicly-financed stadiums have
become the norm for MLB teams. 30
28. Martin J. Greenberg & David Kleinmann, Please Don't Go: How the Twins Were Forced to
Play the 2002 Season in the Metrodome, FOR THE RECORD, July-Sept. 2002, at 5.
29. Ballpark Groundbreaking, http://florida.marlins.mlb.com/fla/ballpark/groundbreaking.jsp
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). For additional information, there is a webpage devoted to the ballpark
history of each MLB franchise on that team's MLB.com website.
30.
TEAM NAME STADIUM OPENING FACILITY COST % PUBLIC
NAME YEAR (MILLIONS) FINANCING
Florida Marlins New Marlins 2012 645 76
Ballpark
Minnesota Twins Target Field 2010 544 72
New York Mets Citi Field 2009 860 19
New York Yankees Yankee Stadium 2009 1,500 32
Washington Nationals Park 2008 611 100
Nationals
St. Louis Cardinals Busch Stadium 2006 365 12
Philadelphia Phillies Citizens Bank 2004 346 50
Park
San Diego Padres PETCO Park 2004 285 57
Cincinnati Reds Great American 2003 291 96
Ball Bark
Milwaukee Brewers Miller Park 2001 414 75
Pittsburgh Pirates PNC Park 2001 237 70
Detroit Tigers Comerica Park 2000 361 32
Houston Astros Minute Maid 2000 265 68
Park
San Francisco AT&T Park 2000 325 0
Giants
Seattle Mariners Safeco Field 1999 517 66
Arizona Chase Field 1998 354 67
Diamondbacks III_ I
Atlanta Braves Turner Field 1996 235 100
Colorado Rockies Coors Field 1995 215 75
2010] 11I
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With the appearance of these multi-hundred-million-dollar stadiums,
largely financed with public money, home cities began taking measures to
protect their investments. The home cities did so only because they could.
Undoubtedly, the home cities of professional sports franchises have always
desired to ensure that their teams not relocate.3 ' But, it is the team's desire for
the construction of a new, publicly financed stadium, however, that provides
the home city with the leverage needed to require the franchise to give
assurances of continued residence. Without this leverage, the home city has
no realistic hope of convincing a franchise to agree to non-relocation
covenants.
Therefore, non-relocation agreements have become part of the politics of
stadium approval. With the large amount of public contribution to the stadium
construction equation, politicians must be assured that the team will remain at
home for the duration of the lease or the term of the bonds. Politicians, in
turn, must assure the public-who will pay the largest portion of the stadium
cost through the imposition of a tax-that their investment will be protected
and the team will remain at home. Therefore, non-relocation agreements have
become the quid pro quo for public contribution.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin is a city that has experienced baseball relocations.
In 1953, the Boston Braves moved to Milwaukee. 32 In 1966, the Milwaukee
Cleveland Indians Progressive 1994 175 48
Field
Texas Rangers Rangers 1994 191 71
Ballpark at
Arlington
Baltimore Orioles Oriole Park at 1992 107 96
Camden Yards
Chicago White Sox U.S. Cellular 1991 167 100
Field
Tampa Bay Rays Tropicana Field 1990 138 100
Total Estimated Average Public
Cost (Millions) = Participation = 65%
9151
Source: National Sports Law Institute, Sports Facility Reports, NLSI, 2010, http://law.marquette.edu/
cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD-472.
31. Anecdotally, the mere mention of a professional sports franchise leaving or having left its
home city continues to evoke strong emotion from the jilted home city and its fans, from the Dodgers
leaving Brooklyn and Giants leaving Queens to, more recently, the Colts' departure from Baltimore,
the Browns' move from Cleveland, and the Raiders' former and possibly future moves around
California.
32. Braves Timeline, supra note 1.
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Braves moved to Atlanta.33 Finally, in 1970, a group of investors, led by now
commissioner Bud Selig, bought the Seattle Pilots out of bankruptcy, brought
them to Milwaukee, and named them the Milwaukee Brewers. 34 After thirty-
six years, the Selig family sold the Brewers to a group headed by Los Angeles
investor Mark Attanasio. 35 Of course, the issue of relocation was raised.
Then Brewers president Wendy Selig-Prieb said, "There is an ironclad lease
that fixes this franchise to this community and that has a 30-year lease that we
entered into." 36
With respect to Milwaukee relocation, MLB Commissioner Bud Selig also
said, "The sale of the Brewers means baseball fans in Milwaukee don't have to
worry about losing another team." 37 "Now they don't have to go through
what people went through in '64 and '65, when the Braves were leaving
Milwaukee." 38 "There is no question about it. So whatever the controversy
was about the ballpark or anything else, the Brewers are there. They're
secure, and they're a marvelous asset." 39
Governor Jim Doyle, who was the Attorney General during the
controversial period when the Brewers lobbied to build Miller Park, has said
that he had been advised that the lease was ironclad. 40 "I think people in
Wisconsin really, truly believed they were getting a [thirty-]year commitment,
and that's what I consider the team's commitment to be."4 1
III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
There are multiple policy reasons why a city would seek to contractually
ensure that its MLB team does not relocate, yet all derive from a simple
maxim-a professional sports franchise is a valuable and limited right. It is a
limited right because the franchise allotment, currently thirty teams, is
mandated and controlled by the governance of MLB. 42 Each major city in
North America competes for one, or at most two, of only thirty opportunities
33. Id.
34. Brewers Timeline, supra note 9.
35. Id.
36. Don Walker, A Tight Grip on Brewers, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 20, 2004, at 3C.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. M.L.B. CONST. art V. § 2(b)(1) (1921) (stating that a three-fourths approval vote of all clubs
is required for any MLB expansion or contraction).
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to be the home of an MLB franchise. 43 Accordingly, should a city's current
team decide to relocate, it is highly unlikely that a replacement franchise will
be available. And although MLB has, in the past, expanded the number of
franchises, 44 most recently, the league investigated, and nearly implemented,
league contraction-initiating a plan for a reduction in the number of MLB
teams to twenty-eight. 45 Certainly, then, an MLB expansion franchise to
replace a departed team cannot be relied upon or taken for granted. Because
of the limited supply of MLB franchises, a home city must take all available
43. The New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan areas
each currently host two MLB franchises. This of course further restricts the pool of available teams
for other cities that desire an MLB franchise.
44. There was a time when a city could reasonably believe that an MLB expansion franchise was
a possibility. Of the thirty current MLB franchises, fourteen came into existence from 1961-1998 as
a result of MLB expansion. See History of the Game, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlbistory/mlb-history-
teams.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL EXPANSION 1961-1998
TEAM YEAR FEE PAID (MILLIONS)
Los Angeles Angels 196 $2.1
Washington Senators 1961 $2.1
Houston Colt .45's 1962 $1.85
New York Mets 1962 $1.8
Kansas City Royals 1969 $5.5
San Diego Padres 969 5.5
Montreal Expos 1969 $5.5
Seattle Pilots 1969 $5.5
Seattle Mariners 1977 $6.25
Toronto Blue Jays* 1977 $7.0
Colorado Rockies 1993 $95
Florida Marlins 1993 $95
Arizona Diamondbacks 1998 $130
iampa Bay Devil Rays 1998 $130
45. See Paul Anderson, Recent Major League Baseball Contraction Cases, SPORTS FACILITY R.,
Spring 2002, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=474 (discussing 2001 MLB
plans to eliminate two teams for the 2002 season, reportedly the Twins and Expos, but also causing
enough concern in Florida for the Florida Attorney General to issue "civil investigative demands to
baseball, its Commissioner, the Florida Marlins and Tampa Bay Devil Rays"); see also Bill Madden,
A's, Marlins Could Be Goners as Contraction Looms, N.Y. DAILY NEWs, Feb. 28, 2009, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseballI2009/02/28/2009-02-28_asmarlins-couldbe-goners
as contractio.html (discussing contraction possibilities in the near future).
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measures to ensure that their home team remains where it is.
The value of an MLB franchise to its home city may be observed in a
variety of areas; some of this value is quantifiable, much is not. Generally, the
categories of value that a home city seeks to protect are: (1) capital investment
and expenditures by the home city to provide facilities for the team, (2)
economic benefits to the home city and surrounding area, and (3) intangible
and non-economic benefits to community citizens, including what has been
termed "psychic income." Each measure of value, whether expended by the
home city to provide for its team or received by the home city from its
association with its MLB team, provides an incentive for that city to seek
assurances that its team will remain, and perhaps most importantly, the home
city's expenditures provide justification for requiring the team to contractually
commit to its home city. Such incentives and justifications include the
following:
* Sports facilities and public infrastructures supporting sports
facilities that are paid for primarily with public tax dollars and the
public investment, which needs to be protected.
* Tax-exempt bonds at government rates are used to finance sports
facilities, and private sector recipients retain the economic
benefits of government credit.
* The statutory power of condemnation is often used to assemble
real estate parcels in order to create the stadium facility.
* The team receives the benefit of having to pay no real estate taxes
in that most stadium facilities are owned by some form of public
entity or District.
* The team in many instances maintains management control and
retains most of the revenues produced from the stadium, and the
quid pro quo therefore is a covenant to play all home games at the
stadium during the duration of the lease.
* A community suffers a direct economic loss if its team relocates.
* A community suffers the loss of intangible and non-economic
benefits (psychic income) if the team relocates.
With these factors in mind, the home city, before it agrees to expend
public assets on building a state-of-the-art facility, uses the leverage created by
the team's desire for a new stadium to bargain with the team for assurances, in
the form of a non-relocation agreement, that the team will remain with the
home city until the public investment can be "recovered" in the form of
economic benefit to the surrounding area or at least until the stadium lease
152010]
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expires. Regarding the concept of psychic income, a baseball franchise is a
community asset that is sometimes difficult to monetarily assess and may
provide to a community greater non-economic benefits than economic. The
value of the franchise is in its name, associated with its city, and its obligation
to retain its franchise in the community and play baseball games at the facility.
Psychic income can best be defined as having the benefit and prestige of a
team in a community and a quality of life that its citizenry enjoys by virtue of
a team playing in its community. Having an MLB team makes the community
major league.
The significance of psychic income has not been lost on the judiciary-in
a decision enforcing an earlier non-relocation agreement between New York
City and the Yankees, the presiding judge explained the significance of the
Yankees to New York:
The Yankee pinstripes belong to New York like Central Park,
like the Statue of Liberty, like the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, like the Metropolitan Opera, like the Stock Exchange,
like the lights of Broadway, etc. Collectively they are "The
Big Apple." Any loss represents a diminution of the quality
of life here, a blow to the city's standing at the top, however
narcissistic that perception may be. 46
It is of course debatable, and has been often debated, whether the
economic and non-economic benefits of an MLB franchise justify the
tremendous capital expenditures that are necessary to provide a modem
stadium for the team-whether having an MLB franchise is ultimately "worth
it." 47 This article will not enter into that debate. If due consideration is given
46. City of New York v. New York Yankees, 117 Misc. 2d 332, 336-37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
47. Bruce W. Burton & Matthew J. Mitten, New Remedies for Breach of Sports Facility Use
Agreements: Time for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L. REv. 809, 818-21 (2003); Martin J.
Greenberg, International Sports Law & Business in the 21st Century: Sports Facility Financing and
Development Trends in the United States, 15 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 93, 94-104, 118-20 (2004);
Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports Relocations from Private Law and Public
Policy Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need for a
Level Playing Field, 56 MD. L. REv. 57, 97-99 (1997). The only debate is whether building a
publicly financed stadium is worthwhile for the home city; there is no debate that it is extremely
valuable to the franchise.
16 [Vol. 2 1:1
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RECENT REPORTED PURCHASES OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAMS
TEAM YEAR REPORTED AMOUNT
Atlanta Braves 2007 $450 million
Chicago Cubs 2009 $845 million (includes Wrigley Field and a 25%
interest in CSN Chicago)
Milwaukee Brewers 2005 $223 million
Oakland Athletics 2005 $180 million
San Diego Padres 2009 $500 million
Washington Nationals 2006 $450 million
I-YR
CURRENT VALUE OPERATING
VALUE' CHANGE DEBT/VALUE REVENUES INCOME'
RANK TEAM ($MIL) (%) 2 (%) ($MIL) ($MIL)
1 New York Yankees 1,600 7 89 441 24.9
2 Boston Red Sox 870 4 28 266 40.0
3 New York Mets 858 -6 81 268 26.2
4 Los Angeles Dodgers 727 1 58 247 33.1
5 Chicago Cubs 726 4 80 246 25.5
6 Philadelphia Phillies 537 8 33 233 14.5
7 Los Angeles Angels of 521 2 7 217 12.0
Anaheim
8 St Louis Cardinals 488 0 56 195 12.8
9 San Francisco Giants 483 3 26 201 23.5
10 Chicago White Sox 466 3 9 194 26.4
11 Houston Astros 453 2 12 189 7.1
12 Texas Rangers 451 11 105 180 4.7
13 Atlanta Braves 450 1 0 188 1.5
14 Seattle Mariners 439 3 23 191 10.5
15 San Diego Padres 408 2 49 157 32.1
16 Minnesota Twins 405 14 25 162 25.0
17 Cleveland Indians 391 -2 28 170 10.1
18 Washington Nationals 387 -5 65 184 33.5
19 Colorado Rockies 384 3 21 183 20.1
20 Arizona 379 -3 38 172 -0.6
Diamondbacks
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to some of the more remote, and therefore less ascertainable, economic
benefits and to the intangible benefits and psychic income derived from their
investment, the question at the heart of this debate becomes unanswerable.
What is indisputable, however, is that large cities, and large numbers of their
citizens, believe that it is well worth the real and intangible expenditures in
order to reap the real and intangible benefits of being the home of a MLB
franchise.
Whatever the actual value of such benefits, whether economic or psychic,
the home city seeks to ensure that the relationship between the team and its
home city endures. Armed with the leverage created by its ability to spend
hundreds of millions of dollars on a new or renovated facility, and negotiating
with team owners who know that better facilities will increase franchise value,
the home city asks for assurances that their money will be well spent and
protected-that the team will play baseball in the new facility for a long, long
time. It is these assurances that comprise each non-relocation agreement.
Though certain covenants vary dramatically from agreement to agreement,
there is also much in common among the twenty non-relocation agreements
between MLB teams and their home cities. Each home city pursues
essentially the same goal-retention of the MLB franchise-and so covenants
prohibiting relocation, along with equitable remedies designed to force a team
to honor these covenants, are present in some form in all agreements. Some
non-relocation agreements, however, go beyond a narrow focus on the
singular goal of team retention and contain provisions designed to further
protect a home city from the economic harm that would result if the team
21 Baltimore Orioles 376 -6 40 171 19.4
22 Detroit Tigers 375 1 56 188 -29.5
23 Milwaukee Brewers 351 1 34 171 10.2
24 Kansas City Royals 341 9 15 155 8.9
25 Cincinnati Reds 331 -3 12 166 17.8
26 Toronto Blue Jays 326 -8 0 163 13.1
27 Florida Marlins 317 15 32 144 46.1
28 Tampa Bay Rays 316 -1 19 156 15.7
29 Oakland Athletics 295 -8 30 155 22.1
30 Pittsburgh Pirates 289 0 35 145 15.6
Source: The Business ofBaseball, FoRBES.COM, Apr. 7, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/33/
baseball-valuations-10_The-Business-Of-BaseballRank.html.
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relocated. Non-relocation agreements have evolved over time, becoming
increasingly prominent, specific, and flexible. And although the ultimate goal
of a home city is to keep its team within its borders, the best agreements will
acknowledge the possibility of a team-city split and include provisions to
protect the home city's economic interests if its team does relocate.
IV. TRADITIONAL NON-RELOCATION CLAUSES-BARE COVENANT
What follows are some of the most basic non-relocation covenants. Many
of these basic covenants were present in the earliest non-relocation
agreements, and some of the prohibitions and duties are included in every non-
relocation agreement-whether a standalone non-relocation contract or as a
series of non-relocation covenants incorporated into the team's stadium lease.
These covenants establish the basic obligations by which a team must abide.
A. Prohibition of Team Relocation
The covenant prohibiting team relocation represents the essence of the
non-relocation agreement. All other covenants are designed to ensure
compliance with this provision, and all remedies are designed either to compel
compliance with this provision or to mitigate the damage that team relocation
would cause. The Cleveland Indians' and Oakland Athletics' stadium leases
have typical clauses relative to the prohibition of team relocation:
ARTICLE XVI-Transfer of Franchise
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the
Lessee agrees as follows: (a) The Lessee shall not enter into
any contract or agreement of any kind to transfer the Lessee's
baseball franchise to a location other than the Baseball
Facility. 48
9.2-American League Franchise
. . . Except as authorized. . . , Licensee shall not permit or
cause to occur any event that may result in the transfer of its
Franchise or any of its Home Games to any other city or
48. Lease Agreement by and between Gateway Economic Development Corporation of Greater
Cleveland and Cleveland Indians Baseball Company Limited Partnership art. XVI(a) (1991)
[hereinafter Indians' Lease].
192010]
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location or do or fail to do anything which will cause its right
to play major league professional baseball in the Stadium to
be lost, impaired or transferred to any other city or location. 49
Of the twenty-two MLB teams that have non-relocation agreements that are
currently in effect, twenty-one are bound by a specific prohibition of team
transfer or relocation. 50
B. All Home Games to be Played at Home Stadium
The home city receives direct economic benefits primarily from the
eighty-one home games that each MLB team plays each season, with the
possibility of extra revenue from any playoff home games as well. A team
that plays any of these games at another location deprives the home city of
these direct economic benefits. Businesses in the area surrounding the
stadium, which often rely on the increased traffic on game days, also tend to
suffer economic loss if a home game is played elsewhere. Home playoff
games bring even more economic benefit to local businesses. Covenants to
play all team regular-season and playoff home games at the home stadium
protect these sources of economic benefit. Of the twenty-two currently active
MLB team non-relocation agreements, all twenty-two contain a covenant to
play team home games at the team's designated home stadium. The Detroit
Tigers' lease contains a typical clause:
Article 14-Relocation of Team
The Tigers shall, from and after the Commencement Date and
until the expiration of the Term, and subject to the provisions
of Article 10.1 of this Agreement, play all its regular season
home games and post-season home games (including without
limitation home games of Divisional and League
Championships and the World Series) for each season at Tiger
49. Lease by and between Oakland Athletics and Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum, Inc. § 9.2
(1995) [hereinafter A's Lease].
50. See chart infra Section VIII for a list of these teams. The Seattle Mariners lease does not
contain an explicit prohibition on relocation/transfer; however, the lease does include a requirement
that 90% of Mariners regular-season home games and 100% of Mariners home playoff games are
played in Safeco Field. See Ballpark Operations and Lease Agreement between the Washington State
Major League Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District and the Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P. § 14.1
(1996) [hereinafter Mariners' Lease].
20 [Vol. 2 1:1
MLB NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
Stadium.51
The non-relocation agreement for the new Yankee Stadium also contains
language typical of "home game" covenants, along with language that
contemplates the team's then-impending transfer to the newly constructed
Yankee Stadium.
2.1 Non-Relocation. The Partnership covenants and agrees as
follows:
2.1.1 Requirement to Play. Subject only to the exceptions
described. . . , it shall cause the Team to play all its Home
Games (a) in the Existing [Yankee] Stadium from the
Effective Date until the end of the Regular MLB Season
immediately preceding the First Season Commencement Date
and (b) in the [new Yankee] Stadium during each Regular
MLB Season from the First Season Commencement Date
through the Initial Term. 52
Generally, there are limited exceptions to this requirement, under which a
home game may be permitted at an alternate location. The first exception
covers situations in which a team's home stadium is unfit for use. In these
cases, a "force majeure" provision allows the team to play at an alternate
location while the home stadium is repaired. The second exception is an
allowance for the current MLB practice of exporting a few games each season
to selected foreign nations-thus far, usually Japan or Mexico.5 3  Non-
relocation agreements that were drafted following the inception of overseas
scheduling typically contain provisions that allow a limited number of games
to be played away from the home stadium. 54 The Yankees agreement contains
51. Lease Agreement by and between City of Detroit Downtown Development Authority and
Detroit Tigers, Inc., art. 14 [hereinafter Tigers' Lease].
52. Non-Relocation Agreement by and among the City of New York, the New York State Urban
Development Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation, the New York City
Industrial Development Agency, and the New York Yankees Partnership §§ 2.1, 2.1.1 (2006)
[hereinafter Yankees' Non-Relocation Agreement]. The need for a four-party agreement is indicative
of the increased complexity of securing pubic financing for stadium construction.
53. See e.g., Jason S. Weiss, The Changing Face of Baseball: In an Age of Globalization, is
Baseball Still as American as Apple Pie and Chevrolet?, 8 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 123, 129
n.21 (1999-2000).
54. In any event, because compliance with MLB is necessary to maintain the franchise in good
standing and because the home city has no interest in jeopardizing its team's MLB affiliation, teams
without specific exceptions in their non-relocation agreement are permitted to play in MLB scheduled
overseas games.
2010] 21
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
both of these exceptions.
2.2.1 Exception for Home Games. Subject to Section 2.2.2,
up to twelve (12) Home Games over any two (2) consecutive
Regular MLB Seasons may be played in venues other than (a)
the Existing Stadium for Regular MLB Seasons ending prior
to commencing on or after the First Season Commencement
Date or (b) the Stadium for Regular MLB Seasons
commencing on or after the First Season Commencement
Date; provided that, in no event shall the number of Home
Games played during any Regular MLB Season in venues
other than the Existing Stadium or the Stadium, as the case
may be, equal or exceed the number of Home Games that
would cause or constitute a Prohibited Relocation under
Section 2.1.3; and, provided, further, that Home Games which
are cancelled or suspended in accordance with the MLB
Trinity due to weather or due to field conditions other than
field conditions resulting from actions of the Partnership or
the failure by the tenant under the Lease Agreement to
perform its obligations thereunder, and are rescheduled and
played in the home ballpark of another Major League Baseball
Club in accordance with the MLB Trinity, shall be treated, for
purposes of Section 2.1.1, as having been played in the
Existing Stadium or the Stadium, as applicable.55
2.2.2 Force Majeure; Casualty; Temporary Taking;
Termination of Lease.
(a) If an event of Force Majeure, a Casualty or a Temporary
Taking renders the Stadium, on or after the First Season
Commencement Date, or the Existing Stadium, prior to the
First Season Commencement Date, not reasonably fit for use
for MLB games in accordance with the Stadium Sublease or
MLB Trinity, the Team may play Home Games in a location
other than the Stadium or Existing Stadium, as applicable, but
only during the period of time that such event of Force
Majeure, Casualty or Temporary Taking continues or the
55. Yankees' Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 52, § 2.2.1. A "Prohibited Relocation" is
defined in this contract as "the failure ... to play at least 87.5%" of home games at Yankee Stadium.
Id. at App'x A.
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Stadium or Existing Stadium, as applicable, remains not
reasonably fit for use, provided that (i) the Partnership
promptly provides notice to the City . . . , (ii) the Partnership
provides updates to such notice on at least a monthly basis . . .
, (iii) the Partnership ... [uses] commercially reasonable and
diligent efforts to remediate or repair such event... , and (iv)
the Team plays such Home Games in a location in one of the
five boroughs of New York City if a Substantially Equivalent
Facility is available for such purpose. 56
C. Prohibition ofApplication to Transfer Team
To further impede team relocation efforts, many non-relocation
agreements contain a prohibition of application to MLB for a transfer of team
location. Many agreements integrate this clause into the general relocation
prohibition; other agreements, such as the Houston Astros', state this
prohibition separately:
Section 3.2 Prohibited Actions. Houston McLane shall not
apply for or seek approval from Major League Baseball or the
National League for (i) the relocation of the Astros or the
home territory of the Astros outside the boundaries of the City
and County or (ii) the reduction of the Astros' territorial or
circuit rights, as defined under Major League Rule 1(a), for
the playing of Baseball Home Games through the exclusion of
any of the following counties: Harris, Brazoria, Chambers,
Fort Bend, Galveston, Liberty, Montgomery or Waller
counties. 57
Some agreements, including the Astros', specify circumstances under which
the team may negotiate with other parties about the possibility of relocating
the team:
Section 3.3 Third-Party Negotiations. Notwithstanding
Section 3.2 to the contrary, during (y) the period of five (5)
56. Id. § 2.2.2. Section 2.2.2 also specifies an exception to breach for cancelled games due to an
"MLB-wide umpire or players strike, slowdown, walkout or lockout," as long as those games are not
played at any other location. Id.
57. Non-Relocation Agreement by and between Harris County-Houston Sports Authority and
Houston McLane Company, Inc. d/b/a Houston Astro Baseball Club (1998), § 3.2 [hereinafter Astros'
Non-Relocation Agreement].
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years prior to the expiration of the [stadium lease] . . . or (z)
the existence of a [default, by the home city representative, of
the stadium lease, licensing agreement, or project
agreement] . . . , then and only then [the Astros] may, after
giving prior written notice to the Sports Authority, enter into
negotiations or agreements with third parties concerning the
relocation of the Astros or the home territory of the Astros
outside the boundaries of the City and the County, but [the
Astros] shall remain, and any other third party agreements
shall be, subject to all other provisions of this Non-Relocation
Agreement including, without limitation, Section 2.2.1
above. 58
Of the twenty-two MLB team non-relocation agreements that are currently in
effect, seventeen contain a specific prohibition of applying to MLB for a
transfer of the team. 59
D. Transferee Must Assume Non-Relocation Obligations
The home city's primary interest is in retention of the MLB franchise,
regardless of who owns the team. Transferee assumption covenants protect
the home city through a change in team ownership. The Cincinnati Reds'
lease contains a typical covenant requiring a transferee to assume non-
relocation obligations:
18.2 Permitted Assignments or Subletting....
18.2.1 The Team may, without prior consent of County,
assign this Lease to any person, firm, corporation or entity
which acquires the Cincinnati Reds Franchise strictly in
accordance with applicable MLB Documents; provided the
following conditions are satisfied: (a) Such assignee assumes
all of the obligations of the Team under this Lease and agrees
to be bound all [sic] of the terms and provisions of this Lease
pursuant to an instrument, in form and substance reasonably
acceptable to the County.60
58. Id.
59. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams.
60. Lease Agreement by and between the Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio
and the Cincinnati Reds, § 18.2 (1999) [hereinafter Reds' Lease].
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Transferee and assignee assumption covenants are found in eighteen of the
twenty-two MLB team non-relocation agreements. 61
E. Maintenance of Franchise/Team Office Location
For the home city to receive the benefits of hosting an MLB team, the
team must of course remain a part of MLB. The home city also has a strong
interest in maximizing team presence in and connection to its home city. To
these ends, several non-relocation agreements contain covenants that require
the team to maintain good standing within their league. Some agreements go
further by requiring the team to maintain its corporate offices in the home
stadium or within the home territory. The St. Louis Cardinals' non-relocation
agreement contains typical provisions requiring maintenance of the franchise's
good standing and team headquarters in the home city:
2.3 Maintenance of Franchise. At all times during the Term
the Cardinals shall (a) maintain the membership in good
standing of the Team in Major League Baseball and (b) hold,
maintain and defend the right of the Team to play baseball as
a member of Major League Baseball and (c) use reasonable
efforts to oppose the adoption of any Major League Baseball
Rules and Regulations that would cause the Cardinals to be
unable to comply with any of the terms of this Agreement.
2.4 Maintenance of Headquarters. The Cardinals shall
maintain their headquarters and their principal place of
business within the City during the Term. 62
Good standing covenants are found in fourteen of the twenty-two MLB non-
relocation agreements; corporate office location covenants are found in nine of
the twenty-two agreements. 63
V. SPECIALIZED ADDITIONS TO NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
Over time, non-relocation agreements of MLB teams have become
increasingly complex. Many non-relocation agreements now contain
covenants designed to protect the home city in specialty situations and may go
61. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams.
62. Operations and Non-Relocation Agreement by and between the Land Clearance for
Redevelopment Authority of the City of St. Louis and the St. Louis Cardinals, §§ 2.3-2.4 (2002)
[hereinafter Cardinals' Lease].
63. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams.
2010] 25
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
beyond simply protecting team location for the term of the agreement.
A. Protection of Team Name and History
Much of the psychic income that flows from a team to its fans is
intertwined with the team name, uniform, and other identifying marks of the
team. Historical records and memorabilia, which are created while a team is
in a particular city, are another source of civic pride. The Atlanta Braves'
lease contains an early example of language designed to protect these sources
of psychic income:
16.1.4. [The Braves] shall not assign, transfer or convey, or
attempt to assign, transfer or convey, its name, good will,
trademarks or the whole or any substantial part of its player
and other contracts except in accordance with [non-
assignment clause] above, except that the Team in the
ordinary course of business may grant such licenses with
respect to names and trademarks and assign such player and
other contracts as the Team deems commercially
appropriate. 64
A more complete protection is found in the Minnesota Twins' agreement from
2007:
Section 2.3 Covenants not to Relocate and to Oppose
Contraction.
In the event of any dissolution or relocation of the [Twins]
Franchise during the Term, the [Twins] shall transfer (and
shall use best efforts to cause the MLB to cooperate in the
transfer of) the Franchise's heritage and records to the State of
Minnesota, including the name, logo, colors, history, playing
records, trophies and memorabilia. Notwithstanding anything
to the contrary set forth in this Section 2.3, during any
Renewal Term the covenants of this section will be subject to
MLB approval and the [Minnesota] Authority's right to
64. Operating Agreement between City of Atlanta and Fulton County Recreation Authority and
Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., § 16.1.4. (1993) [hereinafter Braves' Lease].
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challenge pursuant to the Act.65
The Minnesota provision highlights a primary difficulty with some clauses-
the requirement of MLB approval. Still, considering (1) fans' intense
attachment to team name, colors, etc.; (2) the significant investments by local
businesses and fans in producing or acquiring "team gear;" and (3) the manner
in which Cleveland was able to replace the NFL Browns, such that no changes
in team name or other identifying marks were required, it is a worthwhile goal
for a city to attempt to protect the team's identifying marks and team history.
It is therefore surprising that so few agreements include these clauses. 66
B. Right of First Refusalfor Team Sale
If the sale of a team becomes necessary during the term of a non-
relocation agreement, the home city would like to control, to the greatest
extent possible, to whom the team is sold. Although the buyer will be subject
to any non-relocation agreement that contains a clause requiring this, a few
cities have gone further and included a right of first refusal in the agreement.67
A right of first refusal gives the home city the option to purchase the franchise
at the same terms that the franchise owner is able to obtain from a third
party. 68
C. Secured Creditor Restrictions
Secured creditor issues came to the forefront of a proposed 2010 sale of
the Texas Rangers, reportedly leading to a clash between the creditors and
baseball's Commissioner. 69
65. Baseball Playing and Use Agreement by and between Minnesota Ballpark Authority and
Minnesota Twins, LLC., § 2.3(c) (2007) [hereinafter Twins' Lease].
66. Only five agreements mention team marks at all, and three of these agreements-A's, Mets,
Yankees-merely require that the team keep its current name during the term of the agreement.
67. A's' Lease, supra note 49, § 23; Twins' Lease, supra note 65, § 2.5.
68. In essence, then, the home city has the right to match the offer made to the franchise owner
from a third-party within a specified period of time. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409
F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating "A right of first refusal is a conditional option empowering its
holder with a preferential right to purchase a property on the same terms offered by or to a bona fide
purchaser"). This must be a bona fide offer, the result of arm's length dealing, id, and because they
are restrictions on alienation, rights of first refusal will be interpreted narrowly by courts. Frandsen v.
Jensen-Sundquist Agency, Inc., 802 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1986). An example right of first refusal
clause is given infra Part 2 Section VII. 4. See also infra Section VII.D.2. for a discussion of how a
right of first refusal has been paired with a sale proceeds clause in the agreement between the city of
Indianapolis and the NBA's Indiana Pacers.
69. Richard Sandomir, Selig Widens 'Best Interests' View in Rangers Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2010, at D6.
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Because secured creditors possess rights in their loans' collateral (in this
case, the collateral was the Rangers franchise), the Rangers' secured creditors
were able to impact the sale of the team and nearly affected who the ultimate
purchaser turned out to be. 70 Although the Rangers sale does not appear to be
leading toward relocation of the team, it is illustrative of how a franchise's
ownership can be affected by lenders with secured creditor status.
1. Pledging the Franchise as Collateral
To generate cash for operating expenses or other purposes, a franchise
may need to borrow. A lender may require, as one form of collateral for the
loan, a security interest in the franchise. 71 To accomplish this, the team
owners will enter into a security agreement with the lender.72 In the security
agreement, the franchise owner will grant (pledge) a security interest in the
franchise to cover the loan amounts; the security agreement will include events
of default, usually for the team not meeting payments; it may also include an
acceleration clause that allows the lender to demand immediate full repayment
on certain conditions. 73 If the team defaults on a properly perfected 74 security
agreement, the lender could then, among other possible remedies, "take
possession of the collateral," i.e., claim an ownership interest in the team.75 If
the loan amount represents a majority of the team's worth, the foreclosing
lender, upon successful completion of the court proceedings, could become the
majority owner. In this way, it is possible for ownership of a home city's
MLB team to transfer to a new owner, one that is not a party to the non-
relocation agreement. In the current case involving the Texas Rangers, the
secured creditors became involved in controlling the sale of the team.76 This
led to speculation that, in order to get the Rangers sold, MLB was considering
seizing the franchise or attempting to invalidate existing loan arrangements
under the "best interests" clause. 77
On March 31, 2009, Hicks Sports Group, a company whose holdings
included the Rangers, Dallas Stars, and the Liverpool Football Club, defaulted
on $525 million in loans to forty lenders, some or all of which were secured by
70. Id.
71. U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (2010) (definition of security interest); § 9-109 (scope of UCC Article 9).
72. § 9-102(a)(73); § 9-201(a).
73. § 1-309.
74. § 9-301; § 9-310(a).
75. § 9-609(a)(1); § 9-620.
76. Sandomir, supra note 69.
77. Id.
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an interest in the Rangers.78 Hicks Sports Group took steps to sell the Rangers
franchise, with MLB approval, to a group including sports lawyer Chuck
Greenberg and Hall-of-Famer Nolan Ryan. 79  It was reported that the
Rangers' secured creditors were unhappy with the proposed sale price of the
team, believing that higher bids were made by others, and the creditors
attempted to block the sale. 80 This reportedly led MLB Commissioner Selig
to consider using the "best interests of baseball" power to make the sale
happen. 8  Reaction was hyperbolic, including claims that Selig was
attempting to "revoke" 82 or "invalidate" the creditors' liens. 83  Creditors
reportedly warned that "if the commissioner were to invalidate their rights, it
could decimate sports finance in baseball."84 Others took a more moderate
stance. Smith College Professor of Economics Andrew Zimbalist noted that
the best interest power "is only applicable to internal relationships in baseball.
Creditors are not part of baseball. The application is between baseball and Mr.
Hicks."85 Seeing the situation as more of a negotiation tactic, Zimbalist said
further, "I don't think Bud Selig and Bob DuPuy thought by invoking the
clause, the lenders would lie down." 86
Ultimately, both sides appeared to get what they wanted. Creditor
objections appear to have increased the ultimate sale price, but the buyers
remained the group that earlier received MLB approval. On May 24, 2010,
the Texas Rangers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, reportedly "in
an effort to skirt the creditors' objections." 87  The creditors succeeded,
however, in bringing other bidders to the table, and another group led by
Dallas Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban participated in the bankruptcy
78. Daniel Kaplan, Selig Plays Hardball with Creditors, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J.,
May 10, 2010, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
8 1. Id.
82. Id.
83. Sandomir, supra note 69. Although an MLB Commissioner could not unilaterally remove a
lawfully obtained security interest without providing replacement collateral or other compensation, it
is possible that a Commissioner's actions could impact the value of a secured interest in a franchise
by blocking approval of a prospective buyer that has outbid all others, as NHL Commissioner
Bettman did with the recent sale of the Phoenix Coyotes. See infra Part 2 Section III.B.4. (text
accompanying nn. 291-294) and the In re Dewey Ranch Hockey opinions 406 BR. 30 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 2009), and 414 BR. 577 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) for more on the Coyotes' sale.
84. Kaplan, supra note 78.
85. Sandomir, supra note 69.
86. Id.
87. Daniel Kaplan, Is MLB Warming Toward Rangers Bidder?, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS J., July 12, 2010, at 4.
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auction.88 On August 5, 2010, the team was sold at bankruptcy auction to the
Chuck Greenberg-Nolan Ryan group, who finally outbid the Cuban group in a
nearly sixteen-hour auction. 89 The final purchase price was $593 million.90
Although Greenberg-Ryan was the group that initially was going to buy the
Rangers, the purchase price was reported to be almost $80 million higher than
the initial Greenberg-Ryan buying price.91
Although the issue of team relocation did not arise in that case, the
Rangers sale is an excellent illustration of how secured creditors can play an
important role in team affairs, possibly even in team ownership, and therefore,
secured creditor restrictions should be considered when drafting a non-
relocation agreement.
2. Protection Outside the Non-Relocation Agreement
The 2010 Rangers sale also demonstrates that, notwithstanding any
language in a security agreement, the MLB Constitution can provide another
significant protection for the home city against the holders of a security
interest in the team. The MLB Constitution regulates the acquisition of a
controlling interest in an MLB franchise. 92 Article 5 of the MLB Constitution
requires approval of three-fourths of all MLB "Clubs" (teams) to approve "the
sale or transfer of a control interest in any Club." 93 Article 7 of the MLB
Constitution establishes the MLB Constitution as superseding "any conflicting
provisions of any other agreement . .. to which any Major League Club is a
party."94 The MLB Constitution also gives the MLB Commissioner the
power to take actions that are "in the best interests of baseball;" such actions
could preclude a foreclosing secured creditor from assuming control of a
team. 95
88. Daniel Kaplan, Banker's Gamble Pays Off in Rangers Auction, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS J., August 16, 2010, at 10. In the bankruptcy process, disputes also arose between
"first priority" and "second priority" secured creditors, leading to another blocked sale to the
Greenberg-Ryan group and to threats of litigation between creditors only two days before the August
5, 2010 bankruptcy auction. See id
89. Greenberg-Ryan Group Tops Cuban in Lengthy Rangers Auction, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, August 5, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/l41230.
90. Eric Fisher, ALB Owners Approve Sale ofRangers to Chuck Greenberg's Group, STREET &
SMITH'S SPoRTSBUSINESS DAILY, August 12, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
141396.
91. Greenberg-Ryan Group Tops Cuban in Lengthy Rangers Auction, supra note 89.
92. MLB CONST. art. V., § (2)(b)(2).
93. Id.
94. MLB CONST. art.VII.
95. See, e.g., Sandomir, supra note 69; see also Daniel Kaplan, Rangers Repercussions Already
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However, the MLB Constitution cannot provide the complete protection
that a home city desires. To begin, provisions in the MLB Constitution can be
altered or repealed without the consent of the home city.96 Or, the Clubs may
vote against the home city's interest and allow ownership to pass to the
secured lender. In fact, since each Club's vote is the vote of the team owner, a
team wishing to relocate will have input in the decision to approve transfer of
ownership and may be able to influence the votes of fellow team owners. If
MLB Club owners vote to allow the security interest holder to take control of
the franchise, the new owner may proceed to explore relocation options, 97 and
the home city would be left without any protection, unless the non-relocation
agreement applies to the foreclosing secured creditor. The MLB
commissioner may have the power to intervene under the best interests power,
but the home city cannot rely on such action being taken. Therefore, it
remains imperative that the home city protect itself beyond the MLB
Constitution, to which the city is not a party, against a security-interest-related
transfer.
3. Pledge Restrictions Within the Non-Relocation Agreement
Pledge restrictions can prevent a non-relocation agreement from being
undermined by a lender's foreclosure on a security interest in the franchise by
requiring a lender to agree, prior to the loan, to abide by the non-relocation
agreement in the case of security interest foreclosure. The Yankees' agreement
includes such a requirement:
§ 2.4.3 Covered Pledge
a. Any pledge, lien, security interest, hypothecation, or similar
conditional assignment of the Team or of a controlling interest
therein given to secure indebtedness for borrowed money or a
guarantee of indebtedness for borrowed money is referred to
as a "Covered Pledge." In the absence of a specific intent to
use a Covered Pledge to effect a Prohibited Relocation, the
making of a Covered Pledge is not deemed to be a Transfer
for purposes of this Section 2.4
b. The Partnership shall not grant or permit to exist any
Covered Pledge, unless the documents and other instruments
Being Felt, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINEss J., June 21, 2010, at 3.
96. See MLB CONST. art. VI., § (b)(7).
97. Relocation of a team must also be approved by a vote of MLB clubs. Id.
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implementing the Covered Pledge expressly provide, and the
pledgee agrees in writing for the intended third-party benefit
of the City, ESDC, NYCIDA, and their respective successors
and assigns that (i) such Covered Pledge is subject to this
Agreement, and (ii) any Transfer of the Team upon
foreclosure or other enforcement of the Covered Pledge shall
be on the condition that (x) the pledgee/transferor comply
with Section 2.4.2 in lieu of the Partnership and (y) that the
Transferee comply with Section 2.4.2
c. Concurrent with execution thereof or on the Effective Date
(prior to execution of this Agreement) if such Covered Pledge
exists at such date, the Partnership shall provide to the City,
ESDC and NYCIDA, a copy of any documents and other
instruments implementing such Covered Pledge certified as
true and complete by an officer of the Partnership and
including the express agreement of the pledgee required by
Section 2.4.3(b) and thirty party beneficiary language in favor
of the City, ESDC and NYCIDA which permits any of them
to enforce such agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall
restrict the Partnership's ability to redact the financial or other
material terms (other than the express agreement and third
party beneficiary language referenced in the preceding
sentence, any language which would undermine the operation
or effectiveness thereof, the notice of Transfer required by
Section 2.4.2(a), and the Assumption and Agreement to be
Bound) which it may deliver to the City, the ESDC or the
NYCIDA in connection with any Covered Pledge. 98
The Yankees' relocation covenant should be compared with the Brewers'
relocation covenant, in which a pledge relationship is not subject to the
relocation covenant or agreement:
2(g). Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in
clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) above, it is expressly understood and
agreed that the Team shall have the right to grant a mortgage,
pledge, assignment and/or other security interest in any of the
Team's trade fixtures, equipment, personal property,
receivables, accounts, contract rights, general intangibles,
98. Yankees' Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 52, § 2.4.3.
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tangible and intangible assets, any of the Team's revenue
streams derived from any source whatsoever, and/or the
Team's Franchise to obtain financing and/or secure a loan or
loans from one or more lenders. It is further expressly
understood and agreed that such lender(s) or their successors
and assigns shall not be bound by the terms of this Agreement
and that such lender(s)' mortgage, pledge, assignment or
security interest shall not be subject to nor limited or
restricted, in any way, by the terms of this Agreement.99
Exclusion of secured creditors, and their successors or assigns, from the
contractual obligations of the non-relocation agreement presents a potentially
serious risk if a franchise were to go heavily into debt and be unable to repay.
Subject to three-fourths approval of MLB franchise owners, the secured
lenders could take control of the team from the current owners and then
relocate the team because the secured lenders would not be bound by the non-
relocation agreement.100
Accordingly, an express provision in the non-relocation agreement,
requiring a lender's written agreement to abide by the non-relocation
obligations, is the best means to protect the home city should an involuntary
transfer occur.
D. Team-Specific Covenants
Some of the more specialized covenants are tailored to deal with issues of
specific concern for a city. Such covenants are typically useful only for the
specific team and city involved, although some repetition may be found in the
agreements of teams that play in similarly sized markets. For example, the
non-relocation agreement of the Minnesota Twins contains a clause requiring
the team to "oppose contraction of the [f]ranchise by MLB."101 This was
included because in the past the Twins were specifically targeted for
contraction should MLB decide to reduce the number of teams. 102 For the
99. Amended and Restated Non-Relocation Agreement by and among Southeast Wisconsin
Professional Baseball Park District, State of Wisconsin and Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club,
Limited Partnership, § 2(g) (2004) [hereinafter Brewers' Lease].
100. Of course, there are other restrictions in place that may hinder such a move, primarily the
requirement of approval from Major League Baseball. And with the Brewers' former owner, and
current MLB Commissioner, overseeing the approval process, MLB approval for relocation of the
Brewers might not be so forthcoming. Still, the protections and the remedies provided by the non-
relocation agreement would be unenforceable.
101. Twins' Lease, supra note 65, § 2.3(b).
102. See infra Section IX.B.
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same reason, the Florida Marlins' agreement also prohibits the team from
volunteering for or voting in favor of its own contraction.10 3 Concerns about
possible MLB contraction are obviously not shared by the large-market cities
that are home to MLB franchises. To account for the variability in each home
city's specific situation, each non-relocation agreement must contain
protections that are tailored to any specific concerns that a city may have.
VI. TRADITIONAL REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF NON-RELOCATION
AGREEMENTS
The earliest non-relocation agreements typically have general remedy
provisions that are applicable to the non-relocation covenants. Because the
non-relocation covenants are part of a larger stadium lease, general remedies
for breach of the lease will normally apply to breach of non-relocation
covenants. Additionally, many agreements, including those agreements
containing specific remedies for breach of the non-relocation covenants, focus
exclusively on equitable remedies for breach.
A. Equitable Remedies-Specific Performance, Injunctive Relief Temporary
Restraining Orders
The cornerstone remedies of non-relocation agreements are the equitable
remedies of specific performance, injunctive relief, and the temporary
restraining order. These are the preferred remedies for the home city in
virtually any situation; therefore, they are present, in some form, in every
MLB non-relocation agreement.
Specific performance represents the ideal remedy for a city-a court order
that requires a team to play out its lease in its current location.104 If a suit for
specific performance of a non-relocation agreement is successful, the court
will enter an order requiring the team to fulfill its actual performance
obligations under its agreement with the home city, rather than simply
requiring the team to compensate the home city for damages caused by the
breach. Specific performance is one of the most common remedy provisions,
appearing in twenty of twenty-two agreements. 05
103. Non-Relocation Agreement by and among Miami-Dade County and the Florida Marlins, §
2.2 [hereinafter Marlins' Lease].
104. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (7th ed. 1999) (defining specific performance as "[a]
court-ordered remedy that requires precise fulfillment of a legal or contractual obligation when
monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate, as when the sale of real estate or a rare article is
involved."); see e.g., Bali v. Christiana Care Health Serv., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128 (Del. Ch. June
16, 1999).
105. See chart infra Section VIII.
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Temporary restraining orders (TROs),106 preliminary injunctions, 10 7 and
permanent injunctions108 bear some resemblance to specific performance as
remedies. Although none of these remedies will necessarily require a team to
specifically perform its contractual obligations (as specific performance
would), these remedies, if granted, will prohibit the team from proceeding
with any plans to relocate. TROs and injunctive relief are also common
remedies, with at least one of these remedies appearing in all twenty-two
agreements.109
A TRO or preliminary injunction, if granted, prohibits the team from
relocating during court proceedings to enforce the non-relocation agreement.
A negative injunction would prohibit the team from playing in any other
location for the remainder of the lease term, although it does not compel a
team to play in the home city.110 Negative injunctions are the more common
remedy for courts to grant, generally, because they do not require a court to
closely monitor performance to ensure that a team performs its lease
obligations in good faith.'I Because courts may be reluctant to compel
specific performance of a stadium lease, 112 non-relocation agreements should
also include negative injunctions and TROs as remedies.
B. Language That Justifies or Facilitates the Pursuit ofEquitable Relief
1. Specific Language Justifying Equitable Relief
To increase the chances that a suit for specific performance or other
injunctive relief will succeed, cities include provisions with specific language
designed to justify equitable remedies. Typically, these provisions state that
breach of the non-relocation agreement would cause "irreparable harm," that
106. A temporary restraining order is a "court order preserving the status quo until a litigant's
application for a preliminary or permanent injunction can be heard." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 104, at 1477.
107. A preliminary injunction is "[a] temporary injunction issued before or during trial to prevent
an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a chance to decide the case." Id. at 358.
108. A permanent injunction will be granted only at the end of a trial or hearing on the merits of
a case. See id
109. See chart infra at Section VIII.
110. Technically, the team could refuse to play anywhere, however unlikely that may be.
111. See Burton & Mitten, supra note 47, at 821-22.
112. Courts may be reluctant to grant specific performance because of, among other reasons, the
administrative burdens of supervising the parties to make sure each side is fulfilling its obligations
over the full term of the contract, which could be twenty plus years in the case of an MLB team non-
relocation agreement. See also infra Section X.A. 1.
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there is "no adequate remedy at law,"11 3 or that "monetary damages would not
fully compensate"ll 4 for a breach. This language mirrors language that past
courts have used when granting injunctive relief.115 Such language is present,
in some form, in twenty-one of the twenty-two agreements.116
2. Provisions That Facilitate the Pursuit of Equitable Relief
a. Choice ofRemedies
Many agreements also include a "choice of remedies" provision to further
clarify the desirability of injunctive relief over monetary damages. This
provision often specifies that contractual remedies are cumulative. A choice
of remedies provision is included in sixteen of the twenty-two agreements.117
b. Named Third-Party Beneficiaries
The city or county in which the stadium is located may also be specified as
third-party beneficiaries to the agreement. Third-party beneficiaries, though
not a party to the contract, stand to benefit from the contract.118 This language
supports a stadium owner's position that the bargained-for value of the
contract goes far beyond any direct revenue from stadium rent, includes
intangible economic and non-economic benefits to the larger community, and
can only be received by a team complying with its lease. Third-party
beneficiary provisions are found in eleven of the twenty-two agreements.119
3. No Bond/Waiver of Defenses/Appointment of Receiver
To further streamline the pursuit of equitable relief, many agreements
include a team waiver of any requirements that the home city post a bond in a
suit for equitable relief. Bond waivers are included in fifteen of twenty-two
113. See chart infra at Section VIII (sixteen team non-relocation agreements include "irreparable
harm" or "no adequate remedy at law" language in their non-relocation covenants).
114. See chart infra at Section VIII (nineteen team non-relocation agreements include "monetary
damages would not fully compensate" language).
115. See e.g., Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 380 (1992) (stating "It is a basic
doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief") (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See chart infra Section VIII for a list of these teams.
117. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams.
118. See e.g., Winter v. Floorpro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
119. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams.
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agreements.1 20 Some agreements also contain a waiver of any defense by the
franchise that monetary damages could compensate for breach of the non-
relocation promise. If the franchise can prove to a court that the home city
could be adequately compensated by money, equitable remedies such as
specific performance and injunctive relief typically will not be granted by a
court. 121  Waiver of this defense is included in six agreements. 122  Finally,
two agreements require the appointment of a receiver. 123
4. Venue Selection and Arbitration
Many non-relocation agreements stipulate the venue where disputes must
be resolved. By choosing a venue believed to be favorable to its position, the
city seeks a "home court advantage" in a suit for equitable and other remedies.
Venue selection is included in thirteen of the twenty-two agreements. 124
The Houston Astros' agreement specifies that disputes will be resolved
through the arbitration process. 125 The choice of arbitration is based upon the
same considerations as the choice of a specific court-the home city seeks a
venue that will provide a favorable result. Arbitration may also be a quicker
and less expensive alternative to court action; it also may provide greater
confidentiality.1 26 However, arbitration decisions typically do not offer an
extensive appeals process, and court review of arbitration decisions is
extremely limited.127  Considering the enormity of the stakes involved,
120. See chart infra at Section VIII for a list of these teams. The White Sox agreement provides
for a bond refund.
121. See e.g., Morales v. Trans. World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 380 (1992) (stating, "It is a basic
doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... when the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief') (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See chart infra Section VIII.
123. The Braves and Cardinals agreements include this provision.
124. See chart infra at Section VIII.
125. Astros' Non-Relocation Agreement, supra, note 57, §§ 5.1, 5.2. Although under the Astros
agreement all disputes are to be ultimately resolved by the arbitration process, the parties retain the
right to petition a court for a temporary restraining order or other relief to maintain the status quo,
while the dispute proceeds through the arbitration process. Id at § 4.3(v) § 5.3.
126. See e.g., Olagoke 0. Olatawura, The "Privy to Arbitration" Doctrine: The Withering of the
Common-Law Privity of Contract Doctrine in Arbitration Law, 16 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 429, 430
(2005) (stating "[Plarties' preference for arbitration is based on universal enforceability, finality,
speed, confidentiality, expertise, neutrality, costs, and flexibility of process.").
127. See e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010)
(stating, "It is not enough for petitioners to show that the panel committed an error-or even a serious
error. It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and
effectively dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable.")
(internal citations and quotes omitted, brackets in original).
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agreeing to abide by an essentially unappealable decision seems to be a serious
risk.
VII. MODERN ADDITIONS TO REMEDIES-PROVISIONS FOR MONETARY
RECOVERY
Barring unique and remote circumstances, 128 when faced with an actual or
potential breach of non-relocation covenants, the home city's preferred
remedies will be equitable.1 29 However, the inclusion of equitable remedies
in a non-relocation agreement does not guarantee that those remedies will be
granted. If an action seeking specific performance or other equitable remedies
is unsuccessful, the home city could be left without a team and receive nothing
as compensation. 130 Acknowledging this possibility, modem non-relocation
agreements contain remedies that provide for monetary compensation for the
total anticipated losses the home city would incur following the loss of its
team. These additional monetary remedies not only provide the home city
with greater protection from possible financial harm; they also serve as an
additional disincentive for a team to breach-if team ownership were of the
opinion that a home city's suit for equitable remedies would fail, the monetary
remedies would remain.
A. Liquidated Damages
Calculating a total amount of damages to a city and its inhabitants that
would be caused by the relocation of a city's MLB team is an impossible task.
Damage to a city's prestige and the loss of psychic income for its resident fans
are inherently unquantifiable. Ancillary economic benefits, such as potential
revenues and growth of businesses near the stadium, may be quantifiable but
are inherently uncertain. As such, courts are reluctant to assign a value to
these interests, yet the interests are certainly among those that the non-
relocation agreement was designed to protect. A liquidated damages provision
establishes an agreed-upon value for the team's performance of its obligations
under a non-relocation agreement. Liquidated damages are "an amount of
compensation to be paid in the event of a breach of contract, the sum of which
128. A city would have to be guaranteed a replacement MLB team; as discussed above, such a
guarantee is virtually impossible. And even in this situation, a strain from the loss of "psychic
income" would occur.
129. A home city will likely sue for specific performance of the non-relocation agreement, an
injunction prohibiting the team from playing in another location, and a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the team from proceeding with relocation plans during the pendency of the lawsuit.
130. Traditional remedies for breach would not provide any compensation for loss of ancillary
economic benefits to the community or for loss of psychic income.
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is fixed and certain by agreement." 31  Liquidated damages clauses are
appropriate in situations where damages amounts may be difficult to
determine. 132 A liquidated damages clause, however, cannot impose a penalty
for breach.133
With a liquidated damages clause in the non-relocation agreement, there is
no need for the home city to attempt to prove damages for breach because the
damages amount is included in the contract. This amount is typically reduced
for each year of performance to account for the city's receipt of the benefits of
hosting the team for that year. Liquidated damages provisions have been a
relatively recent addition to non-relocation agreements, included in only five
current MLB team non-relocation agreements. Four of these provisions are
provided below:1 34
1. Florida Marlins
5.3 Liquidated Damages. The parties acknowledge and agree
that if the County or the City do not obtain injunctive or other
equitable relief pursuant to Section 5.2, the County and the
City each shall be entitled to seek and obtain relief pursuant to
this Section 5.3 in the event a court of competent jurisdiction
determines, in a final and non-appealable order, that the Team
has breached its covenants under Section 2(c) (a "Final
Order"). The Parties also recognize, agree, and stipulate that
the financial, civic, and social benefits to the County and the
City from the presence of the Team and the playing of its
MLB Home Games in Miami, Florida are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits cannot be estimated with any
degree of certainty due to the number of citizens and
businesses that rely upon and benefit from the presence of the
Team in Miami, Florida. Accordingly, the magnitude of the
damages that would result from a breach of Section 2(c)
131. Pac. Mech. Corp. v. City of San Luis Obispo, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25006, *2-3 (9th Cir.
Nov. 13, 2009) (citations and internal quotes omitted, emphasis in original).
132. See e.g., Ladco Props. XVII v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 718, 720 (8th Cir.
2008). ("[A] liquidated damages provision is enforceable and will not be considered a penalty where
(1) damages are speculative or difficult to ascertain, and (2) the amount stipulated is a reasonable
estimate of probable damages or the amount stipulated is reasonably proportionate to the damages
actually caused by the breach."). Id.
133. See e.g., id. ("Such a provision is valid if the liquidated damages amount represents an
estimate of actual damages likely to result from the breach; if instead it represents a fixed amount
designed solely to punish a party for a breach, it amounts to an unenforceable penalty."). Id.
134. The Mets' agreement parallels that of the Yankees, with different values inserted.
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hereof that is not enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction
notwithstanding the intent of the parties, would be very
significant in size but are not readily ascertainable and would
include damages to the reputation and finances of the County
and the City. Therefore, the Parties agree that in the event of
a violation of Section 2(c) hereof, including, without
limitation, any such breach arising pursuant to the provisions
of section 365(g) of the United States Bankruptcy Code or
similar provision of any successor thereto, the County and the
City will be entitled to recover from the Team the amounts set
forth in Subsection 5.3.1:
5.3.1: Liquidated Damages. If the County or the City do not
obtain injunctive or other equitable relief pursuant to Section
5.2 and the violation of Section 2(c) is not cured prior to the
date that a court of competent jurisdiction enters a Final
Order, the County shall be entitled to receive, as reasonable
estimated liquidated damages and not as a penalty, the County
Liquidated Damages (as hereafter defined) and the City shall
be entitled to receive, as reasonable estimated liquidated
damages and not as a penalty, the City Liquidated Damages
(as hereafter defined). For purposes of this Agreement,
"County Liquidated Damages" shall mean the sum of (a) the
then outstanding balance of principal and interest of the
County Bonds (as such term is defined in the Construction
Administration Agreement), (b) the unamortized amount of
Public Infrastructure Costs and any other costs for the
Baseball Stadium Project paid by the County under the
Construction Administration Agreement (which amount shall
be amortized on a straight line basis over 30 years) without
duplicating amounts in (a) if such Public Infrastructure Costs
or other costs are funded from County Bonds, and (c) the
present value of all Capital Reserve Fund contributions
required to be made by the Stadium operator pursuant to
Section 9.3(b) of the Operating Agreement. For purposes of
this Agreement, "City Liquidated Damages" shall mean the
sum of (i) the then outstanding balance of principal and
interest of the City Bonds (as such term is defined in the
Construction Administration Agreement), (ii) the unamortized
balance of the funds (other than the proceeds of the City
Bonds) deposited in the City Account (as such term is defined
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in the Construction Administration Agreement) in an amount
that, together with proceeds of the City Bonds, will be equal
to $13,000,000 (which balance shall be amortized on a
straight line basis over 30 years), (iii) the present value of all
regular season MLB Home Game parking fees owed to the
City under Section 6.3(a) of the City Parking Agreement
(assuming 81 regular season MLB Home Games) prior to the
end of the Term (as such term is defined in the City Parking
Agreement), and (iv) the unamortized amount of Public
Infrastructure Costs and any other costs for the Baseball
Stadium Project paid by the City under the Construction
Administration Agreement (which amount shall be amortized
on a straight line basis over 30 years), without duplicating
amounts in (i) and (ii) if such Public Infrastructure Costs or
other costs are funded from City Bonds or amounts referred to
in (ii).1 35
2. St. Louis Cardinals
5.3 Certain Equitable or Liquidated Damages. The Parties
acknowledge and agree that (i) the Ballpark Project is being
constructed with the assistance of the Authority pursuant to
the Redevelopment Plan and the Redevelopment Agreement
to enable the Cardinals and the Team to remain in the city and
to enable the Team to play its Home Games in the Ballpark
and (ii) Section 2.1 of this Agreement is intended to ensure,
among other things, that the Cardinals will not relocate the
Team. The Parties acknowledge and agree that (i) particular
and highly unique circumstances have given rise to this
Agreement, (ii) the Authority will be immediately, uniquely
and irreparably harmed by any violation by the Cardinals of
Section 2.1 of this Agreement, (iii) monetary damages could
not be calculated to compensate the Authority for any breach
by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement and (iv) the
Authority does not have an adequate remedy at law for the
breach by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement. The
Parties acknowledge and agree that the economic, financial,
civic and social benefits to the Authority and the City from the
presence of the Cardinals and the Team and the playing by the
135. Marlins' Lease, supra note 103, §§ 5.3, 5.3.1.
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Team of its Home Games in the City are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits is difficult to quantify due to
the number of citizens and businesses that rely upon and
benefit from the presence of the Cardinals and the Team in the
City. Accordingly, the magnitude of the damages that would
result from the loss of those benefits due to a violation by the
Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement would be
significant in size but difficult to quantify.
The parties agree that in the event of a material default,
violation or breach, or threatened material default, violation or
breach, by the Cardinals of any provision of Section 2.1, the
sole and exclusive remedy of the Authority shall be any one,
but not both, of the remedies specified in (a) and (b) below:
the Authority may, without the necessity of posting any bond
or other security and without any further showing of
irreparable harm, balance of harms, consideration of the
public interest or inadequacy of money damages, be entitled
to seek and obtain an injunction, specific performance or any
other preliminary or permanent equitable relief from any court
of competent jurisdiction to prevent such violation or breach,
and the Cardinals agree and stipulate that the rights of the
Authority to equitable relief pursuant to this Section 5.3 shall
not constitute a "claim" pursuant to Section 101(5) of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and shall not be subject to
discharge or restraint of any nature in any bankruptcy
proceeding involving the Cardinals; or
the Authority shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement and
the Redevelopment Agreement and receive, and the Cardinals
shall pay, liquidated damages in the applicable amount
("Liquidated Damages Amount"), determined as follows
based upon the date on which the violation or breach of
Section 2.1 occurs: for the period commencing on the
Effective Date and ending on the last day of the calendar year
in which Substantial Completion of the Ballpark occurs, the
Liquidated Damages Amount shall be $145,000,000 ("Initial
Liquidated Damages Amount"), thereafter, the Liquidated
Damages Amount shall be reduced by 1/29 of the Initial
Liquidated Damages Amount on the last day of each calendar
42 [Vol. 2 1:1
MLB NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
year during the remaining Term of this Agreement. The
Parties acknowledge that they have negotiated the above
amounts in an attempt to make a good faith effort to quantify
the amount of damages that would result from a violation of
Section 2.1 despite the difficulty in making such
determination. Accordingly, in the event the Authority or any
other Person shall collect the above-described liquidated
damages, then the Authority and any such other Person shall
not have, and hereby waive, the right to collect additional
monetary or any other damages for breach of Section 2.1,
whether for lost or prospective profits, or for special, indirect,
incidental, consequential, exemplary or punitive damages, or
for any other loss or consequence. 136
3. Houston Astros.
Section 4.4 Liquidated Damages. The Parties also recognize,
agree, and stipulate that the financial, civic, and social
benefits to the Sports Authority, the City and the County form
the presence of the Astros and the playing of its Baseball
Home Games in the City and County are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits is difficult to quantify due to
the number of citizens and businesses that rely upon and
benefit from the presence of the Astros in the City and
County. Accordingly, the magnitude of the damages that
would result from a violation of Section 3.1 hereof would be
very significant in size but difficult to quantify including,
without limitation, damages to the reputation and finances of
the Sports Authority, the City, and the County. Therefore, the
Parties agree that in the event of a violation of Section 3.1
hereof including, without limitation, any such breach arising
pursuant to the provisions of section 365(g) of the United
States Bankruptcy Code or similar provision of any successor
thereto, the Sports Authority will be entitled to recover from
Houston McLane the following sums, which are stipulated to
be reasonable estimated damages in the event of a violation of
Section 3.1 hereof, as reasonable liquidated damages and not
as a penalty:
136. Cardinals' Lease, supra note 62, §§ 5.3, 5.3(a)-(b).
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Date of Breach Liquidated Damages
7/1/98 - 6/30/2003 $250,000,000
7/1/03 - 6/30/2008 $200,000,000
7/1/08 - 6/30/2013 $150,000,000
7/1/13 - 6/30/2018 $125,000,000
7/1/18 - 6/30/2023 $100,000,000
After 7/1/2023 $ 75,000,000
The parties hereby acknowledge that they have negotiated the
above amounts in an attempt to make a good faith effort in
quantifying the amount of damages due to a violation of
Section 3.1 hereof despite the difficulty in making such
determination. Accordingly, in the event the Sports Authority
collects the above referenced liquidated damages then the
Sports Authority hereby waives any right to collect additional
monetary damages (other than as provided pursuant to Section
6.18 hereof) including lost or prospective profits, or for any
other special, indirect, incidental, consequential, exemplary,
or punitive damages.' 37
4. New York Yankees.
Section 3.3.2 Liquidated Damages. Solely with respect to an
Event of Default under Section 3.1.1, if the City, the ESDC
and/or the NYCIDA is unable to obtain an equitable remedy
in accordance with Section 3.3.1, then the City and/or the
ESDC, as the case may be, (but not, for the avoidance of
doubt, the NYCIDA) shall have the right to recover from the
Partnership, and the Partnership agrees to pay within thirty
(30) days following demand therefor, in immediately
available funds and in lieu of any and all other damages
payable, and other remedies available, under this Agreement
and applicable law, the applicable amount set forth on
Appendix C attached hereto and made a part hereof, to be paid
to the City, which amounts are stipulated to be reasonable
estimated damages for loss of a bargain in the event of an
Event of Default under Section 3.1.1. for a Prohibited
Relocation, as reasonable liquidated damages and not as a
137. Astros' Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 57, § 4.4.
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penalty (and because the parties hereto agree that damages for
breach of Section 3.1.1 would be difficult or impossible to
determine, but that they intend to provide for damages, and
the amounts set forth on Appendix C are a reasonable estimate
of such damages). Notwithstanding anything herein to the
contrary, nothing in this Section 3.3.2 is intended to limit any
remedies available to the City and/or ESDC under applicable
law to enable them to collect liquidated damages payable
under this Agreement.138
Appendix C: Liquidated Damages
Year Liquidated Damages
1 $1,496,928,205
2 $1,496,928,205
3 $1,496,928,205
4 $1,487,418,205
5 $1,476,408,205
6 $1,464,863,205
7 $1,452,738,205
8 $1,439,993,205
9 $1,426,603,205
10 $1,412,568,205
15 $1,340,193,205
20 $1,251,578,205
25 $1,015,276,966
30 $ 747,045,726
35 $ 438,459,487
40 $ 78,318,248139
Especially in the first years of performance, liquidated damages clauses
provide a strong financial disincentive to relocate; this protection decreases,
however, as the amount is reduced over the course of performance. It is also
unknown whether courts might be less inclined to grant equitable remedies
when liquidated damages are available.140 Still, considering that, without
such a provision, a city's failure to obtain equitable relief would result in a
total loss of compensation for loss of ancillary and intangible benefits,
138. Yankees' Non-Relocation Agreement, supra note 52, § 3.3.2.
139. Id. at App. C.
140. A choice of remedies provision can protect the city somewhat, but a court could still deny
equitable relief, forcing the city to settle for liquidated damages.
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including a liquidated damages clause seems the better-reasoned approach.
It is also possible that the relationship between a team and its home city
may simply turn sour-the team may be losing money, fans may have lost
interest, or a small market may not be able to support the enterprise. This may
be not only an issue of wanting to relocate, it may be an issue of the team's
ability to function and compete with other teams on an equal playing field in a
particular city. In these situations, a liquidated damages clause essentially
provides the team with a buy-out option, but one that the home city can
negotiate more favorably in advance.
B. Recoverable Monetary Damages
Some agreements do not contain a liquidated damages clause but still
provide for the home city's recovery of monetary damages for the team's
breach. Recoverable damages in such clauses may include (1) expenditures
for stadium construction and payment of bonds, (2) loss of stadium generated
revenue, and (3) recovery of attorney fees incurred in obtaining relief for
breach. The Washington Nationals' agreement contains all three:
4.2 Commission Special Remedies
... all costs and expenses incurred by the District
Government, the Commission or any other affected party
claiming through the District Government or the Commission,
including (A) all costs and expenses incurred by the District
Government and the Commission to construct the Baseball
Stadium, including, without limitation, the amount required to
repay principal and interest on (and premium, if any, on) the
Stadium Revenue Bonds, (B) any lost net revenue arising out
of or created by the operation and use of the Baseball Stadium
that the Commission would have received if the Team had
complied with the Team Non-Relocation Obligations, and (C)
all costs and expenses incurred by the Commission, including
attorneys' fees and disbursements (other than as provided for
in Section 6.17), in seeking to enforce its remedies
hereunder.141
The Cincinnati Reds' lease also includes express provisions for monetary
141. Non-Relocation Agreement between the District of Columbia Sports and Entertainment
Commission and Baseball Expos, L.P., § 4.2 [hereinafter Nationals' Lease]; see also Marlins
Agreement infra Section VII.A. 1.
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damage recovery:
22.5 Final Damages. If this lease is terminated by the County
as provided for by Section 22.2.1 [termination for event of
default], the County shall be entitled to recover from the Team
all Rent accrued and unpaid for the period up to and including
such termination date, as well as all other additional sums
payable by the Team or for which the Team is liable or in
respect of which the Team has agreed to indemnify the
County under any of the provisions of this Lease, which may
be then owing and unpaid, and all costs and expenses,
including court costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the
County in the enforcement of its rights and remedies
hereunder, and, in addition, the County shall be entitled to
recover as damages for loss of the bargain and not as a
penalty: (a) the aggregate sum which at the time of such
termination represents the excess, if any, of the present value
of the aggregate rents which would have been payable after
the termination date had this Lease not been terminated,
including, without limitation, Base Rent at the annual rates or
respective annual rates for the remainder of the Term provided
for in Article 6 of this Lease or elsewhere herein, over the
then-present value of the then-aggregate fair rental value of
the Stadium Project for the balance of the Term, such present
worth to be computed in each case on the basis of a five
percent (5%) per annum discount from the respective dates
upon which such rentals would have been payable hereunder
had this Lease not been terminated; and (b) any damages in
addition thereto, including reasonable attorneys' fees and
court costs, which the County shall have sustained by reason
of the breach of any of the covenants of this Lease other than
for the payment of Rent. 142
Currently, thirteen MLB teams are party to non-relocation agreements that
contain monetary recovery provisions. The primary weaknesses of these
provisions are that (1) they do not account for the loss of intangible benefits
and (2) the damage amounts must be proven. These provisions are worthwhile
inclusions, but they should be accompanied by other provisions that quantify
recoverable values, including values for intangible benefits such as psychic
142. Reds' Lease, supra note 60, § 22.5.
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income.
C. Subordinate Security Interest in Franchise
A unique provision, which one city has used to compliment their equitable
and monetary remedies, is Washington, D.C.'s acquisition of a subordinate
security interest in its team, the Nationals. Unlike a traditional security
interest, this subordinate lien does not serve the purpose of securing collateral
as a means for monetary recovery; Washington, D.C.'s security interest is
designed to secure the performance of the team's non-relocation obligations.
The Washington Nationals' agreement provides the following:
2.4 Subordinate Lien on Franchise.
To secure the Team Non-Relocation Obligations, the Team
hereby grants to the Commission a subordinated security
interest in the Franchise (the Subordinate Lien") on the terms
set forth in this Section 2.4. The granting and terms of the
Subordinate Lien shall be subject to each and all of the
following conditions:
(a) The Subordinate Lien shall become effective
contemporaneously with the deposit by the District
Government into the Project Account of the net proceeds from
the issuance of the Initial Stadium Revenue Bonds.
(b) The Subordinate Lien may be foreclosed upon by the
Commission only in the event of a breach by the Team of the
Team Non-Relocation Obligations. The Subordinate Lien
secures only the performance of the Team Non-Relocation
Obligations.
(c) The Subordinate Lien shall be fully subordinate as to
payment and line priority to any then-current or future
Covered Pledge given by the Team to secure payment and
performance of its obligations, without limit as to amount,
including guarantee obligations, in respect of any then
existing or future indebtedness (including capitalized leases
and other obligations classified as liabilities in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles) of the Team or
any person or entity that is affiliated with the Team or has
invested in the Team or in which the Team is an investor,
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provided that the principal purposes of the indebtedness in
respect of which such Covered Pledge is granted relates to the
acquisition, promotion, financing or operation of the Team or
any business venture related to the business of the Team or the
development of the Baseball Stadium Complex and
surrounding area ("Senior Secured Indebtedness"). No
proceeds of the Subordinate Lien may be paid to the
Commission unless and until all Senior Secured Indebtedness
is paid in full. No consent of the Commission is required for
the incurrence of Senior Secured Indebtedness.
(d) The Commission hereby disclaims any right that might
otherwise implicitly or explicitly arise under or in respect of
the Subordinate Lien to review, approve or consent to (i) the
loan, security and other documentation for Senior Secured
Indebtedness or any guarantee thereof and (ii) any transfer or
the making of a Covered Pledge of the Franchise, the Team or
a Control Interest in either (or any financing relating thereto)
that does not involve a violation of the Team Non-Relocation
Obligations.
(e) If then customarily required by Major League Baseball in
connection with the grant of liens in Major League Baseball
franchises generally, in connection with the grant of the lien
as provided in clause (a) above, the Commission and Major
League Baseball will enter into a standard form Major League
Baseball lien consent agreement on customary terms generally
applied by Major League Baseball to third party holders of
liens on Major League Baseball franchises and in which,
among other things (A) Major League Baseball will confirm
its approval of this Agreement and consent to the terms of the
Subordinate Lien, and (B) the Commission will agree with,
for the benefit of Major League Baseball, to the provisions set
forth in Exhibit A.
(f) The Subordinate Lien shall automatically terminate and be
void in the event of a termination of the Lease pursuant to
Section 3.4 thereof, other than with respect to a termination of
the Lease following:
(i) the Team filing a petition in bankruptcy or insolvency or
2010] 49
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
for reorganization under any bankruptcy act, or voluntarily
taking advantage of any such act by answer or otherwise, or
making an assignment for the benefit of creditors;
(ii) the Team being adjudicated bankrupt or insolvent by any
court;
(iii) involuntary proceedings under any bankruptcy law or
insolvency act being instituted against the Team or a receiver
or trustee being appointed for all or substantially all of the
property of the Team, and such proceedings shall not be
dismissed or the receivership or trusteeship vacated within 90
days after the institution of appointment; or
(iv) the Team making an assignment for the benefit of
creditors or the Team petitioning for composition of debts
under any law authorizing the composition of debts or
reorganization of the Team.
(g) The Commission and the Team shall cooperate reasonably
and in good faith in the negotiation and execution of any
financing, subordination or other documents and instruments
as may be necessary more fully to effectuate the intentions of
this Section 2.2. Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing (i) the Commission agrees, promptly upon written
request by the Team, to enter into subordination or other
agreements with the holders of Senior Secured Indebtedness,
in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Team and
such holders, to acknowledge and effectuate the subordination
and other limitations on the Subordinate Lien agreed by the
Commission herein, provided that they do not increase the
obligations of the Commission under the Lease or materially
adversely affect the leasehold interest thereby created or
detract from the Commission's rights under the Lease; and (ii)
the Team agrees, promptly upon written request by the
Commission, to deliver to the Commission, at the Team's sole
* expense, such financing statements and other documents as
the Commission may reasonably request, in form and
substance reasonably satisfactory to the Commission, to
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further evidence and perfect the Subordinate Lien.143
The limited nature of this provision is clear from its language. This security
interest as a subordinate lien (hereinafter lien) is designed only to secure the
location of the team, not to collateralize Washington, D.C.'s investment in the
stadium. Foreclosure is allowed only when non-relocation provisions are
breached. Because the lien is subordinate, its value is limited if the team
becomes insolvent. However, the lien does further limit the Nationals' ability
to breach their non-relocation agreement because foreclosure by the city could
block the team from moving. This possibility should also discourage outside
investors looking to purchase and move the franchise.
D. Percentage of Proceeds from Sale of the Team; Percentage of Contraction
Proceeds
1. Sale Proceeds Clauses in MLB Team Non-Relocation Agreements
Sale proceeds and contraction proceeds clauses are part remedy, part
investment return. Proceeds from a contraction sale are essentially a
contracted remedy in case a breach is forced by MLB. A contracted team's
owners will receive a buyout as compensation for their agreement to MLB
contraction; the contraction sale proceeds clause allows the home city to
recover a portion of this buyout.
Sale proceeds clauses move beyond simply providing recovery for breach
and grant the home city a portion of the proceeds of any sale of the team. This
allows a city to possibly recover some of its investment, even without a breach
of non-relocation provisions. Two examples of sale proceeds clauses, from the
Florida Marlins' and St. Louis Cardinals' agreements, are provided below:
a. Florida Marlins
Payment Upon Sale of Team. Upon either a sale to a third
party of a "control interest" (defined as the sale of more than
50% of the voting, actual or beneficial interest in the
franchise, occurring within the period commencing with the
approval of the Stadium Agreements by the City Commission
and the Board of County Commissioners and ending thirty six
(36) months following Substantial Completion, whether
through a sale of equity shares or partnership interests, to the
143. Nationals' Lease, supra note 141, § 2.4.
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extent proceeds are paid to the owners of the Team and not
contributed to Team Affiliates involved in baseball related
businesses) (other than following the death of the controlling
owner), the Team shall or shall cause the seller to pay to the
County and the City, to be split on a pro-rata basis (including
the value of the City's contribution of the Baseball Stadium
Site, the amount of the City's and the County's expenditures
as required by the Construction Agreement, and the value of
the City and the County's respective expenditures associated
with the Public Infrastructure) determined by each respective
parties' contribution to the Baseball Stadium, an amount equal
to the following percentage of the Net Proceeds of the sale
that are attributable to any increase in value of the franchise
(pro-rated in the case of a sale of the control interest) (the
"County/City Equity Payment"):
Phase of Project Year Description of Time-Frame Percentage
Construction Phase Year I If sale occurs within 12 months of approval date of 18.0%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 2 Sale occurs within 24 months of approval date of 16.2%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 3 Sale occurs within 36 months of approval date of 14.4%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 4 Sale occurs within 48 months of approval date of 12.6%
Stadium Agreements, or, prior to Substantial
Completion of Stadium, whichever occurs first
Operational Phase Year I Sale occurs within 12 months of Substantial 10.0%
Completion
Operational Phase Year 2 Sale occurs within 24 months of Substantial 7.5%
Completion
Operational Phase Year 3 Sale occurs within 36 months of Substantial 5.0%
Completion
The increase in value shall be based on an assumed value of
the franchise of $250,000,000 as of the date of the BSA,
which assumed value shall be increased to give effect to any
additional debt incurred by, or equity capital contributions
made to the Team, Stadium Developer or Operator, including
the capital contributions made to, or the debt incurred by, the
Stadium Developer or the Team pursuant to the Construction
Administration Agreement (net of distributions to any such
Team owners) and an imputed increase in value of 8% per
annum from the date of the BSA. "Net Proceeds" shall mean
MLB NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
the fair market value of all proceeds received from the sale
plus any indebtedness for borrowed money of the Team or
any Team Affiliate assumed by the buyer in the sale, less (x)
the assumed value of the franchise determined under the
preceding sentence, (y) all transaction-related expenses and
taxes payable by the Team Affiliates and/or their direct and
indirect owners to unaffiliated third parties solely as a result
of the sale, and (z) any liabilities or obligations retained by the
Team (in the case of a sale of the franchise) and/or its direct or
indirect owners relating to the Marlins or its affiliated
businesses.
The Team shall cause its independent accountants to provide
the County and City a reasonably detailed calculation of the
County/City Equity Payment (on a combined basis) under this
Section 6, including a detailed calculation showing the
assumed value, Net Proceeds and any other calculations the
Team used to determine the amount payable, as promptly as
practicable following any applicable sale. If the County or
City do not provide a notice of objection within thirty (30)
days after receiving the accountant's calculation, such
calculation shall be final and binding and payment of any
amount due shall be made not later than thirty (30) days after
the expiration of such period. If the County or City does
provide a notice of objection, it shall specify in reasonable
detail the basis for its objections. The objecting Government
Party and the Team shall then seek to resolve any
disagreements between them within the succeeding period of
sixty (60) days. If the objecting Government Party and the
Team are unable to resolve the dispute within such sixty (60)
day period, each of them shall have the right to commence
arbitration in accordance with the Operating Agreement. If the
arbitrator shall enter a final, non-appealable order requiring
payment from the Team under this Section 6, the Team shall
pay such amount within thirty (30) days thereafter.144
b. St. Louis Cardinals
3.1 Sale of Team. Subject to the provisions of this Article, the
144. Marlins' Lease, supra note 103, § 5.6.
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Cardinals shall have the right to sell or transfer ownership in
whole or in part of the Team during the Term to the extent
permitted by Major League Baseball without the Authority's
consent; provided that (a) in connection with such sale, the
new Team owner must concurrently agree in writing, in form
and substance reasonably acceptable to the Authority, to
assume the Cardinals' obligations under this Agreement for
the remainder of the Term (unless waived by the Authority)
and (b) the provisions of Section 3.2 shall not apply to the
new Team owner. In addition, the Cardinals covenant and
agree that the Cardinals shall not transfer, sell or assign the
Team in any manner unless such transfer of the Team is
approved in accordance with applicable Major League
Baseball Rules and Regulations.
3.2 Ballpark-Related Profits from Sale.
(a) In the event that there is a Sale in whole or in part of any
ownership interest in the Cardinals Ownership Entities, the
Cardinals shall cause the Selling Owner(s) to pay to the
Authority the Ballpark-Related Profits, and the Authority shall
be responsible for paying to the County that portion of such
amount agreed upon by the Authority and the County. By
way only of example and without limitation, the Ballpark-
Related Profits from the Sale of the total ownership interests
in the Cardinals Ownership Entities are set forth in Exhibit A.
(b) Not later than 30 days after the consummation of a Sale,
the Cardinals shall furnish to the Authority a notice setting
forth their determination of the amount, if any, due pursuant
to this Section 3.2. If Authority fails to object to such
determination within 30 days following receipt of such notice,
the Cardinals' determination shall be final and binding, and
payment of the amount, if any, due shall be made not later
than 15 days after the expiration of the latter 30-day period. If
Authority objects to such determination, the notice of
objection shall specify in reasonable detail the basis for such
objection. The Authority and the Cardinals shall thereupon
seek to resolve such disagreement and, if they are unable to
resolve the disagreement with 30 days following the
Cardinals' receipt of notice of such objection, then their
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disagreement shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
Section 6.3 of this Agreement.145
EXHIBIT A - Ballpark-Related Profits from Sale*
Owners
Total 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Profits
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.67 2.34 2.00 1.67 1.34 1.00 .67 .34
100 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.34 4.67 4.00 3.34 2.67 2.00 1.34 0.67
150 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
200 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 10.67 9.34 8.00 6.67 5.34 4.00 2.67 1.34
250 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 13.34 11.67 10.00 8.34 6.67 5.00 3.34 1.67
300 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 18.67 16.34 14.00 11.67 9.34 7.00 4.67 2.34
350 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 21.78 19.06 16.34 13.61 10.89 8.17 5.45 2.72
400 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 24.89 21.78 18.67 15.56 12.45 9.34 6.22 3.11
450 31.50 31.50 31.50 31.50 28.00 24.50 21.00 17.50 14.00 10.50 7.00 3.50
500 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 31.11 27.22 23.34 19.45 15.56 11.67 7.78 3.89
550 38.50 38.50 38.50 38.50 34.22 29.95 25.67 21.39 17.11 12.84 8.56 4.28
600 48.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 42.67 37.34 32.00 26.67 21.34 16.00 10.67 5.34
650 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 46.22 40.45 34.67 28.89 23.11 17.34 11.56 5.78
700 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 49.78 43.56 37.34 31.11 24.89 18.67 12.45 6.22
750 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 53.34 46.67 40.00 33.34 26.67 20.00 13.34 6.67
* All amounts in millions.
Allowing the home city to share in the proceeds of a team sale acknowledges
the influence of a new or renovated stadium on franchise value. By providing
a state-of-the-art venue for the team to play in, the stadium builder adds value
of potentially hundreds of millions of dollars to an MLB team's market price,
at least part of which is traceable to the home city's investment in the team's
stadium. Sale proceeds clauses also provide compensation for the uncertainty
caused by a change in team ownership. Although a buyer is likely bound to
honor the non-relocation covenants, 146 the new team owners may not have any
prior relationship with the home city, possibly compromising city efforts to
retain the team beyond the term of the agreement. 147 At the very least, the
home city is provided with compensation for its efforts that increased the
team's selling price, should the signatory team owners decide to sell the team
and profit from this increased value.
145. Cardinals' Lease, supra note 62, §§ 3.1, 3.2.
146. The buyer would agree to abide by the non-relocation agreement before a sale occurred. By
operation of the non-relocation agreement's restrictions on assignment, the selling team owner would
be required, to avoid a breach, to secure the buyer's consent to be bound by the non-relocation
obligations. See infra section IV.D.
147. Often a buyer will have a relationship with another city and intend to eventually relocate the
team as soon as possible. See blocked sale of San Francisco Giants, Phoenix Coyotes, etc.
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2. Case Study: Threat of Relocation of the National Basketball Association's
Indiana Pacers: Sale Proceeds Clause With a Right of First Refusal
The leasehold agreements by and between the Capital Investments Board
(CIB) and the Indiana Pacers (Pacers) with respect to Conseco Fieldhouse
represent good examples of where both a right of first refusal and a percentage
of sale proceeds play a role with respect to non-relocation.
It has been reported that the Pacers have lost money in twenty-five of the
last twenty-seven years, including nine of the last ten seasons at Conseco
Fieldhouse.14 8 Owner Herb Simon claims that the team has lost more than
$200 million since the Simon family bought the team in 1983.149 Simon
claims the economics of operating a small market National Basketball
Association (NBA) franchise make it fiscally impossible to also pay to keep
the arena operating. 150 In order to keep the Pacers in Indianapolis, Pacer
management has asked the CIB to absorb the cost of operating the
Fieldhouse. 151
The Pacers received Conseco Fieldhouse courtesy of taxpayers in 1999,
keeping all arena revenues and paying one dollar in rent; however, they agreed
to pay operating and maintenance costs, now estimated to cost about $15
million per year.
A recent study by Hunden Strategic Partners conducted for the Marian
County Capital Improvement Board indicates that Indianapolis would lose
approximately $55 million a year if the Pacers left town. 152
The Pacers' request has been tagged as a taxpayer bailout. The Pacers'
leasehold agreement, however, states that, if the team is experiencing financial
losses after its eighth season in the building, the franchise can ask to
renegotiate its twenty-year lease after ten years.1 53
The right of first refusal and the non-relocation penalties are part of both
an Operating Agreement and Financial Services Agreement. The Pacers have
148. More on that $33.5 Million Gift to Herb Simon's Pacers, ADVANCE INDIANA, July 13,
2010, available at http://advanceindiana.blogspot.com/2010/07/more-on-that-335-million-gift-to-
herb.html.
149. Id
150. Id.
151. Pacers, CIB Discussing New Three-Year Conseco Fieldhouse Lease, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTsBUSINESs DAILY, June 18, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/140142.
152. City Helping to Keep Pacers in Indy, FoxSPORTS.COM, July 12, 2010,
http://msn.foxsports.com/nba/story/Pacers-indianapolis-lease-071210.
153. See Paul K. Ogden, Dispensing With the Lies Told About the Simons'Right to Terminate the
CIB-Pacers Conseco Fieldhouse Contract, OGDEN ON POLITICS, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.ogdenon
politics.com/2009/08/dispensing-with-lies-told-about-cib.html.
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the right to terminate the lease after the first ten years provided that the Pacers
give written notice to the CIB within thirty days of the Pacers' notifying the
NBA of its intent to relocate.154 However, all of the following conditions
must be met:
1. [The] Pacers have experienced a "significant net cash
flow loss" for the fiscal year for the previous season[.]
2. [The] Pacers reasonably expect that they will produce
a "significant net cash flow loss" for the following
fiscal year;
3. [The] Pacers reasonably believe it will produce a
cumulative "net cash flow" from July 1, 1997 through
the end of the contract.
4. [The] CIB does not within [sixty] days of the "early
termination notice" agree to subsidize the Pacers in an
amount which covers the "net cash flow loss" for the
following fiscal year;
5. [The] Pacers intend to structure a sale which triggers
the CIB's First Refusal Rights or the Pacers intend to
sell or transfer all or a substantial portion of its
assets[.] 115
The right of first refusal is provided for in the Operating Agreement and
indicates that, if the Simons or the Pacers notify the CIB of meaningful
negotiations and are prepared to accept an offer to sell the Pacers stock or a
substantial portion of the Pacers assets, the CIB has forty-five days to match
the offer. Even if the Pacers would exercise the early termination right that
gives effect to the right of first refusal, penalties are outlined in Section 5 of
the Financial Services Agreement. There are two penalty formulas provided
for early termination.
Penalty 1 is the total of the Aggregate Advance Amount not yet forgiven
(basically the CIB advanced utilities at Market Square Arena that is being
forgiven on a declining basis every year) and an amount equal to the
154. See id; see also Paul K. Ogden, The CIB Continues to Misrepresent the Pacers-Conseco
Fieldhouse Contract, OGDEN ON POLITICS, May 16, 2010, http://www.ogdenonpolitics.com/2010!05/
cib-continues-to-misrepresent-pacers.html.
155. Ogden, supra note 153.
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"applicable termination percentage" (which is in Exhibit B of the Financial
Services Agreement) multiplied by the net sales proceeds. That applicable
termination percentage starts out at 50% in 2009 and declines about 3% to 6%
every year. For instance, if the Pacers had sold for $300 million in 2009, then
the penalty would have been$15 million (approximate balance of Unforgiven
Utilities from MSA) plus $150 million ($300 million multiplied by 50%),
equaling $165 million.156
Penalty 2 is $50,000,000 plus an "Applicable Scale Amount," which is
located in Exhibit A. This is an amount that starts out at $184 million in 2009
and 2010 and then declines about $9 to $10 million every year. If the Pacers
exercise the early termination provision in 2009 or 2010, then Penalty 2 is $50
million plus $184 million, which equals $234 million. Under the contract,
Penalty I applies unless Penalty 2 is a lesser amount. Thus, the penalty the
Pacers would owe to the CIB and the taxpayers, should they sell the team for
$300 million and terminate the contract in 2010, would be $165 million.15 7
It was announced in July of 2010 that the Indiana Pacers and CIB had
reached an interim lease amendment to resolve the current issue. 158 CIB will
contribute $30 million for Conseco Fieldhouse operations payable over the
next three years in $10 million installments, plus a minimum investment of
$3.5 million in capital improvements to the facility, which could actually grow
to more than $8 million under the deal.15 9 The $30 million, three-year
contribution is not characterized as a subsidy to the franchise, but the lease
amendment calls it a loan.160 The first $10 million installment is due upon the
execution of the lease amendment.
The Pacers, for and in consideration of the accommodation, give up their
right to terminate the leasehold agreement through June 30, 2013.161
However, the Pacers are given the right to serve notice on the CIB of a lease
termination on July 1, 2012, to become effective at the end of the 2012-2013
season. 162 The loan over the three-year period is interest free.163 The second
and third installments of the loan, payable in January 2011 and January 2012,
156. See id.; see also Ogden, supra note 154.
157. See Ogden, supra note 153; Ogden, supra note 154.
158. Pacers to Receive $33.5M Over Next Three Years to Remain in Indy, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, July 12, 2010, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
sbd.main&ArticlelD=140595.
159. Id
160. More on that $33.5 Million Gift to Herb Simon's Pacers, supra note 148.
161. Pacers to Receive $33.5M Over Next Three Years to Remain in Indy, supra note 158.
162. More on that $33.5 Million Gift to Herb Simon's Pacers, supra note 148.
163. Id
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are subject to Indianapolis City-County Council approval.164 If the Council
refuses to appropriate the money for the loans, the deal is terminated as to the
restriction on the Pacers' early termination of the lease, and furthermore, the
first installment of the loan, i.e., $10 million given upon execution of the lease
amendment, is forgiven in its entirety if the Council fails to approve the
second and third installments on the loans. 165
If the Council approves the second installment but not the third
installment, then the second installment is forgiven, and the first installment is
subject to repayment on a sliding scale basis.166
The lease amendment further states that repayment of the loan proceeds
does not alter the CIB's right to collect a penalty for early termination of the
lease that is determined on a sliding scale basis. The proceeds of the loan are
to be used exclusively for maintenance of the Fieldhouse.167  At the
conclusion of the 2013-2014 season, portions of the loans will be forgiven on
a sliding scale basis, starting with $2 million the first year and increasing to $3
million the second year, to $6 million each of the next four years, and $1
million by the end of the 2018-2019 season. 168 After that, the loan repayment
is forgiven in its entirety. 169 Obviously this is contingent upon the Pacers
staying at the Conseco Fieldhouse.
Although the lease amendment was hailed by some as an important step in
protecting the financial state of the city, others characterized the lease
amendment as "a multi-million dollar bailout of a professional sports team and
its billionaire owner."1 70
164. Id
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id
169. Id.
170. Pacers to Receive $33.5M Over Next Three Years to Remain in Indy, supra note 158.
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VIII. SUMMARY OF COVENANTS AND REMEDIES IN ALL CURRENT MLB
TEAM NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
Non-Relocation Covenants
No No All Hoe Any Maintain Mat Noe- Age % of Right
Transfer Applying Games at Buyer/ Teamn Good Disposition ed-to Contraction of First
ofTeamt to Stadium Assignee Office in Standing of Assets or 3 ISale Refisal
Transfer Must Stadium in League (Trademark, Paey Proceeds to
Team Assuee City Name, Ben. Stadium
NRA Players' Owoner
Good Will)
Braves X X X X X X X
Marlins X X X X X x x
Mets X X X X X X X X
Nationals X X X X X X X
Phillies X X X X X X X
Astros X X X X X
Brewers X X X
Cardinals X X X X X X X X
Pirates X X X X X
Reds X X X X X X
Giants X X X X X
Padres X X X X
Rockies X X X X X
Orioles X X X
Yankees X X X X X X X X
Indians X X X
Royals X X X X X X
Tigers X X X X X
Twins X X X X X X X X X
White X X X
Sox
A's X X X X X
Mariners X X X X
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Eq itable Remedies
No S Dam Permission No Spec. App. Ct. Team Election Arb.
Adequate Would to Seek Bond Perf. of Sel. Waiver of$ Clause
Remedy Not TRO / Req. Rec. of Def. Damages
at Law Comp. Perm. Inj. that $ or Equit.
Dam. Rem./
Would Rem.
Comp. CUm.
Braves X X X X X X X X
Marlins X X X X X X X
Mets X X X X X X X X
Nationals X X X X X X X
Phillies X X X X X X X
Astros X X X X X X X
Brewers X X X X X
Cardinals X X X X X X X
Pirates X X X X X X X
Reds X X X X X X
Giants X X X X X X X
Rockies X X X X X X
Padres X X X X X
Orioles X X
Yankees X X X X X X X X
Indians X X
Royals X X X X X X
Tigers X X X X
Twins X X X X X X
White X X X X
Sox
A's X X X X X
Mariners X X X X X
61
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Recoverable Monetary Damages
Costs &
General Expenses Lost Costs &
Liquidated incurred in Revenues Expenses
Damages Constructing from From
Provision Stadium, Stadium Prosecuting
Including Operation Action,
Repayment Including
of Principal Attorney
and Interest Fees
for Stadium
Revenue
Bonds
Braves
Marlins X X X X
Mets X X
Nationals X X X
Phillies X X
Astros X X
Brewers
Cardinals X X
Pirates X X
Reds X X
Giants X
Rockies
Padres X
Orioles
Yankees X X
Indians
Royals X
Tigers
Twins
WhiteSox
A's
Mariners X
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IX. LITIGATION INVOLVING NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
There are few examples of litigation over non-relocation covenants
between an MLB team and a stadium owner. 17 1 Two disputes reached final
court disposition.17 2 In each of these cases, the non-relocation provisions
were enforced by the court, and equitable remedies were granted to the home
city.
A. 1982-1983: New York v. New York Yankees
The first court decision that directly implicated an MLB team's non-
relocation agreement was handed down in January 1983 when a New York
state court ruled on the City of New York's motion for a preliminary
injunction, asking the court to enjoin the New York Yankees' attempt to play
its first three scheduled home games of the 1983 season in Denver,
Colorado.173 New York City had been renovating Yankee Stadium in the off-
season, and although the playing field was unaffected by this project, between
1,000 and 2,000 seats would not be available for the first three games of the
season while the renovations were completed.174 When the Yankees informed
the city of their plans to play three games in Denver, the city immediately sued
for declaratory and injunctive relief and moved for a preliminary injunction. 75
The court found that the lease provision requiring all home games to be
played at Yankee Stadium would be violated if the Yankees played games in
Denver under these circumstances. 176 The court found that the city faced a
171. Litigation in other sports between team and stadium owner is also sparse. See, e.g. Coyotes,
Penguins, Sonics.
172. City of New York v. New York Yankees, 117 Misc. 2d 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Metro.
Sports Facility Comm'n v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
173. City ofNew York, 117 Misc. 2d at 332.
174. Id. at 334.
175. Id. at 332.
176. Id. at 334. Section 4.7 of the Yankees lease at that time contained a clause requiring all
home games be played at Yankee Stadium:
§4.7 Except during the period of renovation, Lessee shall schedule and play all of its
home games at the stadium except where transfers of such games to other locations are
necessitated by postponements or the unplayable condition of the playing field or force
majeure. Notwithstanding the foregoing, if pursuant to an arrangement equally affecting
all baseball teams in the same division of the American League as Lessee, Lessee shall be
required by the American League schedule to play any baseball game where Lessee is
designated as the home team elsewhere than in the stadium, Lessee may do so provided
(a) no more than eleven (11) such baseball games are scheduled in any baseball
occupancy period, and (b) no such game shall be played within fifty (50) miles of the
stadium.
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"threat of irreparable injury" from such a breach.177 Finding that the balance
of equities favored New York City, the court acknowledged the special
relationship between New York and the Yankees, using the following
language:
Much more is at stake than merely the loss of direct and
indirect revenue to the city. The Yankee pinstripes belong to
New York like Central Park, like the Statue of Liberty, like
the Metropolitan Museum of Art, like the Metropolitan Opera,
like the Stock Exchange, like the lights of Broadway, etc.
Collectively they are 'The Big Apple'. Any loss represents a
diminution of the quality of life here, a blow to the city's
standing at the top, however narcissistic that perception may
be....
[I]t is the symbolism of the act not the quantity which counts.
Any reduction in the number of home games, especially if it
involves the home opening games eagerly awaited by the real
fans after a long winter in the hot stove league, erodes the ties
of loyalty between the people of the city and their team. Dare
one whisper the dreaded words: 'The Denver Yankees'.
No money damages can measure or assuage this kind of
harm. 178
The court granted New York's motion for a preliminary injunction, 179 and the
Yankees played their 1983 home opening series in Yankee Stadium, not in
Denver.
B. 2001-2002: Metropolitan Sports Facility Commission v. Minnesota Twins
Partnership
On November 6, 2001, amid reports that MLB intended to eliminate the
Minnesota Twins by buying and then folding the franchise as part of a MLB
contraction plan, the Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission brought a
declaratory judgment action, seeking specific performance of the Use
Agreement between the Commission and the Twins-specifically, Section 2.3
of the Use Agreement:
177. Id. at 336.
178. Id at 336-37.
179. Id at 337.
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2.3. The Team agrees that, during each baseball season, it
will play all of its baseball games scheduled to be played in
the Minneapolis/St. Paul franchise area at the Stadium as
more specifically provided throughout the Agreement. If the
Team begins using the Stadium after the start of a baseball
season, only the remainder of the Team's games scheduled to
be played in the Minneapolis/St. Paul franchise area that
baseball season will be played at the Stadium. 8 0
The Commission also sought an injunction preventing MLB from
interfering with the Commission's contractual relationship with the team. 181
On November 16, 2001, the Hennepin County District Court granted the
Commission a temporary injunction, pending resolution on the merits. 182 On
January 22, 2002, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota upheld the district
court's decision to issue the injunction.183  This was a victory for the
Commission, as it ensured that the Minnesota Twins would play the 2002
season in the Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome (Metrodome). 184
The court of appeals ruled that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
district court to temporarily enjoin the Twins from breaking the remaining
term of its Use Agreement, nor for the district court to enjoin MLB from
interfering with the Commission's contractual relationship with the Twins, due
in part to the irreparable harm that would result to the Commission if the
Twins breached its promise to play its home games for the 2002 season at the
Metrodome.1 85
In issuing the temporary injunction, the district court noted that the
contractual relationship between the Twins and the Commission was not a
typical landlord-tenant relationship. 18 6 The appellate court also gave several
reasons why the harm suffered by the Commission could be considered an
180. Twins Lease, supra note 65, § 2.3. Default of the Use Agreement would occur if the Twins
stopped playing home games at the Metrodome or if the Twins "cease playing major-league
professional baseball for any reason." Metro. Sports Facility Comm'n v. Minnesota Twins P'ship,
638 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). Only an event outside the Twins' control, one that
triggered the Use Agreement's force majeure clause, could excuse the Twins from the obligations of
the Use Agreement. Id.
181. Metro. Sports Facility Comm'n., 638 N.W.2d at 219-20. For another in-depth analysis of
this case, including suggestion that MLB contraction plans may have been a tactical maneuver to get
a new stadium built for the Twins, see Burton & Mitten, supra note 47.
182. Metro. Sports Facility Comm'n., 638 N.W.2d at 220.
183. Id at 218.
184. Id. at 226.
185. Id. at 229-30.
186. Id at 221.
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intangible loss to the community and not merely lost concessions and
advertising revenues: (1) the Twins paid no rent for its eighty-one home games
nor for year-round use of locker and office space;187 (2) the "benefit of the
bargain" was the Twins' promise to play in the Metrodome; 188 (3) "the stated
purpose for building and operating the ... [Metrodome] was to attract major
league sports franchises to play at the .. . [Metrodome] for the enjoyment of
fans;" 89 (4) the Metrodome was financed by legislation that authorized the
issuance of bonds and a collection of taxes;1 90 (5) the Metrodome was
generally exempt from taxation as it was used for public, governmental, and
municipal purposes;191 and (6) legislation was enacted to exempt the
Metrodome from property taxes. 192
The Minnesota Court of Appeals opinion in the Twins case is, as of this
writing, the most recent court decision involving a MLB team's non-relocation
agreement. Nor has any other court, as of this writing, directly ruled on the
enforceability of a non-relocation agreement involving any of the four major
U.S. professional sports leagues.
C. NBA 2006: Basketball's Super Sonics' Exit from Seattle
The latest litigation involving a non-relocation covenant was that of the
Seattle Super Sonics.
Starbucks founder Howard Schultz purchased the Sonics in 2001 for a
reported $200 million. 193 On July 18, 2006, Schultz sold the Sonics and the
Seattle Storm to an Oklahoma City group, Professional Basketball Club, LLC,
led by Clay Bennett, for a reported $350 million.194 Immediately, there were
rumors that Clay purchased the Sonics with the intention to relocate the team
to a new state-of-the-art facility called the Ford Center in Oklahoma City,
which had previously been the temporary home of the New Orleans Hornets.
Bennett had said that "KeyArena is not a viable NBA arena ... . Renovated,
KeyArena is not a viable NBA arena. The franchise will not remain in this
marketplace without a new arena." 95
187. Id. at 223.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 224.
191. Id.
192. Id
193. Craig Harris, et al., Oklahoma Group Buys Sonics, Storm, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
July 19, 2006, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/local/278072_sonics I 9.html.
194. Id
195. Gary Washburn, Bennett Opens Up About Sonics' Potential Future, SEATTLE POST-
[Vol. 21:166
MLB NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
Bennett proposed a $500 million facility in the neighboring city of
Renton, Washington on a twenty-one-acre parcel owned by the Boeing
Company. 196 On February 13, 2007, Bennett appeared before the Washington
legislature asking for passage of Senate Bill 5986.197
His proposal for the facility was roundly rejected by the state
legislature. 198 In addition, Bennett placed a time limit of October 31, 2007 to
receive an acceptable proposal for a new facility or he would seek to relocate
the team. 199
On November 7, 2006, Seattle voters approved Initiative 91, which
required a guaranteed minimum return to the city on par with a thirty-year
treasury bond on any public investment in city-owned facilities. 200 As a result
of this Initiative, the construction cost of a new facility would be dramatically
increased, and it would be unlikely that the team would stay inside the city
limits. The Initiative was approved with 74.08% of the vote. 201 The Official
Voters Pamphlet urged voters to approve the Initiative:202
As a result of Bennett's inability to get the State of Washington or the City
of Seattle to fund or create a new facility, Bennett issued a relocation
statement on November 2, 2007:
On behalf of the owners of the Seattle SuperSonics and
Seattle Storm, I am disappointed that our efforts over the last
fifteen months to foster the development of a new multi-
purpose arena in the Greater Seattle area were not successful.
From the beginning, it has been my absolute hope and
expectation that we would be able to secure the necessary
governmental commitments to build a successor venue to
KeyArena. Even though our proposal for a new state-of-the-
art multi-purpose facility to be built in Renton was
INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 27, 2007, available at http://www.seattlepi.com/basketball/332766_sbar
22.html.
196. Tim Booth, Sonics to be in Seattle for 2007-08 Season, USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nbalsonics/2007-02-23-future-x.htm.
197. Howard Bloom, Welcome to Franchise Relocation Hell - the Seattle Sonics,
SPORTSBIZNEWS.BLOGSPOT.COM, November 5, 2007, http://sportsbiznews.blogspot.com/2007/1 1/
welcome-to-franchise-relocation-hell.html.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id
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thoughtfully developed by a world-class team, was financially
reasonable and was realistically attainable, we were unable to
persuade the Washington Legislature to vote on our bill. The
region is still in need of a modern building, not just for the
Sonics and Storm, but also for the broad commercial and
quality of life benefits such facilities provide.
We now understand and respect that there is very limited
public support for such a public investment. As we stated on
July 18, 2006, and have stated on many occasions thereafter,
KeyArena is not a viable modem venue for the NBA and if a
successor facility is not identified by October 31, 2007, we
would evaluate our options, which would include relocation.
Given the clear lack of public, political, and business support
for a new multi-purpose arena, plus the enactment of Initiative
91 as a City of Seattle ordinance following a public vote
authorized by the Seattle City Council itself, and the
significant operating losses the businesses are now incurring,
we have no option but to commence the NBA relocation
process. 203
It is interesting to note that, over the last thirty years, few NBA teams have
switched cities:
Franchise Relocations
Year/Team Old City New City
2002 Hornets Charlotte New Orleans
2001 Grizzlies Vancouver Memphis
1985 Kings Kansas City Sacramento
1984 Clippers San Diego Los Angeles
1979 Jazz New Orleans Salt Lake City
1978 Clippers Buffalo San Diego204
In fact, since David Stem was appointed NBA commissioner in 1984, only
two franchises have relocated: the Grizzlies in 2001 and the Hornets after the
2002 season. 205
203. Id.
204. Sonics Tell NBA of Intent to Move SuperSonics to Oklahoma City, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=3091416 (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
205. Bloom, supra note 197.
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The Sonics' use of KeyArena is governed by the KeyArena Agreement. 206
The Agreement began in 1995 and runs through September 30, 2010.207
On September 10, 2007, by an eight to zero vote, the Seattle City Council
approved an ordinance demanding that the City enforce the KeyArena lease
pursuant to its terms, blocking any efforts by Clay Bennett to escape the
team's lease before it expires at the end of September 2010.208
In response to the Common Council vote, Bennett made an arbitration
demand to the American Arbitration Association, dated September 19, 2007
and filed September 21, 2007.209 He sought a determination that under
Sections XXVI and XXVII of the Sonics' Lease Agreement, specific
performance was not available to force the Sonics to play the 2008, 2009, and
2010 NBA seasons in KeyArena. 210 Bennett maintained that the City was
instead entitled to the traditional remedy, the monetary consideration it
bargained for under the Lease Agreement. 211
In essence, what Bennett was asking for was an arbitrator to decide, under
the arbitration clause of the Lease, that the Sonics should be allowed to pay a
monetary settlement to Seattle instead of playing out the remainder of its
KeyArena lease.
In response, the City argued that, although the Lease requires most
disputes between the City and the Sonics to be resolved through arbitration,
disputes about the length of the lease and termination of the lease were not
subject to arbitration. 212
Shortly after Bennett's demand for arbitration, the City filed a complaint
for declaratory relief in the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King
County. 213
In Article II of the Lease, the Sonics promised to "play all Home
Games ... exclusively in [KeyArena]" through September 30, 2010.214 The
City claimed that the fifteen-year lease term was an essential element of the
206. Clay Bennett's Arbitration Demand, SEATTrLE TIMEs, 3:21-4:8 available at http://seattle
times.nwsource.com/ABPub/2007/09/21/2003895617.pdf. (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
207. Id.
208. Jim Brunner, Council Votes 8-0 to Enforce Sonics Lease, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007,
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/htmllocalnews/ 2 0 03 8 7 8 7 6 1_sonics I m.html.
209. Clay Bennett's Arbitration Demand, supra note 206.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 3:12-16.
212. See City of Seattle v. Prof I Basketball Club, LLC, No. C07-1620RSM, 2007 WL 3217556
(W.D. Wash., Oct. 29, 2007).
213. Id. at *3.
214. Id. at *4.
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Lease and a principal incentive for the Seattle Common Council to approve
the Lease. 215 In order to ensure that the Sonics would play all of their home
games in KeyArena through the duration of the lease, the lease included a
specific performance clause. 216 This clause was necessary in part due to the
fact that the Sonics are a wholly unique tenant and an asset to the City that
would be impossible to replace. The City requested a declaratory judgment
that Article II of the Lease was enforceable through specific performance and
that the rights and obligations under the lease were not subject to
arbitration. 217
On October 29, 2007, United States District Judge Ricardo Martinez found
that this dispute related to Article II of the lease and that disputes relating to
Article II are excluded from arbitration. 218
On April 18, 2008, by a twenty-eight to two vote, NBA owners approved
Clay Bennett's proposal to move the franchise to Oklahoma City "'pending
the resolution of a federal lawsuit by the City of Seattle that aims to keep the
Sonics [in town] at least until their KeyArena lease expires in 2010."'219 A
$30 million relocation fee was required as part of said franchise move. 220
The trial commenced before U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman on June
16, 2008. The key issue in the case was whether the Sonics should be forced
to fulfill the remainder of its lease under the specific performance clause of the
lease rather than paying money damages for an early departure.
Prior to the issuance of a decision by Judge Pechman, the parties
settled. 221 In exchange for permission to leave Seattle before the KeyArena
lease expired, Bennett agreed to pay $45 million to the City immediately. 222
He is also required to contribute another $30 million in the event that Seattle is
unable to secure another NBA team by 2013, and that payment is further
dependent upon the Washington state legislature giving Seattle or King
County the authority to raise $75 million in public money to help pay for a
215. Id. at *4.
216. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 17, Seattle v. Prof'1 Basketball ClubLLC, No. C07-
1620RSM 2007 WL 3217556 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 29, 2007).
217. City of Seattle, 2007 WL 3217556 at *3.
218. Id. at *4-5.
219. NBA BOG Approves Sonics Relocation To Oklahoma City, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
120199.
220. Id
221. Sharon Pian Chan & Jim Brunner, Sonics, City Reach Settlement, SEATTLE TIMES, July 3,
2008, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008030229sonitrial02.html.
222. Id
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$300 million KeyArena renovation. 223 The Legislature must act by the end of
2009.224
Aside from the cash, Oklahoma City's new basketball team will also leave
behind the Sonics name, the team's green and gold colors, and all memorabilia
collected by the franchise since the first Sonics team tipped off in 1967. 225
X. CONSIDERATIONS IN DRAFTING NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
A. A Complete Remedies Package
1. Equitable Remedies May Not Be Enough
The Yankees and Twins cases, discussed above, demonstrate the
importance of including provisions allowing equitable remedies in a non-
relocation agreement. Specific performance, injunctive relief, and temporary
restraining orders should be stated as alternative remedies in any non-
relocation agreement. However, the inclusion of equitable remedies for
breach does not guarantee that those remedies will always be granted. In such
cases, liquidated damages clauses will become vital to the recovery of
damages for loss of intangible benefits to the city.
Specific performance, especially, tends to be a remedy that courts
generally disfavor. 226 As with other equitable remedies, specific performance
is a discretionary remedy dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of
each case. 227 Problems with court supervision of the ordered performance
often weigh heavily in a court's decision to deny specific performance of a
contract.228 Further, for a court to grant any equitable remedy, specific
requirements must be satisfied. These requirements typically include (1)
223. Adam Lynn & Eric D. Williams, The $45 Million Goodbye for the Sonics, THE NEWS
TRIBUNE, July 3, 2008, available at http://www.thenewstribune.com/2008/07/03/403826/the-45-
million-goodbye-for-the.html.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., Hamilton West Dev. v. Hills Stores Co., 959 F. Supp. 434, 439 (N.D. Ohio 1997)
Many courts, in many jurisdictions, have refused to specifically enforce obligations of
continuous operation in commercial leases, even where those obligations are
unambiguously expressed. The theory behind this hard and fast rule is that courts should
refuse to order specific perfornance of contracts where such an order would require
continuing court supervision.
(internal citations omitted). See also Metro Sports Facilities Comm. v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 638
N.W.2d 214, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
227. See Metro Sports Facilities Comm'n., 638 N.W.2d at 227.
228. Burton & Mitten, supra note 47, at 821-22.
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irreparable harm to the plaintiff,229 (2) a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits, 230 (3) the plaintiffs clean hands, 231 (4) weighing the harm to the
defendant, 232 and (5) weighing the public interest.233
Immediately, problems with court supervision of specific performance are
apparent. The term of a non-relocation agreement or a stadium lease typically
covers twenty-five to thirty years or longer. 23 4 In the previous successful
actions for equitable remedies, there were no supervisory concerns-in the
Yankees case, specific performance was limited to three games over three
days; 235 in the Twins case, the injunction lasted only until resolution at
trial. 236 In cases where multiple years, and possibly decades, of performance
are still due under the non-relocation agreement, it remains to be seen whether
courts will be as receptive to a request for specific performance or a negative
injunction.
Further, it is unclear what acts by a team would fulfill the team's
obligations to the satisfaction of the home city. Simply remaining in the home
city may prove not to be enough. Team owners that want to relocate but
cannot due to a court order may decide that making significant investments
that are necessary to field a team that is both successful and a "good citizen"
of its community has suddenly become a low priority. The team owners may
decide to trade their best or highest paid players and limit or cancel
community outreach activities in an effort to maximize owner profits over the
remainder of the lease term. 237 Should this occur, a home city may claim that
the team is not meeting its performance obligations. Courts may be unwilling
or unable to enforce an agreement that requires a "certain kind of
performance" to satisfy a home city. In this sense, the team-city relationship
bears some resemblance to personal services contracts, which are generally not
229. Metro Sports Facilities Comm., 638 N.W.2d at 222.
230. Id. at 226.
231. Id. at 221.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 223-26.
234. See, e.g., Non-Relocation Agreement Between Miami-Dade County, the City of Miami, and
Florida Marlins, L.P. (2009), at 9 (35 years) [hereinafter Marlins Agreement]; Operations and Non-
Relocation Agreement between the Land Clearance for Redevelopment Authority of the City of St.
Louis and the St. Louis Cardinals, L.P., (Nov. 1, 2002), 30 years [hereinafter Cardinals Agreement].
235. City of New York v. New York Yankees, 17 Misc. 2d 332, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
236. Metro Sports Facilities Comm'n., 638 N.W.2d at 229.
237. MLB revenue sharing and broadcast revenues would allow an owner to maximize profits in
this manner despite the reduced fan interest that would surely result from a team trading its best
players.
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subject to specific performance. 238  A court inclined to deny specific
performance could find ample justification in the impossibility of measuring
good faith performance over an exceedingly long term.
Additionally, the requirements for a grant of equitable relief do not
necessarily weigh clearly in favor of the home city. From a court's
perspective, much of the damages a city would incur may be to a large extent
calculable. Public funds a city has invested and stadium rents are measurable
to the dollar; expected revenues from games that would have been played in
the home stadium are calculable to some certainty. Reasonably calculable
damages strongly suggest that the harm is not "irreparable" and that monetary
damages would be an adequate remedy. This leaves only the intangible value
of living in a city with a MLB team, or "psychic income," as damages that the
city can rest its claim for equitable relief.
Other requirements for equitable relief could be similarly problematic.
The team could claim that the city does not have clean hands and draw upon
any issues with the city's maintenance and management of the stadium as
justification, claiming that the city's actions contributed to an untenable
situation where the team could not prosper in that city. Similarly, the team
may claim that equitable relief would cause extreme harm to the team.
Considering the possibility of reluctant, possibly ambivalent performance if an
equitable remedy is granted, 239 it is unclear whether forcing a team to remain
in a bad situation serves the public interest.
Of course, a denial of equitable remedies does not necessarily mean that a
home city would receive no damages; the court may convert an equitable
remedy claim to a claim for money damages. 240 However, the absence of
provisions that either set liquidated damages amounts or provide a method for
damage calculation is a squandered opportunity for the home city to account
for the loss of intangible psychic income in the calculation of equitable
damages. If nothing else, it creates another issue that will have to be litigated.
The advantage of silence as to the monetary value of the contract is unclear. 241
238. See, e.g., Gov't Guar. Fund of Fin. v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291, 303 (3d Cir. 1996); Infusaid
Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 739 F.2d 661, 668 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Karrick v. Hannaman,
168 U.S. 328, 335 (1897)).
239. See also Burton & Mitten, supra note 47, at 828-29.
240. The traditional remedy for breach of a commercial lease is lost rentals less any mitigation.
See, e.g., MRI Nw. Rentals Invs. I, Inc. v. Schnucks-Twenty-Five, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1991).
241. Perhaps the reasoning is that inclusion of money damage language weakens the claim for
equitable relief by assigning a value to non-performance. However, the non-relocation agreements
that include liquidated and/or other money damages also include provisions whereby the team agrees
that the stated monetary amounts do not fully compensate for the home city's loss. See, e.g., Non-
Relocation Agreement between the District of Columbia Sports and Entertainment Commission and
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From the home city's perspective, the traditional damages of lost rents for
breach of a commercial lease will not be enough. MLB stadiums are not built
with any hope of profitability measured by positive cash flow; stadium rents
paid by the team may be nominal. 242 For example, in the Twins case,
pursuant to their use agreement, the Twins paid zero rent for the use of their
stadium.243 Noting this, the court remarked that the Twins agreement "may
not be a typical commercial lease between landlord and tenant." 244 The
recovery of lost rents in the Twins case would have been zero.
As can be seen equitable remedy provisions are important within a non-
relocation agreement. In the only judicial decisions regarding this issue the
court granted the home city's request for a remedy. 245 The best agreements
will include both equitable and non-equitable remedy options.246
2. Supplementing Equitable Remedies
The true benefit of the bargain for the city is having the home team play
and the intangible benefits to the city's residents that flow from having a team.
As long as a court recognizes this and grants equitable remedies, these
intangible benefits are preserved. However, should a court find that an
equitable remedy is not appropriate, assigning a value to these intangible
benefits would be impossible, and a court may not even attempt such a task.247
Therefore, a value amount for intangible benefits should be assigned within
the contract as part of a liquidated damages provision.
Although intangible "psychic income" is a somewhat nebulous concept,
and its value debatable, 248 psychic income remains an important consideration
Baseball Expos, L.P., §4.2 (2005) [hereinafter Nationals Agreement]; Marlins Agreement, supra note
234, § 5.2, at 4-5.
242. Mitten & Burton supra note 47, at 65.
243. Metro Sports Facilities Comm'n. v. Minnesota Twins P'ship, 638 N.W.2d 214, 219 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2002).
244. Id. at 227.
245. The Yankees case involved only three games; in the Twins case, no relocation would
occur-the Twins would have ceased to exist.
246. Although admittedly unlikely, a situation could arise in which the home city does not
particularly want the breaching team to play out its lease. This could occur if a city were confident
that a better replacement team would be available. In that case, the inclusion of liquidated or other
recoverable monetary damages would allow the home city to pursue the then-preferred monetary
remedy for breach.
247. See, e.g., Pomeranz v. McDonald's Corp., 843 P.2d 1378, 1381 (Colo. 1993) ("[D]amages
are not recoverable for losses beyond an amount that a plaintiff can establish with reasonable
certainty by a preponderance of evidence.") (emphasis in original). Id.
248. See, e.g., Mitten & Burton, supra note 49, at 57-60, n.7.
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for the home city in drafting a non-relocation agreement. 24 9 That cities are
willing to spend such high-dollar amounts on MLB stadiums 250 speaks to, at
least, the perception that benefits beyond monetary value will accrue. In fact,
considering the exorbitant amount a city may invest in building a state-of-the-
art stadium for its team and the uncertainty of stadium revenues dependant on
attendance and concessions, psychic income may ultimately be the only net
return on the city's investment.
The inclusion of psychic income damage calculations need not undermine
a home city's preferred remedy of specific performance or other equitable
relief. As discussed above, specific language in the agreement can establish
an agreement that damage amounts do not fully compensate for the loss, while
maintaining the option of some monetary recovery for loss of psychic income,
instead of nothing at all. Given that psychic income damages are not
reasonably calculable, their inclusion in a non-relocation agreement may be
the city's only chance at recovery.
Despite the possibility of limitations in agreements containing only
equitable remedies, equitable remedy provisions are a vital part of a well-
drafted non-relocation agreement. As mentioned above, in the only two
enforcement suits that reached a decision, the court in each case granted the
home city's request for an equitable remedy, although it is noteworthy that
neither suit involved a team attempting to permanently relocate. 251
Considering the goal of providing the maximum protection for the city's
interest in having a team and for its investment in building a stadium for that
team, the best agreements will include both equitable and non-equitable
remedy options. 252
B. Bankruptcy Considerations
The implications of an MLB franchise entering bankruptcy proceedings
should be of special concern to the home city. Many of the non-relocation
agreements involving MLB teams, whether a standalone agreement or one
incorporated into a team's stadium lease, contain language that is designed to
protect the home city's interest in preventing team relocation should a
bankruptcy occur. Different non-relocation agreements may approach the
bankruptcy issue somewhat differently.253 Regardless of the approach,
249. Id at 63-66, 72; Mitten & Burton, supra note 47, at 817-820.
250. Mitten & Burton, supra note 47, at 64; see generally Martin J. Greenberg, Sports Facility
Financing and Development Trends in the United States, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 93 (2004).
251. Seenote245.
252. See note 246.
253. Compare, e.g., Baseball Playing and Use Agreement between Minnesota Ballpark Authority
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attempts at ensuring non-relocation in the bankruptcy context are of
questionable value. However, separating a non-relocation agreement from the
stadium lease may provide some protection, and bankruptcy courts may
ultimately aid the home city's cause.
1. Ipso Facto Clauses
The typical non-relocation agreement includes language to the general
effect that (1) the commencement of any bankruptcy or other insolvency
proceedings, voluntary or involuntary, or (2) the appointment of a trustee or
receiver, or (3) an assignment for the benefit of creditors all constitute an
event of default or breach of the non-relocation agreement and that the non-
relocation agreement is not dischargeable in any such proceeding. 254
Although these provisions appear to give protection to the city, they are
essentially worthless; such provisions are expressly contemplated and
expressly rejected by the Bankruptcy code. 255  Section 365(e)(1) of the
Bankruptcy code states:
[A]n executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may
not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation
under such contract or lease may not be terminated or
modified, at any time after the commencement of the case
solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is
conditioned on-
(A) the insolvency or final condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a [bankruptcy]
trustee ... or a custodian before such commencement." 256
Known as "ipso facto" clauses, these provisions will not be enforced by a
and Minnesota Twins, LLC, § 6.1, at 14 (April 26, 2007) [hereinafter Twins Agreement]
(bankruptcy/insolvency a defined "event of default"), with Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, § 5.2,
at 4 (bankruptcy language included in "Declaratory or Injunctive Relief' clause).
254. See, e.g., Twins Agreement, supra note 253, § 6.1, at 14.
255. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2010).
256. Id
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bankruptcy court.257 Therefore, they are of no assistance to the home city in
securing the team's location exiting bankruptcy, absent a ruling that the non-
relocation agreement is not part of an executory contract or an unexpired lease.
2. Section 365, Unexpired Leases, and Executory Contracts
Section 365 of the Bankruptcy code grants a bankrupt debtor the right to
reject "any executory contract or unexpired lease . .. ."258Because of Section
365, any non-relocation obligations contained in a team's stadium lease, along
with the stadium lease itself, can be rejected. 259
A few agreements attempt to structure the non-relocation agreement in a
way that moves the agreement outside the reach of Section 365.260 Avoiding
the application of Section 365 appears to be a primary motive for separating a
team's non-relocation agreement from its stadium lease. 261 Standalone non-
relocation agreements may also contain language that attempts to establish that
the agreement is not an executory contract. 262
Executory contract is not defined in the Bankruptcy code. 263 Determining
the meaning of this term, and the scope of its application to Section 365, has
been the source of much confusion, litigation, and academic debate. 264 Under
257. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler Fin. Servs. Am., LLC v. Jones (In re Jones), 591 F.3d 308, 312
(4th Cir.2010); Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir.
2009).
258. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2010).
259. Id.; see also Ralph C. Anzivino, Reorganization of the Professional Sports Franchise, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9, 40-41 (2001).
260. See, e.g., Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, § 5.2, at 4-5.
261. Structurally, standalone NRAs typically recite that the consideration supplied by the home
city for the NRA is the construction of a new stadium. This bolsters the argument that, because
performance does not remain on both sides, the "Countryman Test" is not satisfied, and therefore, the
NRA is not an executory contract.
262. Some NRAs include language to the effect that the parties agree that the NRA is not an
executory contract and does not constitute a claim. For the reasons discussed in this section, contract
language modifying the effects of the Bankruptcy code will not be enforced.
263. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101-102 (2010).
264. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MINN. L. REv. 227, 227-233 (1989).
Bankruptcy is that volume of the law that might have been written by Lewis Carroll ....
In no chapter of that volume has the law become more psychedelic than in the one titled
"executory contracts." The courts increasingly voice cries of confusion and frustration
over the treatment of contracts in bankruptcy.
Id. at 228. Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group (In re the Drexel Bumham Lambert Group),
138 B.R. 687, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The psychedelic confusion in the area of executory contracts
has infected every aspect of the matter before us, providing textbook examples of the errors in
analysis that Westbrook and Andrew complain about.").
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the "Countryman Test," adopted by many courts, a contract must have
material performance due on both sides to be an executory contract eligible for
rejection under Section 365.265 However, a "growing case law trend" has
adopted a "functional analysis test," which considers the best interests of the
estate to be the primary concern in determining whether a contract can be
rejected. 266
In an attempt to avoid rejection under Section 365, some non-relocation
agreements are (1) separated from the stadium lease so that the agreement
cannot be rejected as an "unexpired lease" and (2) consideration from the
home city is limited to performance that is completed very early in the contract
term (i.e., construction of the stadium), so that material performance will not
remain on both sides.
It is certainly possible that a bankruptcy court could find that a standalone
agreement, with no consideration left due from the home city, cannot be
rejected under Section 365, but that is far from certain. Obviously, whether a
court applies the Countryman Test or the functional analysis test will be
important. Other potential pitfalls include (1) the court may treat the non-
relocation agreement and the stadium lease as a single contract, 267 (2) if the
contract is not executory, it may be considered a "claim," 268 and (3) if the
non-relocation agreement is blocking the debtor from accomplishing an
effective reorganization, it may be seen as contrary to fundamental bankruptcy
policy to let the agreement stand.269
3. Federal Bankruptcy Policy
In general, bankruptcy courts have wide latitude to act in furtherance of
the goals of bankruptcy law. 270 This includes the power to modify creditor-
debtor relations. 271 And the fundamental goal of bankruptcy law-effective
reorganization of the debtor 272-may well be at odds with the interests of the
265. RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 264-65 (4th Cir.
2004).
266. NAT'L BANKRUPTCY REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, THE
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 475 (1997).
267. A stadium lease will often contain references to the corresponding standalone non-
relocation agreement if the agreements are separate; stadium leases and non-relocation agreements are
also typically executed in the same general time period.
268. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2010).
269. See infra section X.B.3.
270. § 105(a).
271. Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Coming Corp. (In re Dow Coming Corp.), 280 F.3d 648,
657 (6th Cir. 2002).
272. See, e.g., Mason v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re FBI Distrib. Corp.), 330
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home city-exiting bankruptcy with the non-relocation agreement intact.
Given the wide-ranging powers of bankruptcy courts, it may not be
possible to draft a "bankruptcy-proof' agreement. However, the strategy of
separating the non-relocation agreement from the stadium lease is advisable.
Although the executory contract issue will have to be litigated, a separate
agreement provides the greatest protection for the city in the bankruptcy
context. If the bankruptcy court adopts the Countryman test, the non-
relocation agreement has at least a chance of surviving an attempt to reject
under Section 365. If the non-relocation provisions are contained in a stadium
lease, it is likely that Section 365 permits the team to reject the agreement.
4. Bankruptcy Law May Protect the Home City
Although a non-relocation agreement cannot supersede or alter bankruptcy
law and might not even be able to avoid Section 365 rejection, the bankruptcy
process does not provide a convenient means for a franchise owner to avoid
non-relocation obligations. Indeed, the bankruptcy code contains provisions
that will serve to protect the interests of the home city, and bankruptcy courts,
in two cases involving NHL franchises, have applied the bankruptcy code in a
manner that maintained each franchise's location.
First, there is a good faith requirement for bankruptcy filings. 273 A
bankruptcy petition must be filed for a legitimate bankruptcy purpose. 274 The
bankruptcy court will apply an objective test to determine whether a petition
was filed in good faith. 275 A petition filed solely as a litigation strategy is not
a good faith filing. 276 The good faith requirement will prohibit a franchise
from filing bankruptcy for the sole purpose of avoiding enforcement of a non-
relocation agreement.
Second, the absolute priority rule will limit a franchise owner's ability to
relocate a team by using the bankruptcy process. Under the absolute priority
rule, unless all unsecured creditors are paid in full, the franchise owner cannot
retain any interest in the franchise. 277 This includes the home city, regardless
of whether the non-relocation agreement is rejected in bankruptcy. Even if a
F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) ("The paramount objective of a Chapter 11 reorganization is to rehabilitate
and preserve the value of the financially distressed business.").
273. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); In re 15375 Mem'1 Corp. v. BEPCO, L.P., 589 F.3d 605, 618 (3d Cir.
2009).
274. Id.
275. Id. at n.7-8.
276. Id. at 625.
277. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 441-42
(1999).
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franchise owner is able to reject the non-relocation agreement under Section
365, the home city will have a claim against the bankruptcy estate for breach
of the non-relocation agreement. 278 Accordingly, the home city's damages
claim must be paid in full in order for the pre-filing team owner to remain the
team owner exiting bankruptcy. 279 In such a case, even if equitable remedies
are unavailable, the monetary value of the home city's claim remains a
deterrent to relocation through the bankruptcy process. This underscores the
importance of a liquidated damages clause to establish the value of a damages
claim.
Third, relocation by means of an expedited sale through the bankruptcy
process may not be available. Under Bankruptcy Code Section 363, it is
possible for a franchise to be sold shortly after entering bankruptcy, "free and
clear of any interest," if a sale is necessary to preserve the value of the
franchise. 280  However, Section 363 sales are closely scrutinized by the
bankruptcy court,281 and the sale must provide adequate protection of any
interest that the franchise is sold free and clear of.282The court is required to
prohibit a franchise sale that does not provide adequate protection. 283
Team relocation by means of a Section 363 sale was unsuccessfully
attempted by the Phoenix Coyotes of the NHL because the bankruptcy court
rejected the Section 363 sale to the buyer that would have relocated the
team. 284 The team owner filed bankruptcy and attempted to sell the Coyotes,
using Section 363, to a new owner (PSE Sports and Entertainment LP) that
would have moved the Coyotes to Canada. 285 The city and the NHL sued to
block this sale. The bankruptcy court dismissed with prejudice the sale to
PSE, finding that adequate protection was not provided to the NHL of its
interests in membership control and control over team location. Other issues
were not decided by the court; 286 therefore, it is unknown whether the home
city's interests would have been protected without intervention by the NHL.
278. COR Route 5 Co., LLC v. Penn Traffic Co. (In re Penn Traffic Co.), 524 F.3d 373, 378 (2d
Cir. 2008).
279. However, there is a "new value exception" recognized by some courts, whereby a pre-filing
team owner could hold an ownership interest in the team by contributing additional capital (new
value) to the team's assets. See, e.g., In re Bonner Mall P'ship, 2 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir.1993).
280. 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2010).
281. Anzivino, supra note 259, at 59-60.
282. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577, 591 (Bnkr. D. Ariz. 2009).
283. Id. at 591.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 580.
286. For example, one of the undecided issues in Dewey Ranch was the city's claim that its right
to specific performance was non-dischargeable. Id. at 589-90.
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Ultimately, a sale of the Coyotes franchise to the NHL was approved, and the
Coyotes remained in Phoenix. 287
Finally, a bankruptcy court may utilize its broad authority to protect the
home city's interest. This was the case in 1998 when the NHL's Pittsburgh
Penguins entered bankruptcy. 288 In that case, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania first issued a temporary injunction, then a
permanent injunction to enjoin team owners from breaching non-relocation
obligations. 289 The court, upholding the terms of the Penguins non-relocation
agreement, found that a monetary claim for damages would not adequately
compensate the city of Pittsburgh's equitable claim and that Pittsburgh's
equitable remedies did not constitute a claim in bankruptcy. 290 Although
arguably not in the best interests of the debtor franchise, the court used its
broad equitable powers to enjoin the franchise from soliciting bids from
buyers that would relocate the team. 291 Thus, in light of the attempts by the
Coyotes and Penguins franchises to relocate during bankruptcy, MLB
franchise owners should be reluctant to pursue the bankruptcy process as a
means of circumventing a non-relocation agreement.
Ultimately, the most serious threat for the home city-one that a non-
relocation agreement might not be able to survive-is a situation where the
home team has a legitimate reason to file for bankruptcy protection and where
relocation is in the best interests for the team to remain viable. The purpose of
federal bankruptcy law is to allow a financially distressed debtor a fresh start
and the opportunity to be successful. If a bankruptcy court determines that the
franchise's viability is threatened by the continued existence of a non-
relocation agreement but that the franchise could recover if not bound by the
agreement, the court has the authority to take the steps necessary to preserve
the franchise. Perhaps the only certainty is that the outcome of a franchise
bankruptcy filing is unpredictable. 292 A liquidated damages clause is crucial
in this situation for the home city to maximize its recovery, should a court
deny the home city's request for equitable relief.
287. Bankruptcy Judge Approves Sale of Coyotes to NHL., REUTERS, Nov. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0245838620091102.
288. Public Auditorium Auth. of Pittsburgh & Allegheny County v. HBRM, LLC (In re
Pittsburgh Sports Assocs. Holding Co.), 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1870 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1999).
289. Id. at *7-9.
290. Id. at *19-33.
291. Id. at*l8-19.
292. As the bankruptcy court noted in another of the Dewey Ranch decisions, discussing whether
specific performance can be rejected, "the decisions are in disarray." Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC,
406 B.R. 30, 41 (Bnkr. D. Ariz. 2009) (quoting In re Ward, 194 B.R. 703, 714 (Bnkr. D. Mass 1996)).
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C. Antitrust
Major professional sports league constitutions, not non-relocation
agreements, demarcate the means by which an owner can move a franchise; 293
they also serve as the antitrust battlefield between any affected party and the
league with which they deal.
Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits any "contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." 294  "Single entity" status will defeat a Section I
lawsuit 295 because there must be multiple entities that do not have a "complete
unity of interest" 296 to form a "contract, combination ... or conspiracy." 297
It is unquestionably in the best interest of the professional sports league to
be considered a single entity. However, the single entity defense has been
largely unsuccessful in team relocation suits, and a recent Supreme Court
opinion, although not specifically ruling on team relocation, appears to have
further limited the viability of the single entity defense for leagues such as the
NFL and NBA.298
In the most notorious antitrust case involving team relocation, in which the
Oakland Raiders and owner Al Davis sued the NFL for blocking the Raiders'
proposed move to Los Angeles, the court ruled that the NFL was not a single
entity, and a jury returned a verdict against the NFL. 299 Antitrust law
generally protects the interests of would-be competitors and, therefore, works
against the interests of a home city.
MLB however, controls team relocation relatively free of concerns for
antitrust violations because MLB operates under a federal antitrust exemption
that dates back to a 1922 Supreme Court decision, Federal Baseball Club v.
National League of Professional Baseball.300 MLB's exemption generally has
been held to apply to the entire "business of baseball." 301
293. Non-relocation agreements merely contractually restrict a team owners' ability to utilize the
processes in the MLB Constitution to relocate their teams.
294. 15 U.S.C. § 1(2010).
295. See, e.g., Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
296. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
297. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
298. See generally American Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (U.S. 2010).
299. See generally L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984).
300. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l League of Prof'1 Baseball, 258 U.S. 200 (1922).
301. See, e.g., Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); Flood v. Kuhn,
443 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Although it has been criticized by commentators and courts, and even by
the Supreme Court, MLB's antitrust exemption has been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court and likely will continue to exist absent a Congressional action
to repeal it. 302 Challenges under state antitrust laws have been generally
denied, or overturned, as preempted by federal antitrust laws.3 03 In the mid-
1990s, two courts held that the exemption does not apply to team relocation
but rather only to baseball's reserve system. 304 More recent cases, however,
indicate that MLB's antitrust exemption is alive and well. 305
The goals of antitrust law stand in opposition to the goals of the non-
relocation agreement. Antitrust law is designed to protect the existence of
markets with multiple competitors; the non-relocation agreement is drafted to
prevent another city from "stealing" the home city's team by making a better
offer.
The non-relocation agreement itself runs little risk of violating antitrust
law. The Sherman Act has been interpreted to prohibit only contracts that
unreasonably restrain interstate commerce. 306 A team can only play in one
place at a time so, for a team to have a home city, exclusion of other possible
home cities is unavoidable. Because the non-relocation agreement enables the
home city to build new facilities, the non-relocation agreement can be said to
facilitate commerce rather than restrain it. However, it is possible that an
unreasonably long contract term, far beyond that needed to justify the
construction of new facilities, could unreasonably restrain the competition
between cities for a professional sports franchise. Much more likely are
antitrust lawsuits that challenge league constitutions and league actions that
control team relocation. The non-relocation agreement, as a contract between
an individual franchise and its home city, would not be implicated in such
lawsuits.
Northern California may be the site of the next antitrust battle over MLB
team relocation, as the city of San Francisco and the San Francisco Giants
battle to keep their interleague rival, the Oakland A's, from moving to San
Jose. 307 The Oakland A's stadium lease expires in 2013. The A's owners,
302. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 269-85 (1972).
303. See. e.g., State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d I (Wis. 1966).
304. Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v. Nat'1
League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
305. See. e.g., Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2001),
affirmed by Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (U.S. 1898); Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (U.S. 1918).
307. See, e.g., Pete Toms, LWIB: MLB's Anti-Trust Exemption and Franchise Relocation,
BIZOFBASEBALL.COM, Jan. 4, 2010 available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/LWIB%3a+MLB's+
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John Fisher and Lewis Woolf, are in the market for a new stadium in Northern
California, and San Jose has emerged as a contender. 308 Although the A's
would be moving farther away from San Francisco, the city of San Francisco
believes that an A's move to San Jose would cause the Giants' revenues to
drop, which, in turn, would economically harm San Francisco, as the city
depends on Giants' revenues to pay off the bonds that paid for improvements
to San Francisco's AT&T Park. 309 San Francisco City Attorney Dennis
Herrera has threatened to sue MLB if the A's are allowed to move to San
Jose. 310
A suit by San Francisco would be unique. Apart from the initial standing
issues, San Francisco would be asking a court to enforce an anticompetitive
territory restriction that MLB was not attempting to impose. 31 1  The typical
antitrust action involves a team owner or a city filing suit because team
relocation has been denied by league officials, asserting that the professional
sports league's relocation restrictions unreasonably restrain competition
between cities for a professional franchise. 312 Here, the city of San Francisco
would sue to block the relocation of the A's to a more competitive market,
specifically because the move would increase the number of competitors in the
relevant market.
A suit by San Francisco would renew the battle over the scope of MLB's
antitrust exemption. Opposing sides will argue that either (1) MLB's
exemption extends to the entire "business of baseball," 313 including team
relocation or (2) the exemption extends only to baseball's reserve clause. 314
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the application
of baseball's antitrust exemption to team relocation, this issue remains a
Anti-Trust+Exemption+and+Franchise+Relocation.-a0215726071.
308. See id
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See id.
312. See, e.g., Raiders 1, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), and Raiders II, 791 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir.
1986). Another typical antitrust action is a suit by the city that is losing its home team. These suits
have been brought under state antitrust laws and have never successfully blocked the relocation of a
pro sports franchise. Such suits are usually held to be pre-empted by federal antitrust laws. See, e.g.,
State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 144 N.W.2d I (Wis. 1966) (Milwaukee suit to block the Braves'
move to Atlanta); L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th
Cir. 1984) (Oakland suit to block Oakland Raiders from moving to LA).
313. See generally Major League Baseball v. Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Fla.
2001), affirmedby Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (1Ith Cir. 2003); Charles 0. Finley
& Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1971).
314. E.g., Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Butterworth v.
Nat'l League of Prof I Baseball Clubs, 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
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subject of vigorous debate.
D. The Future of Sports Franchise Relocation Litigation: Tropicana
Field v. Tampa Bay Rays
The next battleground for a stadium relocation debate is none other than
"build it and they will come" St. Petersburg, Florida, one of the foreclosure
capitals of America. 315
Tropicana Field, originally known as the Florida Suncoast Dome, opened
in 1990 to attract a MLB team to downtown St. Petersburg, Florida. 316 The
city first attempted to acquire a Major League tenant in 1989 when Jerry
Reinsdorf used Tropicana Field as leverage to get a new stadium built for the
White Sox in Chicago.317 From 1990 until 1995, Tropicana Field was unable
to acquire an MLB franchise and instead became home to the National Hockey
League's Tampa Bay Lightning. In 1995, MLB expanded to the Tampa Bay
area and Tropicana Field underwent a $70 million renovation to upgrade a
stadium that had originally cost $138 million to build.318 Overall, public
financing was responsible for all but $14 million of the total cost of Tropicana
Field. 319
The Tampa Bay Rays (Rays) were purchased by an ownership group led
by Vincent J. Naimoli in 1995.320 The Tampa Bay ownership group signed a
thirty-year Use Agreement (by and between the City of St. Petersburg, Florida
and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Ltd. (Rays) dated April 28, 1995) that
included a non-relocation clause, which stated as follows:
Section 2.04. Provision of Major League Baseball. In
315. St. Pete Officials Weighing Options as Rays Eye New Ballpark, STREET & SMITH'S
SPoRTSBUSINESS DAILY, June 23, 2010, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/
140231.
316. Tropicana Field Historical Analysis, BASEBALL-ALMANAC.cOM, http://www.baseball-
almanac.com/stadium/tropicana field.shtml (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Tropicana Field].
317. E. M. Swift, The Sunshine Sox?: After 88 years of Playing Baseball in Chicago, the White
Sox May be Heading South to the Lucrative Market ofFlorida, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 30, 1988,
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1067374/index.htm#ixzz
15mh31fb8.
318. Roger Mills, Jounice L. Nealy, & Jack Sheppard, Answers for Rays Fans, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, available at http://www.sptimes.com/THEFIRSTDAY/33098/ Answersfor
Rays fan.html.
319. "Tropicana Field," BALLPARKSOFBASEBALL.COM, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/all
TropField.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
320. Marc Topkin, Naimoli's Reign, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, http://www.sptimes.
comI/2005/10/07/Rays/Naimoli s reign.shtml.
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consideration for the CLUB's rights under his Agreement,
during the Term the CLUB . .. shall:
Cause the Franchise to play all of its Home Games in the
DOME; ...
Not play any of the Franchise's Home Games in any facility
other than the DOME without the CITY's consent, which may
be withheld in the CITY's sole discretion
Not permit relocation of the Franchise from the DOME. 321
The Use Agreement included remedies, which specifically addressed a
breach of the non-relocation clause, and an exclusive dealings clause, which
defined the actions that would constitute a breach:
Section 8.03. Remedies. The CLUB and CITY agree that
neither has an adequate remedy at law for breach of this
Agreement. The CLUB and CITY agree that, in the event of a
violation of this Agreement, the party not in default shall be
entitled as a non-exclusive remedy, and in addition to an
action for damages, to seek and obtain an injunction or decree
of specific performance or an equitable remedy from a court
of competent jurisdiction to enjoin or remedy any violation of
the Agreement. In the event a court refuses to grant specific
enforcement of Section 2.04, the parties agree that one
element of the damages to be considered by the court as
having been incurred by the CITY for a breach of Section
2.04 would be the outstanding bond debt at the time of the
breach on those bonds backed by the Franchise Funds. 322
Section 11.01. Exclusive Dealings While this agreement is in
effect .. . neither the CLUB nor any of its respective parties,
principals, directors, officers, employees, owners, or agents
will enter into, initiate or conduct any agreement or
321. Agreement for the Use, Management and Operation of the Domed Stadium in St. Petersburg
Including the Provision of Major League Baseball between the City of St. Petersburg, Florida and the
Tampa Bay Devil Rays, LTD, a Florida limited partnership, at 12 (Apr. 28, 1995), available at
http://cori.missouri.edulcori-kbasel/NonSEC/Unclassified/StadiumContractsfinal/StPeteFL Us
eAgmt pc.pdf [hereinafter Rays Agreement].
322. Id. at 28-29.
86 [Vol. 2 1:1
MLB NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
negotiations (directly or indirectly) for the use of any facility
other than the DOME for the Home Games of the Franchise
except to the extent permitted by Section 2.04. The parties
recognize that any violation of this provision will result in
irreparable harm and damages that are not readily calculable.
Accordingly, as a non-exclusive remedy, in addition to any
damages that may be deemed to be appropriate, the CITY and
the CLUB acknowledge that each party shall be entitled to
injunctive relief in the event of a violation of this Section by
any other party. 323
The City's remedies include the right to specific performance or an injunction
in the event that the Rays breach the non-relocation clause. In the event that a
court refuses to grant specific performance, one element of damages to be
considered is the outstanding bond debt. Most interestingly, the Rays' Use
Agreement considers even indirect contact with another venue to be a breach;
therefore, the Rays would not be permitted to use another stadium as leverage
against the City in future negotiations, similar to how Jerry Reinsdorf used the
Florida Suncoast Dome in 1989.
Stuart Sternberg purchased a controlling interest in the Rays from Naimoli
and became the team's Managing General Partner in 2004.324 Since the
ownership change, the Rays have been very successful, including a trip to the
World Series in 2008. However, despite its achievements on the field, the
Rays franchise has been unable to generate the revenues necessary to support a
Major League franchise in downtown St. Petersburg. The New York-based
Sternberg is a strong supporter of relocating the franchise, saying Tropicana
Field would not "last" until 2020 and that the Rays "were not going to be there
through 2027."325
Although the Rays are locked into their Use Agreement through 2027, St.
Petersburg Mayor, Rick Baker, commissioned "A Baseball Community"
Coalition (ABC Coalition) in an effort to determine the best strategies for
maintaining the long-term viability of MLB in the Tampa Bay area. 326 The
ABC Coalition report ultimately determined that both a new stadium and
323. Id. at 32.
324. Topkin, supra note 320.
325. Neil de Mause, Rays Stadium Watch: When Is a Threat Not a Threat, FIELD OF
SCHEMES.COM, May 27, 2010, http://www.fieldofschemes.com/news/archives/2010/05/4177_rays
stadium wa.html.
326. THE ABC COALITION, RECOMMENDATIONS TO KEEP AND SUSTAIN MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL IN THE TAMPA BAY REGION 2, available at http://www.tampabay.com/specials/2010/
PDFs/rays012910/The%20ABC%2OCoalition%2OFinal%2OReport.pdf [hereinafter ABC REPORT].
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location would be necessary. 327
A new stadium was deemed necessary because Tropicana Field was
considered to be at the end of its economic usefulness and was missing key
architectural features that would not be cost-effective to renovate. 328
Challenges to Tropicana Field's revenue-generating capacity included (1) a
complex movement pattern throughout the stadium, which limited the
potential for fan access to amenities, (2) compromised views from both
general admission and premium seating, (3) roof catwalks that interfere with
play, and (4) a pervasive lack of natural light. 329 The ABC Coalition Report
also determined that Tropicana Field was missing features that have become
standards for modem ballparks. 330 The stadium lacked open concourses, more
comfortable seating, club lounges with field views, fan-friendly amenities,
and, most significantly, a retractable roof.331 Tropicana Field is currently the
only stadium in the MLB to have a non-retractable roof.332 Ultimately, the
ABC Coalition Report determined that these upgrades would cost between
$200 and $475 million to renovate the current stadium, which was considered
too costly.333 Therefore, the ABC Coalition Report concluded that Tropicana
Field is near the end of its economically useful life. 334
Most detrimental to the city of St. Petersburg is the ABC Coalition's
finding that a new location was also necessary to increase the franchise's
revenue generating capacity and to enhance corporate support. 335 The ABC
Coalition determined that it was necessary for the team to take advantage of
the growing population of Tampa Bay and to be more accessible to its
corporations. 336  Corporations are traditionally the backbone of an MLB
franchise's revenue, normally accounting for two-thirds of a team's season
ticket sales. 337 However, in St. Petersburg, only one-third of the Rays' season
tickets are bought by corporations. 338 Since 2005, Tropicana Field's overall
327. John Romano, Stadium Report Says Everything the Tampa Rays Could Have Hoped, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, January 27, 2010, http://www.tampabay.com/sports/baseball/rays/article
1068419.ece.
328. ABC REPORT, supra note 326, at 5.
329. Id. at 15.
330. Id
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 16.
334. Id.
335. See id at 9-14.
336. Id. at 12-13.
337. Id. at I1.
338. Id.
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attendance has ranked between twenty-third and thirtieth in the MLB.339
However, the Rays were one of only nine teams to increase their average
attendance in 2009.340
With the potential of relocation, the loss of a valuable community asset,
and an adversarial stadium debate, a number of interested parties have begun
to take action. The Tourist Development Commission is drafting a plan that
could reserve hotel tax dollars to fund a new park for the Tampa Bay Rays as
early as 2015.341 "The Tourist Commission ... controls a 5% tax on
temporary lodging like hotel and motel rooms. The tax brings in
approximately $25 million a year that is largely spent on tourist marketing,
beach re-nourishment, and sports facilities." 342
The Tampa Bay Partnership has offered to mediate and work with all
parties in deciding the very best location for venue replacement. Rays
majority owner Stewart Sternberg has indicated that he wants to consider sites
throughout the Bay area, including Hillsborough County and Tampa. 343
Mayor Bill Foster has indicated that he would be willing to consider sites
adjacent to the city borders as a possible new home for the Tampa Bay
Rays.344 This would include the greater Gateway area, which would include
land outside the city limits such as a Greyhound Race Track, Derby Lane, and
Pinellas County's Airco Golf Course.
Sports venues have become the most important source of revenues for a
team owner because the income is oftentimes not shared with the league or
other owners and may make the difference in profitability. Tropicana Field is
a stadium that is antiquated, not state-of-the-art, cannot produce enough
revenue to be competitive, and puts the team at an economic disadvantage,
with a Use Agreement that requires an on-going relation with the stadium for
seventeen more years.
Tropicana Field has all the characteristics of an ensuing stadium debate:
an antiquated stadium, a community group that says if baseball is going to be
viable in the area, a new stadium is needed, and an owner who does not
339. MLB Attendance Report, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/attendance (last visited Nov.
3,2010).
340. ABC REPORT, supra note 326, at 10.
341. Stephen Nohlgren, Pinellas Bed Tax Could be Tapped to Build New Tampa Bay Rays
Stadium, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 3, 2010, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/local
govemment/pinellas-bed-tax-could-be-tapped-to-build-new-tampa-bay-rays-stadium/ll 106624.
342. Id.
343. Michael Van Sickler, Mayor Bill Foster Insists Tampa Bay Rays Focus on St. Petersburg,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 25, 2010, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/local
government/mayor-bill-foster-insists-tampa-bay-rays-focus-on-st-petersburg/1 104641.
344. Id.
2010] 89
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
necessarily have home roots in St. Petersburg. Although equitable remedies
requiring specific performance are present in most stadium leases, the St.
Petersburg situation gives rise to the necessity of a negotiated non-relocation
agreement. The government entity will want equitable remedies to keep the
team at home for the lease term, while the team will want some type of
monetary exit, which may be in the long run mean less dollars lost by virtue of
the ability to relocate into a state-of-the-art facility. Economic viability to
compete based on a state-of-the-art venue needs to be a concern of every
owner. Locking into the term of a lease without an ability to move, by virtue
of economic necessity, could be a financial disaster for an ownership group.
What may be a compromise is exclusive, equitable remedies for a certain
number of years of the lease with the right of the team thereafter to buy out of
the lease for a specified amount, which would take into consideration the
principal of any outstanding bonds plus interest, lost revenues, and loss of
psychic income, all agreed to on a liquidated amount basis.
Some balancing of the equities with respect to relocation agreements could
ultimately mean that the government unit will want more private equity side
coming to the table. Maybe this is the very reason that we are seeing more
sophisticated agreements, such as the agreements entered into by the Yankees,
the Twins, the Cardinals, and the Nationals, which attempt to more effectively
balance the equities.
PART TWO - BEST PRACTICE CLAUSES
I. INTRODUCTION: NON-RELOCATION AGREEMENTS
In writing this article, we specifically reviewed all leases and separate
non-relocation agreements addressing the issue of "keeping the team at home."
Although each of the leases or agreements is different, there are basic themes
contained in each of the lease or separate non-relocation agreements. The
terms of a specific non-relocation agreement will greatly depend upon the
needs of the parties, its purpose, political or otherwise, and the leverage of the
parties.
II. PREAMBLE - QUID PRO QUO
In most of the separate non-relocation agreements, there is a preamble or
"whereas" clause wherein there is a recitation of some form of subsidy or
government participation that the public has made in order to create the new
facility, the quid pro quo for which is an agreement by the team to stay at
home in the form of a non-relocation covenant or agreement.
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A. Preamble - Quid Pro Quo
1. St. Louis Cardinals 345 - Operations and Non-Relocation Agreement
WHEREAS, by Ordinance No. 65669, the Board of Aldermen
approved certain amendments to the Entertainment License
Tax codified in Chapter 8.08 of the Revised Code of the City
of St. Louis (the "Code"), which provides a tax rate incentive
in connection with the substantial investment in the new
construction or redevelopment of a Recreation Facility (as
defined in Ordinance No. 65669) and the substantial
investment in the development of adjacent mixed-use
development within a blighted or insanitary area pursuant to a
redevelopment plan approved by the City and a
redevelopment agreement approved by the Authority, and to
aid in the retention and acquirement of professional sports
teams; 346 and
WHEREAS, by Ordinance No. 65668, the Board of Aldermen
approved that certain redevelopment plan titled "Blighting and
Insanitary Study and Redevelopment Plan for the South
Downtown Redevelopment Project Area" dated September
24, 2002, (the "Redevelopment Plan") which plan designates
a certain area of the City as the "South Downtown
Redevelopment Project Area" (the "Redevelopment Area"),
provides for assistance in connection with the redevelopment
and construction of a new professional sports facility to serve
as the home of the Team within the Redevelopment Area, and
provides for up to 25 years of tax abatement within certain
portions of the Redevelopment Area as an incentive for the
construction and development of a sports facility;347 and
WHEREAS, the Cardinals and/or its Affiliates will
substantially benefit from the incentives and assistance
345. Operations and Non-Relocation Agreement between the Land Clearance for Redevelopment
Authority of the City of St. Louis and the St. Louis Cardinals, L.P., (Nov. 1, 2002) (hereinafter
Cardinals Agreement).
346. Id at 1.
347. Id.
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provided by Ordinances Nos. 65668 and 65669; 348 and
WHEREAS, the Cardinals and/or its Affiliates and the Team
will substantially benefit from the redevelopment of the
Redevelopment Area and the construction of the Ballpark;349
and
WHEREAS, the incentives and assistance provided for
Ordinance Nos. 65668 and 65669 and the Redevelopment
Plan will significantly aid the redevelopment of the
Redevelopment Area and the construction of the Ballpark;350
and
WHEREAS, the City has vested in the Authority the
responsibility to undertake and administer the Redevelopment
Plan and the redevelopment of the Redevelopment Area; 351
and
WHEREAS, as an inducement to the Authority to enter into a
redevelopment agreement with the Redeveloper which will
effectuate and make available the incentives and assistance
provided for in Ordinance Nos. 65668 and 65669, the
Cardinals have agreed to enter into this Agreement upon the
terms and conditions set forth herein. 352
2. Florida Marlins35 3 - Recitals
A. The Team owns the Major League Baseball franchise
known as the Florida Marlins. 354
B. Contemporaneously with the execution of this Agreement,
(i) the County, the City and Marlins Stadium Developer, LLC,
an affiliate of the Team, are entering into a Construction
Administration Agreement (the "Construction Agreement")
348. Id.
349. Id. at 2.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234.
354. Id. at 1.
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providing for the planning, design and construction of the
Baseball Stadium and the Public Infrastructure; and (ii) the
County, the City and Marlins Stadium Operator, LLC, another
affiliate of the Team (the "Stadium Operator"), are entering
into an Operating Agreement (the "Operating Agreement")
providing for the operation and management of the Baseball
Stadium by the Stadium Operator. (Capitalized terms used
but not defined in this Agreement have the meanings set forth
in the Operating Agreement.)3"s
C. As a material inducement to the County and the City to
enter into the Construction Agreement and the Operating
Agreement, the Team has agreed to enter into this Agreement
to assure that the Team will play its MLB home games at the
Baseball Stadium on the terms and conditions set forth
herein. 356
3. Houston Astros 357 - Recitals
1. Houston McLane is the holder of the franchise for the City
of Houston, Texas issued by the National League and is the
owner of the Houston Astros Baseball Club.358
2. The project known as "The Ballpark at Union Station"
includes the design, development, construction, and furnishing
of the Stadium pursuant to the Project Agreement and the
lease, use, and operation thereof by Houston McLane pursuant
to the terms and conditions of the Stadium Lease and the
License Agreement. 359
3. The Sports Authority, the City, and the County have
invested and contemplate continuing to invest a substantial
amount of funds for the design, development, construction,
and furnishing of the Stadium and such public entities have a
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Non-Relocation Agreement Between Harris County-Houston Sports Authority and Houston
McLane Company, Inc. d/b/a Houston Astro Baseball Club (June 17, 1998) [hereinafter Astros
Agreement].
358. Id. at 1.
359. Id.
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significant interest in assuring that Houston McLane shall
cause the Astros to play its Baseball Home Games at the
Stadium upon completion of construction. 360
4. As an inducement to the Sports Authority to enter into the
Project Agreement, the Stadium Lease, and the License
Agreement, Houston McLane has agreed to enter into this
Non-Relocation Agreement upon the terms and conditions set
forth herein. 361
4. Milwaukee Brewers 362 - Recitals
A. The presence and conduct of professional baseball in the
State of Wisconsin stimulates economic activity in the State
and, therefore, the creation of a modem state-of-the-art
baseball stadium facility for the playing of professional
baseball will be beneficial to the State.363
B. To promote the conduct of professional baseball in the
State, the District was established by the State's legislature
pursuant to Act 56 of the Wisconsin Legislature enacted on
October 12, 195, and published on October 25, 1995, for the
purpose of financing, acquiring, developing, construction,
owning, leasing and operating a modem state-of-the-art
baseball stadium facility. 364
C. The Team is the holder of the franchise for the City of
Milwaukee (the "City") issued by the National League or
Professional Baseball Clubs (the "National League") and is
the owner of the Milwaukee Brewers professional baseball
team (the "Milwaukee Brewers"). 365
D. The State and the District desire that the Milwaukee
360. Id
361. Id
362. Amended and Restated Non-Relocation Agreement Between Southeast Wisconsin
Professional Baseball Park District and Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club L.P. (January 1, 2004)
[hereinafter Brewers Agreement].
363. Id at 2.
364. Id
365. Id
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Brewers continue to play their Baseball Home Games in the
City and the Team desires to cause the Milwaukee Brewers to
continue to play their Baseball Home Games in the City.366
E. As an inducement to the Team to continue to cause the
Milwaukee Brewers to play their Baseball Home Games in the
City, the District, the State and the Team have agreed to cause
the "Stadium Project" and "Infrastructure" (as such terms are
defined in that certain Lease Agreement dated as of December
31, 1996, as amended and restated as of May 2004 [the
"Lease"] between the District and the Team) to be constructed
pursuant to that certain Construction Administration
Agreement (the "Construction Administration Agreement")
dated December 31, 1996.367
F. As an inducement to the District and the State to assist the
Team in causing the Stadium Project and Infrastructure to be
constructed, the Team has agreed to enter into this Non-
Relocation Agreement upon the terms and conditions set forth
herein. 368
G. The District and the Team previously entered into that
certain Non-Relocation Agreement dated as of December 31,
1996 (the "Original Non-Relocation Agreement"). 369
III. BASIC COVENANTS
Most of the non-relocation lease clauses or agreements will have basic
non-relocation covenants, which basically include (1) that the team will
maintain its principal place of business in the home city, (2) that the team will
maintain the franchise under MLB rules, (3) that, during the term of the lease
or some other identifiable term, the team will not relocate from the home city,
(4) that the team will play all of its home games, with some listed exceptions,
in the home city stadium, (5) that the team will not enter into negotiations with
respect to relocation, and (6) that prior to negotiations the team will give the
governmental unit notice of such negotiations.
366. Id.
367. Id
368. Id
369. Id at 3.
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A. Principal Place ofBusiness
1. St. Louis Cardinals
"2.4 Maintenance of Headquarters. The Cardinals shall maintain their
headquarters at the principal place of business within the city during the
term." 370
2. Florida Marlins
"2 Covenant to Play at Baseball Stadium. ... 1. The Team shall maintain
its principal place of business in the City." 371
3. Washington Nationals
"2.1-Obligation to Maintain Franchise In the District. (i) [T]he Team
shall maintain its principal place of business in the District of Columbia as a
registered business in good standing under all applicable laws." 372
4. Kansas City Royals
Section 22.01 - (G) [I]t is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Missouri, is now in
good standing under the laws of the State of Missouri and its
principal office is in Kansas City, Missouri. . . . (H). [I]t will
maintain its corporate existence, will not dissolve or otherwise
dispose of all or substantially all of its assets and will not
consolidate with or merge into another corporation or permit
one or more other corporations to consolidate with or merge
into it.373
B. Maintain Franchise Under ALB Rules
1. Washington Nationals
"2.1. (ii) [T]he Team shall maintain the franchise as a validly existing and
participating Major League Baseball Franchise under Baseball Rules and
370. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 7.
371. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 1.
372. Non-Relocation Agreement between the District of Columbia Sports and Entertainment
Commission and Baseball Expos, L.P., art. 2.1 (2005) [hereinafter Nationals Agreement].
373. Lease Agreement between Jackson County Sports Complex Authority and Kansas City
Royals Baseball Corporation, at 34-35 (January 19, 1990) [hereinafter Royals Agreement].
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Regulations." 374
2. St. Louis Cardinals
2.3 Maintenance of Franchise. At all times during the Term
the Cardinals shall (a) maintain the membership in good
standing of the Team in Major League Baseball and (b) hold,
maintain and defendant the right of the Team to play baseball
as a member of Major League Baseball and (c) use reasonable
efforts to oppose the adoption of any Major League Baseball
Rules and Regulations that would cause the Cardinals to be
unable to comply with any of the terms of this Agreement. 375
3. Minnesota Twins
Section 2.1 Maintenance of Franchise/Corporate Existence;
Covenant to Operate. (a) At all times during the Term, the
Team shall, subject to the provisions of this Article 2, (i)
maintain its membership and Franchise in the MLB in good
standing, (ii) own, hold, maintain and defend its rights and
Franchise to play baseball as a member of MLB in the
City. . . .376
C. Team Shall Not Relocate
1. New York Yankees
"2.1.3 - Prohibited Relocation. From the Effective Date through the
Initial Term, the Partnership shall not cause, nor permit to occur, any
Prohibited Relocation." 377
2. Milwaukee Brewers
"ARTICLE II - Transfer of Team's Franchise. b. The Team shall not
enter into any contract or agreement of any kind to transfer the Team's
374. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 2. 1.
375. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 6-7.
376. Twins Agreement, supra note 253, at 5.
377. Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of New York, the New York State Urban
Development Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation, the New York City
Industrial Development Agency, and the New York Yankees Partnership, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2006)
[hereinafter Yankees Agreement].
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Franchise outside the City of Milwaukee to a location other than the Stadium
Complex without the prior written consent of the State and the District." 378
3. Florida Marlins
"2. Covenant to Play at Baseball Stadium. ... 4. [T~he Team shall not
enter into any contract or agreement or make any request or application to
Major League Baseball to (i) relocate its franchise outside the City in violation
of clause (b) above .. . ."379
4. St. Louis Cardinals
"2.1 Agreement to Play and Not to Relocate. (b) The Cardinals shall not
relocate or transfer the Team outside the boundaries of the City, and shall not
change or move the home territory of the Team in any manner that would
exclude the City or the County." 380
5. Washington Nationals
"2.1 Obligations to Maintain Franchise in the District. (iv) [T]he Team
shall not relocate, attempt to relocate, or permit the relocation of, the Franchise
outside of the District of Columbia." 381
D. Play All Home Games
1. Atlanta Braves
"16.1.1 It shall play all of its Regular Season Home Games and Post
Season Home Games at the Olympic Stadium as required by Article 15."382
2. Milwaukee Brewers
"2. d. The Team shall, from and after the Commencement Date and until
the termination or expiration of the Lease, subject to Force Majeure, any
Untenantability Period, and to Baseball Rules and Regulations, play all of its
Baseball Home Games for each Season at the Stadium Complex." 383
378. Brewers Agreement, supra note 362, at 3.
379. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 2.
380. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 6.
381. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 2.1.
382. Operating Agreement between City of Atlanta and Fulton County Recreation Authority and
Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., at 62 (March 16, 1993) [hereinafter Braves Agreement].
383. Brewers Agreement, supra note 362, at 3.
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3. Washington Nationals
"2.1(iii). [T]he Team shall play all of the Franchise's Regular Season and
Post Season Baseball Home Games at the Baseball Stadium." 384
E. Exceptions to Home Game Requirements
1. Florida Marlins
3. Exceptions. Notwithstanding Sections 1 and 2 above, the
Team shall be permitted to play what would otherwise be an
MLB Home Game at a location other than the Baseball
Stadium:
(a) In the case of an Alternate Site Condition as provided in
Section 4;
(b) in any consecutive five-year period, up to three (3) regular
season MLB home games (not including any games played in
different locations under Section 3(a) above) in an
international or other location as permitted or requested by
Major League Baseball;
(c) in the case of playoff MLB games, at any location required
by Major League Baseball; and
(d) in the case of MLB games other than regular season and
playoff games, at any location it chooses. 385
2. New York Yankees
2.2.1 Exception for Home Games. Subject to Section 2.2.2,
up to twelve (12) Home Games over any two (2) consecutive
Regular MLB Seasons may be played in venues other than (a)
the Existing Stadium for Regular MLB Seasons ending prior
to the First Season Commencement Date or (b) the Stadium
for Regular MLB Seasons commencing on or after the First
Season Commencement Date; provided, that, in no event shall
the number of Home Games played during any Regular MLB
384. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 2.1.
385. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 2.
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Season in venues other than the Existing Stadium or the
Stadium, as the case may be, equal or exceed the number of
Home Games that would cause or constitute a Prohibited
Relocation under Section 2.1.3; and, provided, further, that
Home Games which are cancelled or suspended in accordance
with the MLB Trinity due to weather or due to field
conditions other than field conditions resulting from the
actions of the Partnership or the failure by the tenant under the
Lease Agreement to perform its obligations thereunder, and
are rescheduled and played in the home ballpark of another
Major League Baseball Club in accordance with the MLB
Trinity, shall be treated, for purposes of Section 2.1.1, as
having been played in the Existing Stadium or the Stadium, as
applicable.386
3. Washington Nationals
"2.1(c). Once every five years, up to three Regular Season Home Games
in an international or other venue as requested by Major League Baseball." 387
4. Minnesota Twins
2.1(e). At all times during the Term, the Team shall play all
regular and post season games at the Ballpark unless
otherwise required by any Untenantability Period and subject
to Section 11.4(d) of the Ballpark Lease Agreement; provided
that on a non-regular basis, the Team may, if required by
MLB, play no more than 5 home games per year in a foreign
country. Preseason games and MLB All-Star Games
scheduled to be played in the Twin Cities metropolitan area
shall be played at the Ballpark unless otherwise required by
MLB Rules and Regulations, or any Untenantability Period
and subject to Section 11.4(c) of the Ballpark Lease
Agreement. 388
5. Houston Astros
2.1.1 Covenant to Play in Astrodome Complex
386. Yankees Agreement, supra note 377, at 3.
387. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 2.1.
388. Twins Agreement, supra note 376, at 5.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Astros shall be entitled to
play, and the foregoing covenant shall not prevent or prohibit
the Astros from playing, up to five (5) of their Baseball Home
Games outside the Astrodome Complex during each Major
League Baseball Season during the Astrodome Non-
Relocation Period; provided that none of such five (5)
Baseball Home Games shall include any game in the opening
homestand of a Major League Baseball Season (excluding any
pre-season play), any game during the final four (4) weeks of
the Major League Baseball Season (excluding any post-season
play), or any playoff game or game of the World Series. The
right to play certain Baseball Home Games outside the
Astrodome Complex as provided in the preceding sentence
shall be non-cumulative and any unused portion shall expire at
the end of each Major League Baseball Season. 389
2.1.2 Untenantability of Astrodome Complex
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 2.1.1 to the
contrary, if an Astrodome Untenantable Condition shall exist
at any time during the Astrodome Non-Relocation Period,
then Houston McLane shall be entitled to make arrangements
for alternate sites and the Astros shall be entitled to play their
Baseball Home Games at such alternate sites but only during
the period of time that any such Astrodome Untenantable
Condition shall exist and provided that Houston McLane uses
commercially reasonable and diligent efforts to mitigate and
overcome such Astrodome Untenantable Condition. 390
6. San Diego Padres
13.1. Exclusive Venue
13.1.2 Notwithstanding paragraphs 13.1.1 the Padres may,
without the City's consent:
(a) during each Major League Baseball Season included in the
Term, play up to three (3) Home Games outside the
389. Astros Agreement, supra note 357, at 2.
390. Id.
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continental United States;
(b) play one home series not to exceed five (5) Major League
Baseball Games in Asia during the period commencing on the
first day of the first Major League Baseball Season after the
Commencement Date and ending three (3) years after that
date, and during each successive three (3) year period
thereafter; provided, however, that the Padres may not,
without the City's prior written consent, play a home series in
Asia in any Season immediately following a Season in which
the Padres played a home series in Asia; and
(c) play Home Games at a facility other than the Ballpark
Property if any Governmental Authority with jurisdiction over
the Ballpark Property and its use
F. No Negotiations and/or Notice of Negotiations
1. Milwaukee Brewers
ARTICLE II - Transfer of Team's Franchise. f.
The State and the District shall be given prior written notice of
any negotiations regarding:
i.Any proposed relocation of the Team's Franchise to a
location other than the Stadium Complex;
ii.Any proposed sale or transfer that would involve relocation
of the Team's Franchise to a location other than the Stadium
Complex; or
iii.Any related sale or transfer of the Team's Ownership
Interest in the Stadium Complex. 391
2. New York Mets
2.1.4
No Adverse Action. From the Effective Date through the
391. Brewers Agreement, supra note 362, at 4.
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Initial Term, the Partnership will not (a) cause, nor (b) to the
extent within its powers, permit to occur, nor (c) enter into or
participate in any negotiations or discussions with, or apply
for or seek approval from, third parties, including MLB or any
MLB Entity, with respect to any agreement, legislation or
financing that contemplates, or would be reasonably likely to
result in, any action that would contravene or result in
contravention of Section 2.1 (Non-Relocation).39 2
IV. REMEDIES
A. Equitable Remedies
Non-relocation agreements contain equitable remedies. The equitable
language in these non-relocation leases and agreements recognizes and
acknowledges that a non-relocation covenant is an essential element of the
bargain and consideration of creating the stadium for purposes of protecting
the business and good will of the governmental units; that the asset of having a
team in the home city is unique and cannot be valued monetarily; that there is
normally a listing of those economic values, which include, but are not limited
to, new jobs, additional revenue sources, economic development, and
increased tourism; that the governmental unit will suffer irrevocable injury and
harm if there is a breach of the obligation to play its home games in the home
city facility; that monetary damages could not be calculated to compensate the
government unit for any breach of the non-relocation covenant; that, in the
event of any form of material default, violation, or breach of the covenant, the
governmental unit may, without the necessity of posting any bond or other
security and without any further showing of irreparable or irrevocable injury
or harm, be entitled to seek and obtain an injunction for specific performance
or any other preliminary or permanent equitable relief from a court of
competent jurisdiction.
1. Washington Nationals
4.2 Commission Special Remedies
The Team acknowledges and agrees that the rights and duties
392. Non-Relocation Agreement between the City of New York, the New York State Urban
Development Corporation d/b/a Empire State Development Corporation, the New York City
Industrial Development Agency, and the Mets Limited Partnership, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2006) [hereinafter
Mets Agreement].
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established under Article 2 are of a unique and special nature
and that any violation thereof by the Team will resort in
immediate and irreparable harm to the Commission and the
District Government. Among other considerations, the
Commission and the District Government are detrimentally
relying on the Team's compliance with Article 2 in
connection with taking certain financial and non-financial
governmental actions required to enable the planning,
development and financing of the Baseball Stadium Complex.
Accordingly, in the event of any actual or threatened breach or
violation of any of the provisions of Article 2, the
Commission shall be entitled as a matter of right to an
injunction or decree of specific performance, without bond,
from any equity court of competent jurisdiction compelling
the Team to comply fully with the terms of Article 2. The
Team waives the right to assert the defense that such breach or
violation can be compensated adequately in damages in an
action of law.393
2. St. Louis Cardinals
5.3 Certain Equitable or Liquidated Damages.
The Parties acknowledge and agree that (i) the Ballpark
Project is being constructed with the assistance of the
Authority pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan and the
Redevelopment Agreement to enable the Cardinals and the
Team to remain in the City and to enable the Team to play its
Home Games in the Ballpark and (ii) Section 2.1 of this
Agreement is intended to ensure, among other things, that the
Cardinals will not relocate the Team. The Parties
acknowledge and agree that (i) particular and highly unique
circumstances have given rise to this Agreement, (ii) the
Authority will be immediately, uniquely and irreparably
harmed by any violation by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of
this Agreement, (iii) monetary damages could not be
calculated to compensate the Authority for any breach by the
Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement and (iv) the
Authority does not have an adequate remedy at law for the
393. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372.
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breach by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement. The
Parties acknowledge and agree that the economic, financial,
civic and social benefits to the Authority and the City from the
presence of the Cardinals and the Team and the playing by the
Team of its Home Games in the City are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits is difficult to quantify due to
the number of citizens and businesses that rely upon and
benefit from the presence of the Cardinals and the Team in the
City. Accordingly, the magnitude of the damages that would
result from the loss of those benefits due to a violation by the
Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement would be
significant in size but difficult to quantify.
The Parties agree that in the event of a material default,
violation or breach, or threatened material default, violation or
breach, by the Cardinals of any provision of Section 2.1, the
sole and exclusive remedy of the Authority shall be any one,
but not both, of the remedies specified in (a) and (b) below:
(a) the Authority may, without the necessary of posting any
bond or other security and without any further showing of
irreparable harm, balance of harms, consideration of the
public interest or inadequacy of money damages, be entitled
to seek and obtain an injunction, specific performance or any
other preliminary or permanent equitable relief from any court
of competent jurisdiction to prevent such violation or breach,
and the Cardinals agree and stipulate that the rights of the
Authority to equitable relief pursuant to this Section 5.3 shall
not constitute a "claim" pursuant to Section 101(5) of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and shall not be subject to
discharge or restraint of any nature in any bankruptcy
proceeding involving the Cardinals. 394
3. Florida Marlins
5.2 Declaratory or Injunctive Relief.
Upon the occurrence of a Non-Relocation Default, each of the
County and the City shall be entitled to seek injunctive relief
394. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 10-11.
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prohibiting or mandating action by the Team in accordance
with, or a declaratory relief with respect to, the Non-
Relocation Covenants. In addition, the Team: (a)
acknowledges that the Non-Relocation Covenants are an
essential part of the bargain and consideration of the Stadium
Agreements and are necessary to protect the business and
goodwill of the County and the City; (b) recognizes that the
Baseball Stadium is being constructed and certain debt is
being incurred by the County and the City to permit the MLB
Home Games in the Baseball Stadium during the Non-
Relocation Term; (c) recognizes that having the Team play its
MLB Home Games in the Baseball Stadium throughout the
Non-Relocation Term provides a unique value to each of the
County and the City, including generating new jobs,
additional revenue sources and economic development and
increased tourism for the County and the City; and (d)
acknowledges and agrees that any breach by the Team of the
Non-Relocation Covenants shall cause irreparable and
continual harm to the County and the City and that damages
for a default under such Non-Relocation Covenants cannot be
estimated with any degree of certainty and that monetary
damages cannot fairly or adequately compensate the County
and the City for a breach of such Non-Relocation Covenants.
Accordingly, the Team agrees that, in the event of any of the
actual or threatened breach by the Team of any one of the
Non-Relocation Covenants (i) each of the County and the City
shall be entitled to seek and obtain, a temporary restraining
order, together with temporary, preliminary and permanent
injunctive or other equitable relief, from any court of
competent jurisdiction, to restrain or enjoin any actual or
threatened breach by the Team of any Non-Relocation
Covenant without the necessity of posting a bond or other
security and without any further showing of irreparable harm,
balance of harms, consideration of the public interest or the
inadequacy of monetary damages as a remedy, (ii) the
administration of an order for injunctive relief would not be
impractical and, in the event of any breach of any Non-
Relocation Covenant by the Team, the balance of hardships
would weigh in favor of entry of injunctive relief, and (iii)
each of the County and the City may enforce any Non-
Relocation Covenant contained in this Agreement through
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specific performance. 395
4. Houston Astros
4.3 Declaratory or Injunctive Relief
Any Party or express beneficiary of this Non-Relocation
Agreement shall be entitled to seek injunctive relief
prohibiting or mandating action by any other Party in
accordance with this Non-Relocation Agreement, or
declaratory relief with respect to any matter under this Non-
Relocation Agreement. In addition, Houston McLane (a)
recognizes that the Stadium is being constructed, certain taxes
are being imposed by the Sports Authority, and certain debt is
being incurred in order to permit the Baseball Home Games in
the Astrodome Complex during the Astrodome Non-
Relocation Period and in the Stadium during the Lease Term,
all as provided in Article 2, and (b) acknowledges and agrees
that monetary damages could not be calculated to compensate
the Sports Authority for any breach by Houston McLane of
the covenants and agreements contained in this Non-
Relocation Agreement. Accordingly, Houston McLane agrees
that (i) the covenants and agreements contained in this Non-
Relocation Agreement shall constitute an agreement described
by Subsection (a)(2) of Section 335.004 of Chapter 335 of the
Texas Local Government Code, (ii) the Sports Authority may
restrain or enjoin any breach or threatened breach of any
covenant, duty, or obligation of Houston McLane contained in
this Non-Relocation Agreement without the necessity of
posting a bond or other security and without any further
showing of irreparable harm, balance of harms, consideration
of the public interest or the inadequacy of monetary damages
as a remedy, (iii) the administration of an order for injunctive
relief would not be impractical and, in the event of any breach
of any covenant, duty or obligation contained in this Non-
Relocation Agreement, the balance of hardships would weigh
in favor of entry of injunctive relief, (iv) the Sports Authority
may enforce any such covenant, duty or obligation of Houston
McLane contained in this Non-Relocation Agreement through
395. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 4-5.
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specific performance if so awarded pursuant to the Arbitration
Procedures, and (v) the Sports Authority may seek injunctive
or other form of ancillary relief from a court of competent
jurisdiction in order to maintain the status quo and enforce the
terms of this Non-Relocation Agreement on an interim basis
pending the outcome of arbitration of the applicable Dispute
or Controversy pursuant to the Arbitration Procedures. The
Parties hereby agree and irrevocably stipulate that the rights of
the Sports Authority to injunctive relief pursuant to this Non-
Relocation Agreement shall not constitute a "claim" pursuant
to section 101(5) of the United States Bankruptcy Code and
shall not be subject to discharge or restraint of any nature in
any bankruptcy proceeding involving Houston McLane. 396
5. Atlanta Braves
16.2
The Team further acknowledges and agrees that the duties,
obligations and responsibilities of the Team under this Article
16 and Article 15 are unique, and that monetary damages
would not fully compensate the Authority, the City and the
County, all of which are agreed to be beneficiaries of this
Agreement, from the direct and indirect consequences of any
breaches thereof. Therefore, the Team agrees that the
Authority does not have an adequate remedy at law, and that
the Authority shall have the right to seek appropriate equitable
relief, including appointment of a receiver, specific
performance and injunctive remedies without regard to
whether the Authority is also entitled to damages for such
breaches. The Team further agrees that the Superior Court of
Fulton County, Georgia is an appropriate and convenient
forum to resolve any dispute arising under this Agreement
(except for those matters for which the parties have chosen
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism), and hereby
consents to such court's jurisdiction to hear matters arising
hereunder. Furthermore, the Team expressly waives and
relinquishes the right to seek to require the Authority, the City
or the County to post any bond or other security in connection
396. Astros Agreement, supra note 357, at 5-6.
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with or as a condition to the granting of any equitable relief
such court may order. No allegations of insolvency, value of
collateral or other security or other similar matters usually
incident to equitable proceedings need be established by the
Authority, the City or the County as part of any such equitable
proceedings.397
6. Colorado Rockies
Article XIII
(c) The Partnership recognizes that the stadium is being
constructed, the sales tax was imposed, and the bonds were
issued solely to bring the Team and the franchise to the
District, and agrees that in the event of a violation of this
Article XIII, the District shall, without posting any bond, be
entitled to seek and obtain an injunction from the District
Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, or any
other court of competent jurisdiction, to enjoin any violation
of this Article XIII. Additionally, the District shall have the
right to enforce any breach of Sections 5.1(3) or 24.6 through
specific performance as provided in Section 11.2(a), or
otherwise as provided in this Agreement. 398
V. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Some of the leases and non-relocation agreements have an optional
remedy; that is, in the event the governmental units do not obtain injunctive or
equitable relief, the governmental unit will be entitled to seek and obtain
stipulated or liquidated damages. The team and government unit will agree
and stipulate that the financial, civic, and social benefits to the government
unit from the presence of the team in the home city cannot be estimated with a
precise value or with any degree of certainty, but such damages would be
significant in size. The governmental unit will be entitled to collect liquidated
damages, which are either a stipulated amount, a de-escalating amount, or an
amount based upon a formula. In some instances, the liquidated damages are
reduced by the number of years in which the team plays its games in the home
397. Braves Agreement, supra note 382, at 63-64.
398. Amended and Restated Lease and Management Agreement between Denver Metropolitan
Major League Baseball Stadium District and Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, LTD., at 79 (Mar. 30,
1995) [hereinafter Rockies Agreement].
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city facility; therefore, damages are reduced for each year that the Team has
fulfilled its lease.
A. Florida Marlins
5.3 Liquidated Damages. The parties acknowledge and agree
that if the County or the City do not obtain injunctive or other
equitable relief pursuant to Section 5.2, the County and the
City each shall be entitled to seek and obtain relief pursuant to
this Section 5.3 in the event a court of competent jurisdiction
determines, in a final and non-appealable order, that the Team
has breached its covenants under Section 2(c) (a "Final
Order"). The Parties also recognize, agree, and stipulate that
the financial, civic, and social benefits to the County and the
City from the presence of the Team and the playing of its
MLB Home Games in Miami, Florida are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits cannot be estimated with any
degree of certainty due to the number of citizens and
businesses that rely upon and benefit from the presence of the
Team in Miami, Florida. Accordingly, the magnitude of the
damages that would result from a breach of Section 2(c)
hereof that is not enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction
notwithstanding the intent of the parties, would be very
significant in size but are not readily ascertainable and would
include damages to the reputation and finances of the County
and the City. Therefore, the Parties agree that in the event of
a violation of Section 2(c) hereof, including, without
limitation, any such breach arising pursuant to the provisions
of section 365(g) of the United States Bankruptcy Code or
similar provision of any successor thereto, the County and the
City will be entitled to recover from the Team the amounts set
forth in Subsection 5.3.1:
5.3.1: Liquidated Damages. If the County or the City do not
obtain injunctive or other equitable relief pursuant to Section
5.2 and the violation of Section 2(c) is not cured prior to the
date that a court of competent jurisdiction enters a Final
Order, the County shall be entitled to receive, as reasonable
estimated liquidated damages and not as a penalty, the County
Liquidated Damages (as hereafter defined) and the City shall
be entitled to receive, as reasonable estimated liquidated
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damages and not as a penalty, the City Liquidated Damages
(as hereafter defined). For purposes of this Agreement,
"County Liquidated Damages" shall mean the sum of (a) the
then outstanding balance of principal and interest of the
County Bonds (as such term is defined in the Construction
Administration Agreement), (b) the unamortized amount of
Public Infrastructure Costs and any other costs for the
Baseball Stadium Project paid by the County under the
Construction Administration Agreement (which amount shall
be amortized on a straight line basis over 30 years) without
duplicating amounts in (a) if such Public Infrastructure Costs
or other costs are funded from County Bonds, and (c) the
present value of all Capital Reserve Fund contributions
required to be made by the Stadium operator pursuant to
Section 9.3(b) of the Operating Agreement. For purposes of
this Agreement, City Liquidated Damages" shall mean the
sum of (i) the then outstanding balance of principal and
interest of the City Bonds (as such term is defined in the
Construction Administration Agreement), (ii) the unamortized
balance of the funds (other than the proceeds of the City
Bonds) deposited in the City Account (as such term is defined
in the Construction Administration Agreement) in an amount
that, together with proceeds of the City Bonds, will be equal
to $13,000,000 (which balance shall be amortized on a
straight line basis over 30 years), (iii) the present value of all
regular season MLB Home Game parking fees owed to the
City under Section 6.3(a) of the City Parking Agreement
(assuming 81 regular season MLB Home Games) prior to the
end of the Term (as such term is defined in the City Parking
Agreement), and (iv) the unamortized amount of Public
Infrastructure Costs and any other costs for the Baseball
Stadium Project paid by the City under the Construction
Administration Agreement (which amount shall be amortized
on a straight line basis over 30 years), without duplicating
amounts in (i) and (ii) if such Public Infrastructure Costs or
other costs are funded from City Bonds or amounts referred to
in (ii).399
399. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 5-6.
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B. St. Louis Cardinals
5.3 Certain Equitable or Liquidated Damages. The Parties
acknowledge and agree that (i) the Ballpark Project is being
constructed with the assistance of the Authority pursuant to
the Redevelopment Plan and the Redevelopment Agreement
to enable the Cardinals and the Team to remain in the city and
to enable the Team to play its Home Games in the Ballpark
and (ii) Section 2.1 of this Agreement is intended to ensure,
among other things, that the Cardinals will not relocate the
Team. The Parties acknowledge and agree that (i) particular
and highly unique circumstances have given rise to this
Agreement, (ii) the Authority will be immediately, uniquely
and irreparably harmed by any violation by the Cardinals of
Section 2.1 of this Agreement, (iii) monetary damages could
not be calculated to compensate the Authority for any breach
by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement and (iv) the
Authority does not have an adequate remedy at law for the
breach by the Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement. The
Parties acknowledge and agree that the economic, financial,
civic and social benefits to the Authority and the City from the
presence of the Cardinals and the Team and the playing by the
Team of its Home Games in the City are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits is difficult to quantify due to
the number of citizens and businesses that rely upon and
benefit from the presence of the Cardinals and the Team in the
City. Accordingly, the magnitude of the damages that would
result from the loss of those benefits due to a violation by the
Cardinals of Section 2.1 of this Agreement would be
significant in size but difficult to quantify.
The parties agree that in the event of a material default,
violation or breach, or threatened material default, violation or
breach, by the Cardinals of any provision of Section 2.1, the
sole and exclusive remedy of the Authority shall be any one,
but not both, of the remedies specified in (a) and (b) below:
(a) the Authority may, without the necessity of posting any
bond or other security and without any further showing of
irreparable harm, balance of harms, consideration of the
public interest or inadequacy of money damages, be entitled
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to seek and obtain an injunction, specific performance or any
other preliminary or permanent equitable relief from any court
of competent jurisdiction to prevent such violation or breach,
and the Cardinals agree and stipulate that the rights of the
Authority to equitable relief pursuant to this Section 5.3 shall
not constitute a "claim" pursuant to Section 101(5) of the
United States Bankruptcy Code and shall not be subject to
discharge or restraint of any nature in any bankruptcy
proceeding involving the Cardinals; or
(b) the Authority shall be entitled to terminate this Agreement
and the Redevelopment Agreement and receive, and the
Cardinals shall pay, liquidated damages in the applicable
amount ("Liquidated Damages Amount"), determined as
follows based upon the date on which the violation or breach
of Section 2.1 occurs: for the period commencing on the
Effective Date and ending on the last day of the calendar year
in which Substantial Completion of the Ballpark occurs, the
Liquidated Damages Amount shall be $145,000,000 ("Initial
Liquidated Damages Amount"), thereafter, the Liquidated
Damages Amount shall be reduced by 1/29 of the Initial
Liquidated Damages Amount on the last day of each calendar
year during the remaining Term of this Agreement. The
Parties acknowledge that they have negotiated the above
amounts in an attempt to make a good faith effort to quantify
the amount of damages that would result from a violation of
Section 2.1 despite the difficulty in making such
determination. Accordingly, in the event the Authority or any
other Person shall collect the above-described liquidated
damages, then the Authority and any such other Person shall
not have, and hereby waive, the right to collect additional
monetary or any other damages for breach of Section 2.1,
whether for lost or prospective profits, or for special, indirect,
incidental, consequential, exemplary or punitive damages, or
for any other loss or consequence. 400
C. Houston Astros
Section 4.4 Liquidated Damages. The Parties also recognize,
400. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 10-11.
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agree, and stipulate that the financial, civic, and social
benefits to the Sports Authority, the City and the Country
from the presence of the Astros and the playing of its Baseball
Home Games in the City and County are great, but that the
precise value of those benefits is difficult to quantify due to
the number of citizens and businesses that rely upon and
benefit from the presence of the Astros in the City and
County. Accordingly, the magnitude of the damages that
would result from a violation of Section 3.1 hereof would be
very significant in size but difficult to quantify including,
without limitation, damages to the reputation and finances of
the Sports Authority, the City, and the County. Therefore, the
Parties agree that in the event of a violation of Section 3.1
hereof including, without limitation, any such breach arising
pursuant to the provisions of section 365(g) of the United
States Bankruptcy Code or similar provision of any successor
thereto, the Sports Authority will be entitled to recover from
Houston McLane the following sums, which are stipulated to
be reasonable estimated damages in the event of a violation of
Section 3.1 hereof, as reasonable liquidated damages and not
as a penalty:
Date of Breach Liquidated Damages
7/1/98 - 6/30/2003 $250,000,000
7/1/03 - 6/30/2008 $200,000,000
7/1/08 - 6/30/2013 $150,000,000
7/1/13 - 6/30/2018 $125,000,000
7/1/18 - 6/30/2023 $100,000,000
After 7/1/2023 $ 75,000,000
The Parties hereby acknowledge that they have negotiated the
above amounts in an attempt to make a good faith effort in
quantifying the amount of damages due to a violation of
Section 3.1 hereof despite the difficulty in making such
determination. Accordingly, in the event the Sports Authority
collects the above referenced liquidated damages then the
Sports Authority hereby waives any right to collect additional
monetary damages (other than as provided pursuant to Section
6.18 hereof) including lost or prospective profits, or for any
other special, indirect, incidental, consequential, exemplary,
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or punitive damages. 401
D. New York Yankees
Section 3.3.2 Liquidated Damages. Solely with respect to an
Event of Default under Section 3.1.1, if the City, the ESDC
and/or the NYCIDA is unable to obtain an equitable remedy
in accordance with Section 3.3.1, then the City and/or the
ESDC, as the case may be, (but not, for the avoidance of
doubt, the NYCIDA) shall have the right to recover from the
Partnership, and the Partnership agrees to pay within thirty
(30) days following demand therefor, in immediately
available funds and in lieu of any and all other damages
payable, and other remedies available, under this Agreement
and applicable law, the applicable amount set forth on
Appendix C attached hereto and made a part hereof, to be paid
to the City, which amounts are stipulated to be reasonable
estimated damages for loss of a bargain in the event of an
Event of Default under Section 3.1.1. for a Prohibited
Relocation, as reasonable liquidated damages and not as a
penalty (and because the parties hereto agree that damages for
breach of Section 3.1.1 would be difficult or impossible to
determine, but that they intend to provide for damages, and
the amounts set forth on Appendix C are a reasonable estimate
of such damages). Notwithstanding anything herein to the
contrary, nothing in this Section 3.3.2 is intended to limit any
remedies available to the City and/or ESDC under applicable
law to enable them to collect liquidated damages payable
under this Agreement.
Appendix C:
Year Liquidated Damages
1 $1,496,928,205
2 $1,496,928,205
3 $1,496,928,205
4 $1,487,418,205
5 $1,476,408,205
6 $1,464,863,205
7 $1,452,738,205
401. Astros Agreement, supra note 357, at 6-7.
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8 $1,439,993,205
9 $1,426,603,205
10 $1,412,568,205
15 $1,340,193,205
20 $1,251,578,205
25 $1,015,276,966
30 $ 747,045,726
35 $ 438,459,487
40 $ 78,318,248402
VI. ACTUAL DAMAGES
Finally, some of the agreements provide that, in the event the
governmental unit is unable to obtain equitable relief and stipulated damages,
they are entitled, in the event of non-relocation default, to actual damages
caused by the team's breach of the non-relocation covenant. These damages
could include, but are not limited to, the amount required to pay the
outstanding principal and interest on the stadium bonds, loss of revenues
arising out of or created by the operation and use of the facility, and any other
costs and expenses incurred by the government unit seeking to enforce its
remedies.
A. Florida Marlins
5.4 Actual Damages
In the event of any breach of or misrepresentation in this
Agreement by the Team (other than a Non-Relocation Default
subject to the remedies set forth in Section 5.2 or, if
applicable, Section 5.3), or in the event of a Non-Relocation
Default for which, notwithstanding the intent of the Parties,
the County and the City are unable to obtain the relief set
forth in Section 5.2 or, if applicable, Section 5.3 the County
and City shall have the right (i) to institute any and all
proceedings or claims permitted by law or equity to recover
any and all amounts necessary to compensate the County and
the City for all damages proximately caused by the Team's
breach under this Agreement, and (ii) to institute any and all
proceedings or claims permitted by law or equity to compel
402. Yankees Agreement, supra note 377, at 10, Appendix C.
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specific performance with respect to the Team's obligations
under this Agreement and one or more actions to seek and
obtain a temporary restraining order, together with such other
temporary, preliminary and permanent injunctive or other
equitable relief, from any court of competent jurisdiction
capable of issuing or granting such relief, to compel the Team
to comply with or refrain or cease from breaching or violating
the terms, covenants and conditions of this Agreement.4 03
B. Washington Nationals
4.2 Commission Special Remedies
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as prohibiting
the Commission from pursuing any other remedies at law or
in equity available to it for such breach or violation or
threatened breach or violation. In addition, in the event of any
breach or violation of any of the provisions of Article 2, the
Subordinate Lien described in Section 2.2 shall secure, and
the Commission shall be entitled as a matter of right to
terminate this Agreement and recover from the Team, as
damages and not as a penalty, any and all damages incurred or
suffered by the Commission, including, without limitation, all
costs and expenses incurred by the District Government, the
Commission or any other affected party claiming through the
District Government or the Commission, including (A) all
costs and expenses incurred by the District Government and
the Commission to construct the Baseball Stadium, including,
without limitation, the amount required to repay principal of
and interest on (and premium, if any, on) the Stadium
Revenue Bonds, (B) any lost net revenue arising out of or
created by the operation and use of the Baseball Stadium that
the Commission would have received if the Team had
complied with the Team Non-Relocation Obligations, and (C)
all costs and expenses incurred by the Commission, including
attorneys' fees and disbursements (other than as provided in
Section 6.17), in seeking to enforce its remedies hereunder.404
403. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 6.
404. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 4.2.
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VII. SPECIAL COVENANTS
A. Payment Upon Sale of Team
1. Florida Marlins
6. Payment Upon Sale of Team. Upon either a sale to a third
party of a "control interest" (defined as the sale of more than
50% of the voting, actual or beneficial interest in the
franchise, occurring within the period commencing with the
approval of the Stadium Agreements by the City Commission
and the Board of County Commissioners and ending thirty six
(36) months following Substantial Completion, whether
through a sale of equity shares or partnership interests, to the
extent proceeds are paid to the owners of the Team and not
contributed to Team Affiliates involved in baseball related
businesses) (other than following the death of the controlling
owner), the Team shall or shall cause the seller to pay to the
County and the City, to be split on a pro-rata basis (including
the value of the City's contribution of the Baseball Stadium
Site, the amount of the City's and the County's expenditures
as required by the Construction Agreement, and the value of
the City and the County's respective expenditures associated
with the Public Infrastructure) determined by each respective
parties' contribution to the Baseball Stadium, an amount equal
to the following percentage of the Net Proceeds of the sale
that are attributable to any increase in value of the franchise
(pro-rated in the case of a sale of the control interest) (the
"County/City Equity Payment"):
Phase of Project Year Description of Time-Frame Percentage
Construction Phase Year I If sale occurs within 12 months of approval date of 18.0%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 2 Sale occurs within 24 months of approval date of 16.2%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 3 Sale occurs within 36 months of approval date of 14.4%
Stadium Agreements
Construction Phase Year 4 Sale occurs within 48 months of approval date of 12.6%
Stadium Agreements, or, prior to Substantial
Completion of Stadium, whichever occurs first
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Completion
Operational Phase Year 2 Sale occurs within 24 months of Substantial 7.5%
Completion
Operational Phase Year 3 Sale occurs within 36 months of Substantial 5.0%
Completion
The increase in value shall be based on an assumed value of
the franchise of $250,000,000 as of the date of the BSA,
which assumed value shall be increased to give effect to any
additional debt incurred by, or equity capital contributions
made to the Team, Stadium Developer or Operator, including
the capital contributions made to, or the debt incurred by, the
Stadium Developer or the Team pursuant to the Construction
Administration Agreement (net of distributions to any such
Team owners) and an imputed increase in value of 8% per
annum from the date of the BSA. "Net Proceeds" shall mean
the fair market value of all proceeds received from the sale
plus any indebtedness for borrowed money of the Team or
any Team Affiliate assumed by the buyer in the sale, less (x)
the assumed value of the franchise determined under the
preceding sentence, (y) all transaction-related expenses and
taxes payable by the Team Affiliates and/or their direct and
indirect owners to unaffiliated third parties solely as a result
of the sale, and (z) any liabilities or obligations retained by the
Team (in the case of a sale of the franchise) and/or its direct or
indirect owners relating to the Marlins or its affiliated
businesses.
The Team shall cause its independent accountants to provide
the County and City a reasonably detailed calculation of the
County/City Equity Payment (on a combined basis) under this
Section 6, including a detailed calculation showing the
assumed value, Net Proceeds and any other calculations the
Team used to determine the amount payable, as promptly as
practicable following any applicable sale. If the County or
City do not provide a notice of objection within thirty (30)
days after receiving the accountant's calculation, such
calculation shall be final and binding and payment of any
amount due shall be made not later than thirty (30) days after
the expiration of such period. If the County or City does
provide a notice of objection, it shall specify in reasonable
detail the basis for its objections. The objecting Government
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Party and the Team shall then seek to resolve any
disagreements between them within the succeeding period of
sixty (60) days. If the objecting Government Party and the
Team are unable to resolve the dispute within such sixty (60)
day period, each of them shall have the right to commence
arbitration in accordance with the Operating Agreement. If the
arbitrator shall enter a final, non-appealable order requiring
payment from the Team under this Section 6, the Team shall
pay such amount within thirty (30) days thereafter. 405
2. St. Louis Cardinals
3.1 Sale of Team. Subject to the provisions of this Article, the
Cardinals shall have the right to sell or transfer ownership in
whole or in part of the Team during the Term to the extent
permitted by Major League Baseball without the Authority's
consent; provided that (a) in connection with such sale, the
new Team owner must concurrently agree in writing, in form
and substance reasonably acceptable to the Authority, to
assume the Cardinals' obligations under this Agreement for
the remainder of the Term (unless waived by the Authority)
and (b) the provisions of Section 3.2 shall not apply to the
new Team owner. In addition, the Cardinals covenant and
agree that the Cardinals shall not transfer, sell or assign the
Team in any manner unless such transfer of the Team is
approved in accordance with applicable Major League
Baseball Rules and Regulations.
3.2 Ballpark-Related Profits from Sale.
(a) In the event that there is a Sale in whole or in part of any
ownership interest in the Cardinals Ownership Entities, the
Cardinals shall cause the Selling Owner(s) to pay to the
Authority the Ballpark-Related Profits, and the Authority shall
be responsible for paying to the County that portion of such
amount agreed upon by the Authority and the County. By
way only of example and without limitation, the Ballpark-
Related Profits from the Sale of the total ownership interests
in the Cardinals Ownership Entities are set forth in Exhibit A.
405. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 7-9.
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(b) Not later than 30 days after the consummation of a Sale,
the Cardinals shall furnish to the Authority a notice setting
forth their determination of the amount, if any, due pursuant
to this Section 3.2. If Authority fails to object to such
determination within 30 days following receipt of such notice,
the Cardinals' determination shall be final and binding, and
payment of the amount, if any, due shall be made not later
than 15 days after the expiration of the latter 30-day period. If
Authority objects to such determination, the notice of
objection shall specify in reasonable detail the basis for such
objection. The Authority and the Cardinals shall thereupon
seek to resolve such disagreement and, if they are unable to
resolve the disagreement with 30 days following the
Cardinals' receipt of notice of such objection, then their
disagreement shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with
Section 6.3 of this Agreement. 406
406. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 7.
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EXHIBIT A - Ballpark-Related Profits from Sale*
Owners'
Total 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Profits
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.67 2.34 2.00 1.67 1.34 1.00 .67 .34
100 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.34 4.67 4.00 3.34 2.67 2.00 1.34 0.67
150 9.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 8.00 7.00 6.00 5.00 4.00 3.00 2.00 1.00
200 12.00 12.00 12.00 12.00 10.67 9.34 8.00 6.67 5.34 4.00 2.67 1.34
250 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 13.34 11.67 10.00 8.34 6.67 5.00 3.34 1.67
300 21.00 21.00 21.00 21.00 18.67 16.34 14.00 11.67 9.34 7.00 4.67 2.34
350 24.50 24.50 24.50 24.50 21.78 19.06 16.34 13.61 10.89 8.17 5.45 2.72
400 28.00 28.00 28.00 28.00 24.89 21.78 18.67 15.56 12.45 9.34 6.22 3.11
450 31.50 31.50 31.50 31.50 28.00 24.50 21.00 17.50 14.00 10.50 7.00 3.50
500 35.00 35.00 35.00 35.00 31.11 27.22 23.34 19.45 15.56 11.67 7.78 3.89
550 38.50 38.50 38.50 38.50 34.22 29.95 25.67 21.39 17.11 12.84 8.56 4.28
600 48.00 48.00 48.00 48.00 42.67 37.34 32.00 26.67 21.34 16.00 10.67 5.34
650 52.00 52.00 52.00 52.00 46.22 40.45 34.67 28.89 23.11 17.34 11.56 5.78
700 56.00 56.00 56.00 56.00 49.78 43.56 37.34 31.11 24.89 18.67 12.45 6.22
750 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 53.34 46.67 40.00 33.34 26.67 20.00 13.34 6.67
* All amounts in millions.
3. Colorado Rockies
Article XIV Sale of Franchise. Upon sale of the Franchise or
80% of the beneficial interests in the Partnership during the
Term, or Grace Term, the Partnership shall pay to the District
an amount equal to 2% of the net profit realized by the
Partnership or the selling partners or beneficial owners of the
Partnership, as the case may be, not to exceed $2 million. Net
profit shall be the gross proceeds of the sale less capital
contributions (or capital contributions of partners selling their
beneficial interests) to the Partnership, plus a five percent
(5%) imputed annual return on such capital contribution(s),
and less Partnership debt if such debt is not assumed or paid
by the purchasing entity. The sale of the Franchise or 80%
beneficial interests in the Partnership to any person or entity
(or any affiliate thereof), who is a partner or a stockholder of a
partner on the date of this Agreement and who has been a
partner or a stockholder of a partner in the Partnership for at
least three (3) years prior to the subject sale will not trigger
this profit sharing provision. Individual sales of the
Partnership interests in the Partnership and sales of stock of
the general partner of the Partnership will not trigger this
profit-sharing provision, provided such sales do not result in
the sale of 80% or more of the beneficial interests in the
Partnership to a person or entity or related persons or entities
that have not been a partner or partners in the Partnership for
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at least three (3) years prior to the initial sale, subsequent to
the Commencement Date, of any beneficial interest to such
person(s) or entity(ies). Nothing in this Article XIV shall be
interpreted as limiting the Partnership's obligations or the
District's rights set forth in Article XIII. 407
4. Minnesota Twins
2.4 Sale of Team (a) In the event there is a Sale during the
period beginning on May 27, 2006 and ending on the tenth
anniversary of the Construction Start Date, the Team shall be
obligated to pay to the Authority an amount equal to a certain
percentage, as specified below, of the gross sales price
resulting from the Sale (the "Team's Sale Percentage"), which
amount shall be deposited in the CapEx Reserve Fund and
credited against any future funding obligations of either the
Authority or the County to such CapEx Reserve Fund. During
the twelve (12)-month period immediately following the
Construction Start Date, the Team's Sale Percentage shall be
equal to eighteen percent (18%), reduced by one and eight-
tenths (1.8) upon each anniversary of the Construction Start
Date, until the amount of the Team's Sale Percentage is
reduced to zero. After the tenth anniversary of Construction
Start Date the Team shall no longer have any payment
obligation to the Authority under this Section following any
Sale; provided, however, that this sentence shall not release
the Team from any other obligation arising prior to or upon
any Sale.
(b) Except as otherwise required herein (e.g., in the event a
Sale is subject to the Right of First Refusal set forth in Section
2.5 hereof), the Team shall use commercially reasonable
efforts to give the Authority written notice of any Sale within
thirty (30) days prior to the Sale and shall, in all events, give
the Authority written notice of any Sale within ten (10) days
thereafter.
(c) In the event of any Sale or Exempt Transfer, the successor
in interest shall become bound to the terms and conditions of
407. Rockies Agreement, supra note 398, at 79-80.
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this Agreement, the Ballpark Lease Agreement, and any other
Related Agreements pursuant to the provisions of Article 3,
below. 408
B. Bankruptcy
1. Florida Marlins
5.2 Declaratory Relief ... The parties hereby agree and
irrevocably stipulate that (x) the rights of each of the County
and the City to injunctive relief pursuant to this Non-
Relocation Agreement shall not constitute a "claim" pursuant
to section 101(5) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the
"Bankruptcy Code") and shall not be subject to discharge or
restraint of any nature in any bankruptcy proceeding involving
the Team, (y) this Agreement is not an "executory contract" as
contemplated by section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (z)
action(s) taken by each of the County and the City pursuant to
this Section 5.2 shall not in any way prejudice any other rights
or remedies that the County and the City may have under
Section 5.3 or Section 5.4 of this Agreement or under the
other Stadium Agreements if a court of competent jurisdiction
fails to provide injunctive or other equitable relief prohibiting
the Team's violation of the Non-Relocation Covenants or, in
the case of the remedies set forth in Section 5.4, fails to award
liquidated damages under Section 5.3.409
2. New York Mets
(3.2.4) That (a) the rights of the City, ESDC, NYCIDA and/or
Taxable Bond Insurer to injunctive relief pursuant to Section
3.3.1 shall not constitute a "claim" pursuant to Section 101(5)
of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy
Code") and shall not be subject to discharge or restraint of any
nature in any bankruptcy proceeding involving the
Partnership, and (b) this Agreement is not an "executory
contract" as contemplated by Section 365 of the Bankruptcy
408. Twins Agreement, supra note 376, at 7.
409. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 5.
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Code.410
C Collateral Pledge
1. Transfer of Team's Franchise to a Secured Creditor (Loan Default)
a. Milwaukee Brewers
2. g. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in
clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) above, it is expressly understood and
agreed that the Team shall have the right to grant a mortgage,
pledge, assignment and/or other security interest in any of the
Team's trade fixtures, equipment, personal property,
receivables, accounts, contract rights, general intangibles,
tangible and intangible assets, any of the Team's revenue
streams derived from any source whatsoever, and/or the
Team's Franchise to obtain financing and/or secure a loan or
loans from one or more lenders. It is further expressly
understood and agreed that such lender(s) or their successors
and assigns shall not be bound by the terms of this Agreement
and that such lender(s)' mortgage, pledge, assignment or
security interest shall not be subject to nor limited or
restricted, in any way, by the terms of this Agreement. 411
b. New York Yankees
2.4.3 Covered Pledge. (a) Any pledge, lien, security interest,
hypothecation, or similar conditional assignment of the Team
or of a controlling interest therein given to secure
indebtedness for borrowed money or a guarantee of
indebtedness for borrowed money is referred to as a "Covered
Pledge." In the absence of a specific intent to use a Covered
Pledge to effect a Prohibited Relocation, the making of a
Covered Pledge is not deemed to be a Transfer for purposes of
this Section 2.4
(b) The Partnership shall not grant or permit to exist any
Covered Pledge, unless the documents and other instruments
410. Mets Agreement, supra note 392, at 9-10.
411. Brewers Agreement, supra note 362, at 4.
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implementing the Covered Pledge expressly provide, and the
pledgee agrees in writing for the intended third-party benefit
of the City, ESDC, NYCIDA, and their respective successors
and assigns that (i) such Covered Pledge is subject to this
Agreement, and (ii) any Transfer of the Team upon
foreclosure or other enforcement of the Covered Pledge shall
be on the condition that (x) the pledgee/transferor comply
with Section 2.4.2 in lieu of the Partnership and (y) that the
Transferee comply with Section 2.4.2
(c) Concurrent with execution thereof or on the Effective Date
(prior to execution of this Agreement) if such Covered Pledge
exists at such date, the Partnership shall provide to the City,
ESDC and NYCIDA, a copy of any documents and other
instruments implementing such Covered Pledge certified as
true and complete by an officer of the Partnership and
including the express agreement of the pledgee required by
Section 2.4.3(b) and thirty party beneficiary language in favor
of the City, ESDC and NYCIDA which permits any of them
to enforce such agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall
restrict the Partnership's ability to redact the financial or other
material terms (other than the express agreement and third
party beneficiary language referenced in the preceding
sentence, any language which would undermine the operation
or effectiveness thereof, the notice of Transfer required by
Section 2.4.2(a), and the Assumption and Agreement to be
Bound) which it may deliver to the City, the ESDC or the
NYCIDA in connection with any Covered Pledge. 412
2. Right of First Refusal
a. Minnesota Twins
Section 2.5 Right of First Refusal
(a) Grant of Right of First Refusal. If, during the Initial Term,
the Team or the Team's owners (as used in this Section, the
"Selling Party") receives a bona fide written offer for a Sale
from a Person who is credit-worthy and has been approved by
412. Yankees Agreement, supra note 377, at 6.
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MLB as an MLB franchise holder or who, though not then
approved, meets all of the criteria established by MLB for its
franchise holders, that the Selling party desires to accept, the
Selling Party shall furnish to the Authority, the Metropolitan
Sports Facilities Commission and the then Governor of the
State (collectively, the "Other Party") a written notice (an
"Offer Notice") setting forth (i) the identity of the offeror, (ii)
the material terms and conditions of the proposed Sale,
including the purchase price therefor and the terms of
payment of such price, and (iii) such other material terms as
are applicable to such proposed Sale. The Other Party, acting
on behalf of a to-be-formed Acquisition Corp. (defined
below), or Acquisition Corp. (when formed) shall have the
exclusive right and option, but not the obligation, during the
period ending sixty (60) days following the date of the Offer
Notice (the "Option Exercise Period"), to elect that
Acquisition Corp. purchase the Team or the Franchise, as the
case may be, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the
Offer Notice (the "Right of First Refusal"). To the fullest
extent permitted by any applicable Laws or MLB Rules and
Regulations, the Other Party and Acquisition Corp. shall keep
confidential the Offer Notice and the terms set forth therein
and shall not disclose the same to any Persons other than its
officers, attorneys or other consultants of the Other Party or
Acquisition Corp. assisting with the evaluation of the Offer
Notice, who shall also agree to abide by the foregoing
confidentiality provisions.
(b) Exercise of Right of First Refusal. To exercise the Right
of First Refusal, the Other Party, acting on behalf of
Acquisition Corp., or Acquisition Corp. (when formed), shall
(i) deliver a written notice of exercise of the Right of First
Refusal to the Selling Party during the Option Exercise Period
(the "Exercise Notice") and (ii) deliver, during the period
ending ninety (90) days following the date of the Offer
Notice, evidence in form and substance reasonably acceptable
to the Selling Party that a corporation, the capital structure of
which is in compliance with the provisions of Section 473.763
of the Minnesota Statutes ("Acquisition Corp.") has been
formed and that Acquisition Corp. has available to it fully
committed financing in an amount necessary to consummate
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the proposed purchase. The Right of First Refusal shall
immediately terminate, without any further action by the
Parties, on the earliest to occur of the following: (A) the Other
Party, on behalf of Acquisition Corp., or Acquisition Corp.
fails to exercise the Right of First Refusal during the Option
Exercise Period, (B) the Other Party, on behalf of Acquisition
Corp. or Acquisition Corp. fails to provide, within ninety (90)
days of the Offer Notice, evidence of fully committed
financing in an amount necessary to consummate the
proposed Sale or evidence of formation of Acquisition Corp.,
(C) the Other Party, on behalf of Acquisition Corp., or
Acquisition Corp. exercises the Right of First Refusal and the
proposed Sale to Acquisition Corp. is not consummated
during the period ending one hundred eighty (180) days
following the date of the Offer Notice (the "Outside Date"),
(D) if the agreement resulting from the exercise of the Right
of First Refusal is terminated other than due to the default of
the Selling Party, or (E) MLB provides the Team and
Acquisition Corp., prior to the Outside Date, with written
notice that the sale to Acquisition Corp. is not approved by
MLB. If the Right of First Refusal is terminated pursuant to
(A)-(E) above, then, subject to Article 3, the Selling Party
shall have the right, during the period ending one (1) year
following the expiration of the Option Period, if the Right of
First Refusal is not exercised, or one (1) year following the
Outside Date (the "Unrestricted Sale Period") if the Right of
First Refusal is exercised, to consummate a Sale on
substantially the same financial terms and conditions set forth
in the Offer Notice. If any material financial terms of the Sale
are modified or revised from the terms set forth in the Offer
Notice, such modified or revised material financial terms shall
be subject to the right of first refusal provisions set forth
above as if the Selling Party had not yet given an Offer
Notice. If the Sale is not consummated prior to the expiration
of the Unrestricted Sale Period on the terms and conditions set
forth in the Offer Notice, then the Sale shall again become
subject to the restrictions set forth in this Section. If the Sale
is consummated prior to the expiration of the Unrestricted
Sale Period on the terms and conditions set forth in the Offer
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Notice, then the Right of First Refusal shall be deemed null
and void and shall not apply to any subsequent Sale. 413
3. Assumption/Assignment
a. Florida Marlins
13.1 Successors and Assigns; Third Party Beneficiaries
(a) This Agreement shall bind the Team and its assigns and
successors, provided that the Team shall not be entitled to
transfer or assign its obligations hereunder without the prior
written consent of the Government Parties, which consent
shall be in their sole discretion; provided, further, however,
that the Team may, without the prior written consent of the
Government Parties, transfer and assign its obligations
hereunder to any Person (or Affiliate of any Person) that
acquires the Team's MLB franchise with the required
approval of Major League Baseball, provided that (i) such
transferee assumes unconditionally, in a writing reasonably
satisfactory to the Government Parties, all of the obligations
of the Team under this Agreement, and (ii) such transferee or
its Affiliates assume all of the other obligations of the
Stadium Operator and its Affiliates under the Stadium
Agreements.
(b) This Agreement shall bind the Government Parties and
their respective assigns and successors; provided that neither
of the Government Parties may transfer or assign this
Agreement or any of their respective rights and obligations
hereunder without the prior written consent of the Team,
which consent shall be in the Team's sole discretion.
(c) Nothing in this Agreement, express or implied, is intended
to (a) confer upon any Person other than the parties and their
permitted successors and assigns any rights or remedies under
or by reason of this Agreement as a third-party beneficiary or
otherwise; or (b) authorize anyone not a party to this
Agreement to maintain an action pursuant to or based upon
413. Twins Agreement, supra note 376, at 7-9.
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this Agreement.414
b. St. Louis Cardinals
6.4 Assignment. Except as provided herein and in Section
3.1, none of the Parties shall assign or transfer their rights or
obligations under this Agreement without the written consent
of the other Party, which consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld, conditioned or delayed. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the Cardinals may, without the necessary of
obtaining the consent of the other Parties, assign any or all of
its rights under this Agreement to a person, firm, corporation
or entity which acquires the Team pursuant to a sale and in
accordance with applicable Major League Baseball Rules and
Regulations, provided that the assignee assumes all of the
obligations of the Cardinals pursuant to this Agreement and to
be bound by all of the terms, conditions and provisions thereof
pursuant to an instrument of assignment in form and substance
reasonably acceptable to the Authority. The Cardinals may,
without the necessary of obtaining the consent of the other
Parties, assign any or all of their rights under this Agreement
to (a) an Affiliate or (b) a third party entity for the sole
purpose of the Cardinals (or an Affiliate of the Cardinals)
entering into a lease or similar financing arrangements with
such third party entity, provided that the Cardinals remain
liable for the obligations of the Cardinals hereunder, and any
such assignee shall agree to be bound by the provisions of this
Agreement, jointly and severally with the Cardinals, in a
written instrument executed by such assignee and delivered to
the Parties. 415
c. Houston Astros
Article 6 Assignment;
6.1 Sale of Franchise. Houston McLane shall have the right
and power to sell, transfer, and assign (but not mortgage,
encumber, or pledge) the Franchise without the consent of the
414. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 11.
415. Cardinals Agreement, supra 345, at 14,
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Sports Authority. Houston McLane agrees, however, that an
essential part of the consideration to the Sports Authority
under this Non-Relocation Agreement is the obligation to
cause the Astros to pay in the Astrodome Complex, as
provided in Section 2.1, the obligation to cause the Astros to
play in the Stadium, as provided in Section 2.2, the
prohibition of relocating the Astros, as provided in Section
3.1(a), and the requirement that the Person who from time to
time holds the Franchise comply, in all other respects, with
the applicable terms and provisions of this Non-Relocation
Agreement. Accordingly, Houston McLane covenants and
agrees that Houston McLane shall not transfer, sell, or assign
the Franchise in any manner except upon compliance with
each of the following conditions precedent:
(a) The transfer of the Franchise is approved in accordance
with the applicable Major League Baseball Rules and
Regulations;
(b) Such assignee of the Franchise executes and delivers to the
Sports Authority an instrument whereby such assignee
assumes full responsibility for the performance of all of the
obligations of Houston McLane under this Non-Relocation
Agreement arising on and after the date of such assignment.
The form of the instrument of assumption shall be subject to
the prior written approval of the Sports Authority, which
approval shall not be unreasonably withheld, delayed or
conditioned, and shall be limited to the question of whether
such instrument, when duly executed, will accomplish its
intended purpose under this Non-Relocation Agreement; and
(c) In all instances the assignee of the Franchise must also be
the successor tenant under the Stadium Lease and the
successor licensee under the License Agreement.
The provisions of this Non-Relocation Agreement shall be
deemed to be a restrictive covenant that attaches to and is
binding upon the Franchise. 416
416. Astros Agreement, supra note 357, at 10-11.
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d. Baltimore Orioles
"Article XX No Relocation.
The Orioles shall not permit any sale, assignment or other transfer of the
Baltimore Orioles unless the assignee is required to assume all of the
obligations of the Orioles under this Agreement." 4 17
4. Attorneys' Fees
a. New York Yankees
3.3.5 Attorney's Fees. The City, the ESDC and the NYCIDA
shall be entitled to recover from the Partnership their
reasonable out-of-pocket legal fees and expenses incurred in
prosecuting or pursuing a claim under this Agreement in
which the City, the ESDC or the NYCIDA prevails (including
reasonable out-of-pocket legal fees and expenses incurred in
an action to enforce this Agreement). In addition to the
foregoing, the City, the ESDC or the NYCIDA shall be
entitled to its reasonable out-of-pocket attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in any post-judgment proceedings to collect
or enforce any judgment. Notwithstanding the foregoing, to
the extent the City, the ESDC and the NYCIDA are entitled to
recover from the Partnership any attorneys' fees and expenses,
such fees and expenses shall be limited to the reasonable out-
of-pocket legal fees and expenses of one firm of legal counsel.
This provision is separate and several and shall survive the
merger of this Agreement into any judgment on such
instrument. 418
5. No Personal Liability
a. St. Louis Cardinals
6.14 Representatives Not Personally Liable. No official
agent, employee, representative or consultant of any party to
this Agreement shall be personally liable to any other party to
this Agreement in the event of any default or breach by any
417. Agreement Regarding Oriole Park at Camden Yards between the Maryland Stadium
Authority and The Orioles, Inc., at 140 [hereinafter Orioles Agreement].
418. Yankees Agreement, supra note 377, § 3.3.5.
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party under this Agreement or for any amount which may
become due to any party or on any obligations under the terms
of this Agreement. 419
b. New York Yankees
5.9 Limitation on Liability. None of the members, directors,
officers, partners, joint venturers, principals, shareholders,
employees, agent or servant of the Partnership shall have any
liability hereunder (personal or otherwise, other than their
respective interests in the assets of the Partnership) or be
subject to levy, execution or other enforcement procedure for
the satisfaction of any remedies of the City, the NYCIDA or
the ESDC available hereunder. The provisions of this Section
5.9 shall govern every other provision of this Agreement. The
absence of explicit reference to this Section 5.9 in any
particular provision of this Agreement shall not be construed
to diminish the application of this Section 5.9 to such
provision. This Section 5.9 shall survive the termination of
this Agreement. Nothing in this Section 5.9, however, is
intended to be a waiver of the provisions of Section 1782.37
of the Ohio Revised Code, as the same may be amended or
replaced from time to time, or any similar provisions
applicable to any Transferee under the laws governing its
formation and operation, refer to distributions made in
violation of such provisions or of provisions referenced
therein which relate to distributions or dividends.420
c. Florida Marlins
15 Nonrecourse Liability of Team Personnel.
Notwithstanding and prevailing over any contrary provision or
implication in this Agreement and except for their criminal
acts with respect to this Agreement (i.e., acts which would
constitute crimes were they prosecuted for and convicted of
such acts), the officers, directors, partners, shareholders,
members, employees and agents of the Team and their
Affiliates (the "Team Personnel") shall not in any way be
419. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 16.
420. Yankees Agreement, supra note 377, at 16.
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liable under or with respect to this Agreement; no deficiency
or other monetary or personal judgment of any kind shall be
sought or entered against any of the Team Personnel with
respect to liability under or with respect to this Agreement; no
judgment with respect to liability under or with respect to this
Agreement shall give rise to any right of execution or levy
against the assets of any of the Team Personnel; and the
liability of the Team under this Agreement shall be limited to
the assets of the Team. 421
6. Arbitration
a. St. Louis Cardinals
6.3 Arbitrations. All disputes, disagreements, controversies or
claims which under the specific terms of this Agreement eh
parties have agreed to submit to arbitration shall be
exclusively and finally settled by binding arbitration
conducted before three arbitrators in accordance with the
commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration
Association, and judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof. In any arbitration, the parties shall be entitled to
conduct discovery in accordance with the applicable rules of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with such modifications
thereto as may be mutually agreeable to the parties unless the
arbitrators appointed to hear the case rule that discovery
should be limited in light of the particular dispute. In the
event the parties are unable to agree on the three arbitrators,
the parties shall select the tree arbitrators by striking
alternatively (the first to strike being chosen by lot) from a list
of 13 arbitrators designated by the American Arbitration
Association. Each of the parties to the arbitration shall bear
the cost of the arbitration (including reasonable attorneys'
fees) on such basis as the arbitrators of the matter shall
determine. The arbitrators shall be further authorized to take
whatever interim or temporary measures deemed necessary,
including injunctive relief and measures for the protection or
conservation of property. Such interim relief may take the
421. Marlins Agreement, supra note 234, at 12.
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form of an interim award, and the arbitrators may require
security for the costs of such measures. 422
b. Washington Nationals
4.3 Arbitration. Except for Litigable Matters, all disputes and
claims for damages between the Team and the Commission
arising out of this Agreement shall be resolved not by
litigation but rather by binding arbitration ("Arbitration") in
the District of Columbia before a panel of three (3)
independent arbitrators under the auspices and pursuant to the
rules of the American Arbitration Association. Any such
dispute shall be governed by the Commercial Arbitration
Rules then in effect. The Arbitration hearing will be
scheduled so that it is concluded within six months from the
date of the filing of the Arbitration and the panel shall render
its decision within one month after the closing of the hearing.
Arbitrators will be chosen under the usual procedures and
from the usual panels of the American Arbitration Association
except that none of the arbitrators shall have performed,
directly or indirectly, a material amount of work for the Team,
the Commission or the District Government within the five
year period immediately preceding the date of their selection
or intend or desire to perform work for the Team, the
Commission or the District Government within one year
following the date of their selection. Issues determined by
Arbitration pursuant to this provision shall be given preclusive
or collateral estoppel effect. Each Party shall bear its own
costs relating to the Arbitration except that the Arbitration
panel shall have the authority to award attorney's fees. The
costs and fees of the panel and the fees to the American
Arbitration Association shall be borne equally by the Team
and the Commission. 423
c. Houston Astros
5.1 Settlement by Mutual Agreement. In the event any
dispute, controversy or claim between or among the Parties
422. Cardinals Agreement, supra note 345, at 13-14.
423. Nationals Agreement, supra note 372, at art. 4.3.
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arises under this Non-Relocation Agreement or is connected
with or related in any way to this Non-Relocation Agreement
or an right, duty or obligation arising therefrom or the
relationship of the Parties thereunder (a "Dispute or
Controversy"), including, but not limited to, a Dispute or
Controversy relating to the effectiveness, validity,
interpretation, implementation, termination, cancellation or
enforcement of this Non-Relocation Agreement, the Parties
shall first attempt in good faith to settle and resolve such
Dispute or Controversy by mutual agreement in accordance
with the terms of this Section 5.1 In the event a Dispute or
Controversy arises, either Party shall have the right to notify
the other that it has elected to implement the procedures set
forth in this Section 5.1. Within fifteen (15) days after
delivery of any such notice by one Party to the other regarding
a Dispute or Controversy, the Sports Authority Representative
and Houston McLane Representative shall meet at a mutually
agreed time and place to attempt, with diligence and good
faith, to resolve and settle such Dispute or Controversy.
Should a mutual resolution and settlement not be obtained at
the meeting the Sports Authority Representative and Houston
McLane Representative for such purpose or should no such
meeting take place within such fifteen 915) day period, then
either Party may by notice to the other Party submit the
Dispute or Controversy to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of Section 5.2 and Appendix C. Upon the receipt
of notice of referral to arbitration hereunder, the receiving
Party shall be compelled to arbitrate the dispute or
Controversy in accordance with the terms of this Article 5 and
appendix C without regard to the justiciable character or
executory nature of such Dispute or Controversy.
5.2. Arbitration. Each Party hereby agrees that any Dispute
or Controversy which is not resolved pursuant to the
provisions of Section 5.1 may be submitted to binding
arbitration hereunder and if submitted shall be resolved
exclusively and finally through such binding arbitration. This
Article 5 and Appendix C constitute a written agreement by
the Parties to submit to arbitration any Dispute or Controversy
arising after the Effective Date within the meaning of Section
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171.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 424
7. Consent of Major League Baseball
a. Houston Astros
Section 7.3 Consent of Major League Baseball. Any
amendment to this Non-Relocation Agreement shall be
subject to and made in accordance with Major League
Baseball Rules and Regulations, to the extent applicable, all as
the same now exist or may be amended or adopted in the
future. Any such amendment to this Non-Relocation
Agreement that requires the consent of the Office of the
Commissioner o Baseball, the Commissioner, the National
League, the National League President, the Ownership
Committee or the Member Team is prohibited and shall be
null and void unless all applicable consents are obtained in
advance, and any such consent may be withheld at the sole
and absolute discretion of the Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball, the Commissioner, the National League, the
National League President, the Ownership Committee or the
Member Team, as applicable. 425
424. Astros Agreement, supra note 357, at 9-10.
425. Id. at 20.
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